Gramsci and Global Politics

The aim of this book is to explain and assess the relevance of the ideas of Gramsci to a world fundamentally transformed from that in which his thought was developed. It takes some of Gramsci’s best known concepts – hegemony, civil society, passive revolution, the national-popular, trasformismo, the integral state – and uses them creatively to analyse features of present-day politics, assessing to what extent his ideas can aid our understanding of the contemporary political world.

The book contains essays focused on: aspects of global politics (the development of a global civil society, the validity of the knowledge claims of neoGramscian International Relations specialists and the politics of the World Trade Organization and the Alternative Globalisation Movement); contemporary feminism and the problem of adjusting Gramsci’s theory of agency to modern conditions; Turkish and Israeli politics; and a series of essays on present-day British politics. The book concludes that while there remain considerable problems in applying Gramsci’s concepts to the contemporary world, his political thought still retains an attraction and validity that is likely to continue to inspire political analysts well into the future.

Bringing together a range of essays written by scholars and experts in the Gramsci and Global Politics: Hegemony and Resistance will be of vital interest to students and scholars of International Relations and Political Science, Sociology and History.

Mark McNally

intellectual history, ideology and rhetoric with a primary focus on twentiethcentury Ireland. John Schwarzmantel is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Leeds, and author of Ideology and Politics (2008). Routledge innovations in political theory

1 A Radical Green Political Theory

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2 Rational Woman

A feminist critique of dualism

Raia Prokhovnik

3 Rethinking State Theory

Mark J. Smith

4 Gramsci and Contemporary Politics

Beyond pessimism of the intellect

Anne Showstack Sassoon

5 Post-Ecologist Politics

Social theory and the abdication of the ecologist paradigm Ingolfur Blühdorn

6 Ecological Relations

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7 The Political Theory of Global Citizenship

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8 Democracy and National Pluralism

Edited by Ferran Requejo

9 Civil Society and Democratic Theory

Alternative voices

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10 Ethics and Politics in Contemporary Theory

Between critical theory and post-marxism

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Towards a new republic

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12 Multiculturalism, Identity and Rights

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13 Political Theory of Global Justice

A cosmopolitan case for the World State

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14 Democracy, Nationalism and Multiculturalism

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15 Political Reconciliation

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17 Power and Politics in Poststructuralist Thought New theories of the political

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Men, power and resistance

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Hegemony and resistance

Edited by Mark McNally and John Schwarzmantel

Gramsci and Global Politics

Hegemony and resistance

Edited by Mark McNally and

John Schwarzmantel

First published 2009

by Routledge

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Contents

Notes on contributors

ix

Acknowledgements

xii

Abbreviations

xiii

1 Introduction: Gramsci in his time and in ours

1

J O H N S C H W A R Z M A N T E L

PART I

Gramsci and the new world order

17

2 Beyond world order and transnational classes: the (re)application of Gramsci in global politics

19

O W E N W O R T H

3 Gramsci, epistemology and International Relations theory

32

J O S E P H F E M I A

4 Trasformismo at the World Trade Organization

42

B I L L P A T E R S O N

5 Gramsci’s inter nationalism, the national-popular and the Alternative Globalisation Movement

58

M A R K M C N A L L Y

PART II

Theorising the political

77

6 Gramsci and the problem of political agency

79

J O H N S C H W A R Z M A N T E L

7 Governing gender: the integral state and gendered subjection

93

G U N D U L A L U D W I G

viii Contents

8 Civil society and state in Turkey: a Gramscian perspective

107

H A S R E T D I K I C I - B I L G I N

9 Populism as counter-hegemony: the Israeli case

119

D A N I F I L C

PART III

Gramsci and contemporary British politics

135

10 Prince of modernisers: Gramsci, New Labour and the meaning of modernity

137

W I L L L E G G E T T

11 Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ and Gramsci’s ‘passive revolution’

156

J U L E S T O W N S H E N D

12 Feelbad Britain: a Gramscian view

173

P A T D E V I N E A N D D A V I D P U R D Y

13 Conclusion: the enduring attraction of Gramscian analysis

187

M A R K M C N A L L Y

Bibliography

200

Index

218

Contributors

Pat Devine is Honorary Research Fellow in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Manchester. Writing from a Marxist perspective, his main research interests are in participatory economic planning, ecological socialism, and the political economy of Britain since 1945. His publications include Democracy and Economic Planning (Polity Press, 1988), What On Earth Is To Be Done? (co-author, Red-Green Study Group, 1995), and Feelbad Brit- ain (forthcoming).

Hasret Dikici-Bilgin

sity in Istanbul in Turkey. Her main research interests include ideology and electoral politics.

Joseph Femia is Professor of Political Theory at the University of Liverpool. He is the author of several books, including Gramsci’s Political Thought (Clarendon Press, 1981), Marxism and Democracy (Oxford University Press, 1993), Machiavelli Revisited (University of Wales Press, 2004), and Pareto and Political Theory (Routledge, 2006). He has also published articles in a wide variety of academic journals, among them the British Journal of Polit- ical Science, Political Studies, Political Theory, and History and Theory. He has held Visiting Fellowships at Yale and Princeton Universities, and a Visiting Professorship at the European University Institute in Florence. Dani Filc is Senior Lecturer at the Department of Politics and Government, Ben Gurion University, Israel. He is the author of Hegemony and Populism in Israel (Resling, 2006), Circles of Exclusion: The Politics of Health in Israel (Cornell University Press, forthcoming) and The Political Right in Israel: The Many Faces of Jewish Populism (Routledge, forthcoming). Will Leggett is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Birmingham, where he researches and teaches in social theory and political sociology. He is the author of After New Labour: Social Theory and Centre-Left Politics (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

Gundula Ludwig is currently a PhD candidate and Assistant in the Political Sciences Department at the University of Vienna. She studied social sciences at the Universities of Vienna, Innsbruck, Berlin and New Orleans. Her research x Contributors

ical social theory. Her publications include ‘Gramscis Hegemonietheorie und die staatliche Produktion von vergeschlechtlichten Subjekten’ ( Das Argument 270, 2007) and articles on Foucault and feminist theory. Mark McNally is Visiting Fellow in the Department of Government at Essex University. His main research interests are Gramsci-inspired ideological and rhetorical analysis, contextualist approaches to the history of political thought, nationalism and republicanism. His empirical work focuses on twentiethcentury Irish intellectual history. He has published articles in the History of Political Thought, the European Journal of Political Theory and Nations and Nationalism.

Bill Paterson is currently a Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Stirling. His research interests include the mobilisation and power struggles between social forces from the local to the global level, which determine the policies and process of international organisations. He is currently editing his PhD thesis for publication with Routledge, entitled The World Trade Organ- ization and Protest Movements. In the autumn of 2008, he will be taking up a position at Strathclyde University, Scotland.

David Purdy is a social economist and former Head (now retired) of the Department of Applied Social Science at the University of Manchester. Politically active since the early 1960s, he is a member of Democratic Left Scotland and lives in Stirling. Recent publications include: Eurovision or American Dream? Britain, the Euro and the Future of Europe (Luath Press, 2003);

‘Social Policy’ in Mike Artis and Frederick Nixson (eds), The Economics of the European Union, 4th edn (Oxford University Press, 2007); and ‘Is Basic Income Viable?’, in Basic Income Studies (Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007). John Schwarzmantel is Senior Lecturer in Politics and Programme Director of the MA in Democratic Studies at the University of Leeds. His main interests his most recent publication is Ideology and Politics (Sage, 2008). Jules Townshend is Professor of Political Theory in the Department of Politics and Philosophy, Manchester Metropolitan University. His main areas of research interest focus on Marxism, post-Marxism and liberalism. His publications include J.A. Hobson (Manchester University Press, 1990); The Politics of Marxism (Leicester University Press, 1996); C.B. Macpherson and the Problem of Liberal democracy (Edinburgh University Press, 2000); Key Thinkers From Critical Theory to Post-Marxism (co-author with Simon Tormey, Sage, 2005). He has also written numerous articles and chapters in edited books on Marxist and liberal theory. He is on the editorial boards of Studies in Marxism and Capital and Class. Owen Worth is Lecturer in International Relations in the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Limerick, Ireland. He has published Contributors xi

in the general areas of Globalisation and International Political Economy and is the author of Hegemony, International Political Economy and Post- Communist Russia (Ashgate, 2005) and a number of co-edited collections. He has also published in International Politics, Third World Quarterly, Globaliza- tions, Capital and Class, Global Society and Review of International Studies. Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank all the participants who attended the section,

‘The Enduring Legacy of Antonio Gramsci: Theory, Politics, Society and Culture’ at the ECPR General Conference in Pisa, 6–8 September 2007, where this volume originated. Thanks are also due to the editorial and production team at Routledge, and especially the Politics Editor, Heidi Bagtazo, and the Editorial Assistant, Lucy Dunne. Mark McNally would like to acknowledge the generous support of the ESRC which allowed him to dedicate time to further research on Gramsci, and to work on his contributions to the book (Ref: PTA-026–27–1394). He is also grateful to Veronica Chafer-Soler for her help and support during the various editorial tasks.

Abbreviations

AFL-CIO

American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial Organisation

AGM

Alternative Globalisation Movement

Alter-NGO Alter-globalisation NGO

CIEL

Centre for International Environment Law

CTE

Committee on Trade and Environment

DDA

Doha Development Agenda

DSB

Dispute Settlement Body

DSU

Dispute Settlement Understanding

ECSC

European Coal and Steel Community

EMU

European Monetary Union

ESF

European Social Forum

EU

European Union

GATS

The General Agreement on Trade in Services

GATT

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

ICTSD

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development IGO

International governmental organisation

IMF

International Monetary Fund

IO

International organisation

IPE

International Political Economy

IR

International Relations

Ma-NGO

Market-oriented NGO

NGO

Non-governmental organisation

OECD

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PCd’I

Partito Communista d’Italia

PSI

Partito Socialista Italiano

TRIMS

Trade Related Investment Measures

TRIPS

Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights

WB

World Bank

WSF

World Social Forum

1

Introduction

Gramsci in his time and in ours

John Schwarzmantel

Gramsci in his time

The purpose of this volume of essays is to examine the relevance of the ideas of Antonio Gramsci to a world transformed radically from that in which his writings were conceived. Just over 70 years after Gramsci’s death in 1937, it is timely to probe the question of whether the ideas of one of the master-thinkers of the twentieth century still have the power to illuminate political and cultural ci’s life from 1891 to 1937 spanned some of the most turbulent and formative events of the twentieth century: the First World War, the Russian Revolutions of 1917 (February and October), the growth and coming to power of Fascism in Italy and later in Germany, the formation of Communist parties throughout Europe as part of the Communist International, seen as an agent of world revolution, and the failure of revolution, inspired by the Bolshevik model, to spread beyond the borders of what became the Soviet Union. There is no doubting the be known as ‘Western Marxism’, a branch of Marxist thought which sought to the prospects for revolution there. Along with other ‘Western Marxists’ like those of the Frankfurt School, but with a perspective very distinct from their working-class movement in Western Europe and the rise of Fascism, and attempted to draw lessons from that defeat by suggesting a different way of challenging the existing order. The purpose of this introduction is to pose the question of the continuing relevance of Gramsci’s writings, by presenting some of his key ideas, assessing their reception in the English-speaking world and politics.

The main themes of Gramsci’s thought were developed in close connection activist. They can be summarised as a deep concern with the importance of 2 J. Schwarzmantel

culture and of intellectuals in civil society; the creative role of the working-class movement and its potential emergence from a subaltern or dominated position to istics of Western Europe compared with the society in which the Bolshevik revolution had taken place. The impact of these ideas was only felt some considerable time after Gramsci’s death, and, at least in the English-speaking world, was all the more forceful precisely because of that time-lag and because of the particular context in which they were received. Gramsci’s most extensive, Prison

Notebooks, written under conditions of censorship and illness, and with highly defeat of the working-class movement, but a personal struggle to rise above the conditions of imprisonment and produce something, as Gramsci wrote, ‘ für ewig’ (for ever), without ever knowing whether those notebooks would survive and see the light of day and be read by a wider public. Indeed, they were precisely notebooks, with a series of thoughts, some brief, others developed at greater length, on a whole range of topics to do with politics, philosophy, culture, history and the nature of Marxism (referred to always as ‘the philosophy of praxis’, as a code word to defeat or elude the censor). The rediscovery of Gramsci

In the English-speaking world, it was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that Gramsci’s ideas became more widely known. The publication in 1971 of Selec- tions from the Prison Notebooks made his ideas available to a wider audience, and it is the context of that time which needs some further explanation, since it differed not only from that of Gramsci’s own time (and place), but from that of today, in which we have to reassess the applicability of some of the core Gramscian concepts. Why did Gramsci’s ideas have such resonance in the particular conditions of Western Europe and especially Britain in the late 1960s and 1970s?

This was a time when the Cold War orthodoxies of rigid dogmatic Communism, on the one hand, and ‘free world’ liberalism on the other, were being undermined in a host of ways. The impact of the movements of 1968 throughout Europe and North America gave space for a range of radical aspirations, challenging the established order. The rebirth of feminism, the urban riots in the United States and the international protests against the Vietnam War all witclass movements but also for a host of new social movements that mobilised around new political issues and agencies. All those developments were occurring in what, in the language of Cold War politics, was referred to as ‘the free world’. With respect to the Soviet bloc, equally epochal developments had taken place, starting with Khrushchev’s ‘secret speech’ of 1956 on the crimes of Stalin, the attempts at liberalisation of Communist one-party rule initiated by the ‘Polish October’ and the revolution in Hungary in that same year, leading later to the Introduction

3

‘Czech Spring’ and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1968. These movements challenged orthodox Soviet Marxism in both theory and practice. They revealed the aspiration to a revision of Marxism, opposing Marxism-Leninism in the name of a humanistic Marxism, often related to Marx’s early writings (the 1844 or ‘Paris Manuscripts’ above all, contrasted with the ‘later Marx’ of Capital). The themes of this Marxist revival included an emphasis on human agency, the concept of alienation and the possibility of human beings rediscovering what Marx called their ‘species being’ by throwing off the rigid chains of orthodox established systems, whether those of the capitalist West or the monolithic dogmatic party orthodoxy of Soviet-style MarxismLeninism. emergence of new radical movements in civil society that Gramsci’s ideas gained a wider currency on the European Left. With its stress on culture and ideas, Gramsci’s analysis of ‘hegemony’, his key concept, opened the way to a tionism. His form of cultural Marxism pointed out, in ways relatively underemphasised in earlier versions of Marxism, the extension of power relations beyond the state and the economy into civil society, where a particular conception of the world was privileged and would have to be challenged before any seizure of political power could be envisaged. Gramsci had no knowledge of the 1844 writings of the ‘early Marx’ with their themes of alienation and species-being. of historical materialism that claimed to have the ‘key’ to history by offering a Marxism. It emphasised a creative view of human agency, free from any idea that human beings were merely passive bearers of economic forces. After all, it revolution ‘against (Marx’s book) Das Kapital’, and in so doing ‘they live Marxist thought . . . which in the case of Marx was contaminated by positivist and naturalist encrustations’ (Gramsci 1977: 34). Thus the circulation or popularisation of Gramsci’s ideas to a wider audience occurred, at least initially, at a time of hope and optimism, from the point of view of radical movements. His ideas were seized on as showing that Marxist thought was not to be simplistibetween Russia in 1917 and the situation of Western societies opened the way to a type of Marxism relevant to the developed ‘civil society’ of contemporary liberal-democracy where revolution had to take different forms: in Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed.

(Gramsci 1971: 238)

4 J. Schwarzmantel

Two examples can be given of the way in which Gramsci’s ideas were utilised and appropriated in the period of their initial wider diffusion, before discussing whether those ideas are still applicable in the changed circumstances of phenomenon of ‘Eurocommunism’, when the mass Communist parties of Western Europe, notably the Italian and Spanish parties, with the French party lagging some way behind in this process, asserted their own ‘road to socialism’

distinct from that of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). In the heyday, brief though it was, of ‘Eurocommunism’ the dominant themes were those of ‘polycentrism’, ‘national roads to socialism’, and respect or recognition of pluralism. These themes highlighted the distinct nature of liberal-democratic politics in Western Europe and its difference from the countries of what was then the Soviet bloc. They were Gramscian themes to the extent that they recognised the importance of ‘civil society’ and the need to establish a ‘presence’

within its institutions and gain support for radical ideas. Eurocommunist perworking in factories in conditions of ‘Fordist’ mass production) as inappropriate to the liberal-democratic context of Western politics. Writing in the late 1970s, son, then editor of New Left Review, wrote that ‘If one political ancestry is more widely and insistently invoked than any other for the new perspectives of “Eurocommunism”, it is that of Gramsci’. And in the same passage Anderson stated that

the great mass Communist Parties of Western Europe – in Italy, in France, in Spain – are now on the threshold of a historical experience without precethe framework of bourgeois-democratic states, without the allegiance to a horizon of ‘proletarian dictatorship’ beyond them that was once the touchstone of the Third International. (Anderson 1976/7: 6)

Over 30 years later, with the disappearance (in Italy) or marginalisation (in France and Spain) of those ‘great mass Communist Parties’, it is impossible to avoid the question of ‘what went wrong’, and the implications of this for Gramsci’s ideas and analysis. If the initial reception of his ideas was focused on his realisation of the complexity of contemporary liberal-democracy and the need for a ‘war of position’ to engage with that complexity, why did that perspective not yield more fruitful results? What are the implications of the failure of Eurocommunism and its Gramscian perspective for the relevance of Gramsci’s ideas The second example of the way in which Gramsci’s ideas were creatively applied in and soon after the period of their initial discovery is taken from the British context. It was in the analysis of ‘Thatcherism’ and its wider resonances Introduction

5

that Gramsci’s perspectives seemed particularly appropriate. The ‘time of hope’

discussed above with reference to the movements of 1968 had given way in Britain to the period of Conservative governments following the victory of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. It soon became clear that this was a Conservative government different from its more moderate predecessors, and that it was guided by a distinct ideology. This ideology sought to ‘roll back’ the state, at least in the economic sphere, giving priority to market principles, even though the ‘free market’ required a ‘strong state’ to enforce its principles, in the classic analysis him who found inspiration in Gramsci’s ideas to develop an analysis of the spefrom its articulation of a new ‘common sense’, a form of ‘authoritarian populism’ that achieved a temporary hegemony which the Left had severely underestimated. This analysis was much more concerned with the dynamics of ideology in civil society. It used a framework derived from Gramsci to point out the ways in which the Thatcher governments relied on consent, and how they were able to achieve such consent by playing on and heightening certain themes which resonated with established ‘common sense’. In turn the implication was that the parties of the Left would have to engage with and challenge this

‘common sense’ if they were to have any chance of gaining power and of renewing themselves. Hall spoke of ‘the hard road to renewal’ (Hall 1988), and of the creative power of Gramsci’s ideas to analyse the situation in which the British Left found itself. The themes of the Prison Notebooks defeat of socialism by Fascism and to develop a new political strategy, were now employed to analyse a modern (British) form of Conservative politics and to indicate ways in which its ideology had percolated and drawn on the sphere of civil society whose importance Gramsci had emphasised. The question which has to be posed now is that which underlies the essays collected in the present volume and which is its raison d’être: how has the world the time (post-Second World War) of the reception of those ideas by a wider audience? Do such changes render Gramsci’s ideas irrelevant, or do his ideas offer insights and perspectives which can illuminate the different political and social world in which we now live? If the latter is the case (and this is the premise of the present volume), then does this impose on us a ‘new reading’ or a rereading of Gramsci in the light of changed conditions, and what forms might this new reading take? The discussion here follows the three main parts which organise the subsequent essays: the international context, themes of political agency and organisation, and the changed context of British politics, seen as symptomatic of wider more global changes in politics and society. Why read Gramsci? What does he have to offer us in the new context of global politics?

What are the ‘problem areas’ of contemporary politics, and in what ways can analysis of Gramsci’s political theory prove fruitful in a world which has changed so much since his own time? As the title of one recent book tells us, Gramsci Is Dead (Day 2005) – but do his ideas live on in helping us make sense 6 J. Schwarzmantel

of the real world of contemporary politics? To adapt the title of a famous work written by Benedetto Croce, the Italian philosopher with whose ideas Gramsci had such a sustained critical engagement: ‘what is living and what is dead in the thought of Antonio Gramsci?’

Gramsci and the new world order

those working in this area, and which focus on the key question of the conthe core concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘passive revolution’, can be applied in the his ideas in ways he did not envisage. The second issue goes further: even if there is nothing intrinsically illegitimate in such an application, in what ways have the international system and the nature of the world economy changed so radically as to require tools of analysis that a form of Marxism developed in the questions form the testing-ground and area of debate for the current relevance of Gramsci’s ideas. A world in which globalisation appears to constitute the new paradigm and dominant ideology (Steger 2005b), and in which the nation-state seems (at least to some) less important as the framework for political action, appears to constitute a challenge to Gramsci’s apparently more ‘national’ frame of analysis, while simultaneously also suggesting that the sphere of international relations and a new global economy are ‘where the action is’ in our contemporary world. Does Gramscian analysis have anything to offer to this globalised world of neo-liberal dominance? Can terms such as ‘hegemony’ and ‘passive revolution’ be legitimately developed as critical concepts in this area, other than to refer to a straightforward and relatively banal idea of US hegemony in the post-Cold War world?

or ‘the Italian school’ clearly believe that Gramsci’s analysis can be developed to make sense of a new structure of international power and a new world system. refers to a new structure or world order, in which a particular economic order and a corresponding way of organising social life are dominant or hegemonic on an international level. In the words of one of the original members of this socalled ‘Italian school’, Robert Cox, ‘A world hegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class’ (Cox 1983: 171). Cox also observes that ‘World hegemony is describable as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three’ (Cox 1983: 171–2). The claim that is made is thus that contemporary world politics and Introduction

7

international relations have to be understood as taking place within a particular global structure in which one model of society is hegemonic, a model of society involved in these debates argue about the extent to which a form of neoliberalism, in which market relations are the paradigm of all social relations, has been imposed on all actors (state and non-state) in the world system. Such a way organisations as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The whole debate, therefore, relates to the concept of ‘world hegemony’ and its changing nature. Robert Cox uses ‘neo-liberalism’ in a different sense from interests, organised labour, and government – the neo-liberal historic bloc’ (Cox 1993: 265). He suggests that ‘The Thatcher–Reagan model’ broke up this corporatist consensus, and that such a model is better described as ‘hyperliberalism’, equivalent to ‘the ideology of globalisation in its most extreme form’

(Cox 1993: 272). Other authors analyse the historical transformations of world hegemony, from the Westphalia system of state sovereignty with Holland as its initiator, through ‘free trade imperialism’ under British hegemony to the postSecond World War period of the ‘free enterprise system’ under the leadership of the United States (Arrighi, 1993). Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, extended to the international sphere, has thus proved to be an indispensable tool for describing and analysing world politics. The issue is whether and in what ways the current world order can be described as a hegemonic one, in the sense of a particular model of state, economy and society being diffused on a global level and imposed by regulatory institutions and organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank which could be viewed as part of a global civil society. Global civil society can also be seen as part of ‘the solution’ rather than ‘the problem’, if the term is taken to refer to potentially counter-hegemonic movements such as the Alternative Globalisation Movement, which is analysed in the chapters by McNally and Paterson in this volume.

The claim to relevance for Gramsci’s analysis is thus that a particular way of life, rooted in the economic system of the free market, is now dominant on a world level. His own analysis, developed in the different, less globalised world of early twentieth-century Italy, clearly did not encapsulate terms such as globalisation and neo-liberalism. Nevertheless, his historical analysis showed how the ideas of the French Revolution spread throughout Europe. They constituted the directing or leading ideas of the nineteenth century, expressed with most vigour by the Jacobins in the course of the French Revolution. His analysis suggested that Italy was backward in picking up on such modern ideas, and that the Risorgimento, lay in the absence of a native group that had the same determination as the Jacobins in France. In the same way, on the international level, the world today is marked by the phenomenon of ‘uneven development’, and the 8 J. Schwarzmantel

states and societies which have to conform to this hegemonic structure, policed by a global civil society and its key economic and social institutions. Gramsci himself had an acute awareness of how peripheral capitalist states such as Italy, and indeed particular areas within such states like the Italian South, suffered because of the global phenomenon of uneven development. There are those (as in the essay by Femia in the present volume) who are sceptical of the applicability of Gramscian analysis to the sphere of international relations. They suggest (as Femia does) that Gramsci in his own writings was more of a ‘realist’ in his analysis of relations between states, and that therefore he cannot be enlisted in the ranks of those critical of neo-realism, as authors like Mark Rupert seek to do (Rupert 1995). Other equally sceptical positions are taken up by those (Germain and Kenny 1998) who maintain that Gramsci deployed his analysis of hegemony in the particular context of the nation-state, and with special reference to Italy. On their line of argument, Gramsci’s concern lay in challenging the dominant ideas or hegemonic concepts, and forming a new historic bloc or constellation of social forces to create an alternative set of ideas which could win the consent of large strata of the (national) population as a necessary condition for taking over power. But where, such critics ask, is a task at the international level? The implication of such criticisms seems to be any case so different from that of his original writings. The answer to such critics has to be that Gramsci was indeed aware of the international dimension of politics, and that it is precisely the spreading on an international or global level of one conception of the world that shows what he meant by hegemony. One of the neo-Gramscians mentioned above (Mark Rupert) quotes to good effect the statement from the Prison Notebooks that Every relationship of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various forces of which the complexes of national and continental civilisations. (Gramsci 1971: 350)

The implication here is not that Gramsci was anticipating Samuel Huntington’s

‘clash of civilisations’ thesis, but that he was aware of the international dimension of hegemony, and this is the theme taken up by much of the more exciting national economy, some of which is discussed in Worth’s chapter in this volume. Indeed, so it is argued here, the notion of an international structure of power which presents one neo-liberal model of society as the only acceptable one and which penalises dissenters from this vision, is a framework which is helpful in describing the contemporary world. That world can be fully analysed only by Introduction

9

using Gramsci’s ideas of the all-pervasive dominance of a worldview which gains people’s consent. The chapter below by Worth takes a more positive view than does Femia of the use of Gramscian perspectives in international relations and international economy, and the different stances taken by these two scholars Similar debates arise with respect to the question of agency and ‘counterhegemony’ at the international level. One recent commentator remarks that Gramsci’s historical approach and his concern with language make ‘Gramsci especially relevant in a world of debates about postmodernism, new social movements and globalisation’ (Ives 2004: 128). Gramsci’s analysis was originbut with the forging of an alternative, a challenge to that hegemony. Leaving it be envisaged in a global context? What are the agencies and forces that could bring such a challenge to the new world order into being? The issue here is whether new forces, such as those of the Alternative Globalisation Movement, could constitute what one writer calls a ‘postmodern Prince’ (Gill 2000). This is a coalition of forces very different from the agency which Gramsci himself gaining consent to an alternative model of the social order. Some authors talk of a possible counter-hegemonic bloc as possibly including ‘Amnesty International, Green parties and ecological groups, socialist think-tanks like the Transnational Institute, peace groups such as European Nuclear Disarmament, development agencies such as Oxfam, and religious organisations such as the World Council of Churches’ (Gill and Law 1993: 122). To that list, compiled in 1993, one might now want to add the Alternative Globalisation Movement and its periodic gatherings at such venues as Porto Alegre, Seattle and Genoa. Clearly, there are important problems here: Gramsci envisaged a movement of the working class, in which the political party (his concept of the ‘modern Prince’) would play a leading role, even if his view of the party differed from that of orthodox Leninism, itself a claim which has been contested. Those who envisage an alternative

‘cosmopolitanism from below’ see a different agency, not so much based on the working class. The Alternative Globalisation Movement has less of a clear ideological base. It is more heterogeneous and less explicitly Marxist in its social philosophy, but is still seen by some, for example in Paterson’s chapter in this volume, as the bearer of a challenge to dominant neo-liberalism. There is certainly scope for argument about whether such an agency of opposiarise over the issue of whether the overtly internationalist perspective of the Alternative Globalisation Movement can be reconciled with the emphasis on the

‘national-popular’ character which Gramsci insisted was a vital requirement of resistance. This issue of the problematic nexus between ‘the international’ and the section of the present volume by McNally which sets out to clarify to what extent 10 J. Schwarzmantel

Gramsci’s concept of the ‘national-popular’ redundant. He argues instead that scholars of international relations and those focusing on international civil society still have much to learn from Gramsci and from his understanding of the national dimensions of political action. The implication is that the analysis of contemporary politics on a global level needs the Gramscian terms of hegemony and of movements challenging that hegemony (Gramsci himself never used the term counter-hegemony) to make sense of current developments. The essays in Part I of the current volume thus seek to take these debates forward in their analysis of the present world order and the ways in which it might be challenged, as well as assessing the nature of Gramsci’s perspective on international relations and the value of extending his concepts beyond the national frame of reference. Problems of political analysis

Similar problems arise with respect to the Gramscian analysis of politics in general. Part of the rediscovery of Gramsci analysed above involved the realisation that here was a theorist in the Marxist tradition who did not reduce ‘the the phenomena of political leadership and organisation. As Gramsci observed in a study of Machiavelli is the question of politics as an autonomous science’

(Gramsci 1971: 136). It is clear that the attractiveness of Gramsci’s ideas stems in large part, as already noted, from his realisation of the distinct character of politics in liberal-democratic societies, as witnessed by his emphasis on what he calls the ‘trenches’ and ‘earthworks’ of civil society which would have to be

‘captured’ before any socialist movement would have a chance of success. Here again, however, the problem that has to be confronted is that of the ways in which the world has changed since Gramsci grappled with these problems, and whether such changes invalidate the general lines of his analysis. First comes the problem of agency, in the broadest sense: however much Gramsci was innovative with respect to the classical Marxist tradition in his emphasis on culture and in his recognition of the autonomy of the political, he remained an orthodox Marxist in his belief that it would be the working class that would furnish the crucial social basis for a revolutionary movement. Whatever might have been his differences from the Leninist idea of a ‘vanguard party’, Gramsci had no doubt that a political party was necessary to lead a radical movement. Such a party would constitute the ‘modern Prince’, a collecthad envisaged for ‘the Prince’ in his own time. Are these Gramscian perspectives still relevant? Those who give a negative answer to this question would of the (traditionally conceived) working class in precisely those societies of liberal-democracy on which Gramsci had focused his attention. Some of these Introduction 11

issues are discussed in Schwarzmantel’s chapter below, and also by Leggett with

‘difference’, of the growth of new social movements and of ‘identity politics’, as well as a growing scepticism towards mass political parties and indeed to politics in general, what do Gramsci’s ideas have to offer? The question becomes more acute in the light of the conditions of post-Cold War politics. One does not history’ to recognise that Marxist ideas are confronted with severe problems, in large part because the collective agency (the organised proletariat) on which those ideas relied for their realisation is a far weaker force in the conditions of contemporary politics.

Similar problems are raised with the fundamental concepts which Gramsci used to explore the complexities of Western politics, the state and, above all, civil society. Dikici-Bilgin’s chapter in this volume analyses clearly some of the complexity of Gramsci’s notion of civil society. Her analysis of the Turkish situation shows the usefulness of a Gramscian analysis for understanding current developments, while also demonstrating that for Gramsci state and civil society were not necessarily antithetical in their relationship. Gramsci’s famous concept of ‘the war of position’ was meant to suggest a strategy for gaining power in such systems. He wrote of ‘the massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society’

(Gramsci 1971: 243) which would have to be captured by a counter-hegemonic movement aiming to take power and establish its own hegemony, which is how he envisaged the aim of the working-class movement. Among the many problems posed by this perspective in the conditions of contemporary politics we can build up a counter-hegemonic movement in contemporary liberal-democratic society. In Gramsci’s perspective, ‘the philosophy of praxis’ (Marxism) constituted the new Weltanschauung which could potentially capture mass support, in the same way as the Reformation had constituted itself as a genuinely popular movement compared with the more elitist circles of the Renaissance. However, even neglecting the ways in which Marxism in present-day politics has become associated with the failures of Soviet-style Communism, a broader problem is clear. This is that civil society in contemporary liberal-democracy may be less open to oppositional or contesting ideas than used to be the case. If the mass media magnates like Rupert Murdoch and Silvio Berlusconi, then where can the institutional space arise for oppositional or critical ideas which could challenge the trivialisation and personalisation of politics which are so evident in the politics of the contemporary world? This raises questions concerning the availability of spaces in civil society for the counter-hegemonic movement which Gramsci himself envisaged.

The second problem in this context refers again to the broad question of political agency and of identities in the modern world. Do Gramsci’s ideas allow enough space for the plurality of identities and for the range of different social 12 J. Schwarzmantel

movements evident in contemporary politics? Reference should be made here to his idea of the uomo collettivo or collective man, as a collective being which would infuse people with a sense of belonging. The question that is posed here is whether Gramsci wanted to replace one dominant hegemony (that of the bourgeoisie) with another (that of the proletariat and its allies), and whether such ideas have any purchase in a political setting which exalts both pluralism (many identities are on offer in contemporary society, and people can select more than one of them) and individualism, the latter taking the guise of consumerism, in which individuals are ‘interpellated’, as Althusser would put it, as sovereign consumers in a market. In such a situation, the civil society which Gramsci suggests is the terrain for the ‘war of position’ would seem rather to disaggregate the collective identity which he was seeking to foster in the name of the ‘philosophy of praxis’. Civil society would thus furnish not so much a terrain of opposition, still less revolution, but more a means of absorbing any critical movement, in a process like the trasformismo characteristic of Italian politics. This term refers to the ability of leaders of the existing system to ‘cream off’ the leaders of any potential opposition movement, or, more broadly, the capacity of the system to absorb any challenge. Icons of the revolutionary Che Guevara become fashionable decorations sold in the shops; the very word ‘revolution’

itself becomes a label used to sell a range of goods ranging from bikes to winebars. The idea of a cohesive movement based on the working class belongs to

‘old-style politics’ which have no purchase in a more diverse society, in which different identities and movements compete for people’s attention. Such a society would seem to be one in which Gramscian concepts of opposition and challenge would have little purchase.

These are problems which have to be confronted in any discussion of the relevance of Gramsci today, and which the chapters in Part II of the present collection seek to deal with in their different ways. By way of general introduction it can be said that it is precisely Gramscian concepts which allow one to get a hold on the problems of contemporary politics and illuminate them. Gramsci’s concept of a ‘historic bloc’ opens up the problem of agency: in his own time he suggested (with respect to the Italian situation) an alliance between northern working class and southern peasantry, and the need for organic intellectuals to emerge from this movement, rooted in the particular circumstances of the

‘national-popular’, to take up again this key Gramscian concept discussed above. Another essay in the present volume, by the Israeli scholar Dani Filc, offers an illuminating analysis of populism in the context of recent Israeli politics, showing the way in which a populist movement could function in a counter-hegemonic capacity, in ways different from the ones which Gramsci envisaged. The implication for the circumstances of our own time could be that another historic bloc would need to be constituted, more diverse, more on the lines of the social movements which bring together citizens in ways that politsociety: this still forms the terrain or the ambit of political action in modern politics, but Gramsci’s analysis needs to be developed, not merely reproduced, Introduction 13

to show the processes of diffusion of dominant ideas, and investigate whether there is a ‘public space’ within which they could be challenged. The chapters gathered in the second part of the present volume seek to perform this task of

‘updating’ Gramsci’s analyses, by adapting his concepts to the changed circumstances of contemporary politics. A historic bloc may need to take a quite different shape in the conditions of postmodern diversity which contrast with those of Gramsci’s own time. The chapter by Gundula Ludwig seeks to unite Gramscian analysis of the state with the feminist analysis of gender relations, by combining Gramsci’s ideas with those of the contemporary feminist scholar Judith Butler. Ludwig extends to the sphere of gender Gramsci’s insistence that contemporary systems of power are maintained not so much by force but more by consent. Such ideas seem even more relevant in our own time than in his, with the expansion of the mass media and the greater range of channels through which a conception of the world is diffused and imposed on the citizens of modern democracy. Problems of the nature of agency, the openness of civil society to oppositional ideas, and the structures available for affecting people’s consciousness are indeed, it is argued here, problems for Gramscian analysis, but they are also problems which can be analysed through Gramscian concepts, as long as they are used in an open and creative way. Such an adaptation of Gramsci’s ideas may be the best way of being faithful to his style of thought, since Gramsci himself insisted that Marxism had to relate to the reality of society and be open to its historical transformations, rather than imposing one dogmatic model on to that reality.

Gramsci in Britain: from Thatcher to New Labour

lution of politics in Britain. As stated above, the impact of reading Gramsci in the British context made itself felt in the use of his concepts to analyse the pheThis was, and remains, of interest not purely for parochial British reasons, but as providing an example of the creative application of Gramsci’s ideas to analyse a posed: taking Britain as an example, can Gramsci’s political ideas be used to good effect in a political situation different both from that of his own times and the period of the 1980s when Thatcherism was rampant, setting the tone for the Prime Minister. The question is thus raised of whether Gramscian concepts have any purchase on these developments, and, if so, whether they illuminate wider processes of interest beyond the context of the UK. Debate on New Labour and on what has (in rather ‘on and off’ ways) been proclaimed as its guiding ideology of ‘the Third Way’ has focused on whether New Labour is a continuation of Thatcherism (‘Thatcher without a handbag’, as 14 J. Schwarzmantel

one description proposes), or whether it represents a break with its predecessor, and a genuine renewal of social democracy appropriate to the changed condefenders and initiators of ‘the Third Way’, notably by Anthony Giddens, who has suggested that we are in a world ‘beyond Left and Right’ where traditional categories of socialist thought no longer apply (Giddens 1994a). If true, this would presumably consign Gramsci and his outlook to the ‘dustbin of history’, central role of the working class and its allies in a revolutionary movement. The chapters in this volume by Townshend and Leggett offer contrasting perspectives on the Third Way. Townshend is highly critical of Giddens and his Third Way perspective, seeing it as a form of ‘passive revolution’ which continues in the line of Thatcherism. Leggett, on the other hand, argues that ideas associated with the Third Way did represent an attempt to come to grips with real changes in the contemporary world, such as the growing individualisation of present-day society. Hence he suggests that some of those ideas could form Thus in a broader sense Gramsci’s ideas still provide a conceptual framework for dealing with recent developments in British politics, and analysing their question is whether ideas of New Labour and the Third Way are best seen as evidence of the hegemony of neo-liberalism, as a way of eliciting consent to the existing neo-liberal order. In debating this issue, fruitful use can be made of further concepts in the Gramscian conceptual armoury, that of trasformismo New Labour can be seen as a means of ‘selling’ a form of neo-liberalism, remains of the traditional labour movement to this new reality. ‘Passive revolution’ for Gramsci was a concept which pointed to movements which used revolutionary rhetoric while seeking to maintain the existing order in its essential features. In his analysis of the Italian Risorgimento Gramsci was highly critical of the Action Party, the democratic wing of the Risorgimento, for remaining subordinate to the Moderate Party and accepting the latter’s intellectual and political leadership of the movement for Italian national unity and selfdetermination. The question could thus be posed whether the whole New break with the existing order and instead to accept the hegemony of neo-liberal New Labour ideologues and politicians would be the contemporary equivalent of the Action Party. The case of the British Labour Party would be exemplary in showing the continued hegemony of a particular ‘world order’ along the lines discussed above in the section on international politics. The intention here is not to settle this issue, but to suggest that terms derived from the Gramscian vocabulary provide necessary intellectual tools for coming to grips with these questions. In so doing, Marxist political theory can be developed in precisely Introduction 15

the way Gramsci himself sought to extend it: by applying it to a particular historical and political situation, and investigating its potentialities without any dogmatic expectation of a particular outcome.

Whatever the analysis of New Labour and the Third Way, analysis of British politics from a Gramscian perspective raises a further question, also of wider systems. What are the possibilities for parties and movements that seek to challenge the existing framework of these systems and to attract citizens to alternative perspectives, broadly within the socialist tradition? This is a question taken volume, that of Devine and Purdy. They take issue with contemporary New Labour perspectives by painting a picture of ‘Feelbad Britain’, where commitment to a public sphere has been fragmented by the Thatcher revolution and its continuation by Blair and Gordon Brown. Devine and Purdy’s essay is an exercise in what they call ‘applied Gramscianism’, and calls for the development of a renewed Left as an agent of ‘democratic renaissance’. Gramsci himself, as noted above, sought to analyse how a new philosophy could take hold of the masses and lay the basis for a different society. He was concerned with the role of the state (and civil society too) in helping to create a different culture and a different type of civilisation. His remarks on the role of the state, cited in Ludwig’s chapter below, are worth quoting here: Educative and formative role of the State. Its aim is always that of creating new and higher types of civilisation; of adapting the ‘civilisation’ and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production; hence of evolving even physically new types of humanity.

(Gramsci 1971: 242)

In a society in which there is much debate about what the role of the state should be, if it has any role at all, in educating its citizens, these words of Gramsci are very relevant. If present-day society in Britain (but not only there) is one in which its youth engage in ‘binge-drinking’ and have ‘anti-social behaviour orders’ (ASBOs) imposed on them by the authorities, is it the task of the state to have an ‘educative and formative role’, and what would this mean in practical hold the society together, and are these the rightful preserve of the state, or does this open the way to a totalitarian state which threatens the values of liberalevery State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes. (Gramsci 1971: 258)

16 J. Schwarzmantel

He then went on to discuss the school and the law courts as the ‘most important State activities in this sense’. He saw the former as having a positive educative function, while the latter played a repressive and negative role (Gramsci 1971: 258). Questions of social cohesion and education in the broadest sense form the stuff of debate of contemporary liberal-democracy. In this sense Gramsci’s ideas remain highly relevant, raising problems of the role of the state and civil society in educating citizens and developing a sense of common culture. whether narrowly political or more broadly active in the sphere of civil society, which could function as critics of the existing social and political order. Politics in Britain, and indeed in most contemporary liberal-democracies, seems to move within quite a restricted range of ideas, at least as far as the mainstream parliamentary parties are concerned. Ideas of socialist revolution, preceded by the capture of the sphere of civil society by movements representing alternative philosophies, seem of little immediate relevance to these societies. In those respects the ideas of Gramsci do seem to belong to a past that has gone. Nevertheless, in a broader sense, his awareness of the importance of language, of the ways in which a particular concept of the world is diffused through a whole range of channels, seems more relevant than ever to the contemporary world. The essays which follow seek to engage with these debates and broader questions of the nature of power in the contemporary world by employing concepts successful, and whether Gramsci’s ideas can help us understand a world which has changed radically from that of his own times.

Part I

Gramsci and the new world

order

2

Beyond world order and

transnational classes

The (re)application of Gramsci in

global politics

Owen Worth

For nearly 30 years, the work and ideas of Antonio Gramsci have been used to understand the practices and workings of international politics and, in recent years, have become increasingly prominent as a critical paradigm within the discipline of International Relations (IR). Indeed, the growth of work that borrows from Gramsci has risen to a level whereby dissertations and scholarly papers are produced annually that all seek to propel Gramscian concepts such as ‘hegemony’, ‘passive revolution’ to the larger spatial sphere of the international arena. which largely originated from the work of Robert Cox, before being developed by pioneers such as Stephen Gill and Kees van der Pijl through their respective concepts of ‘world order’ and the ‘transnational capitalist class’ (Cox 1987, 1996; Gill 1990, 1993b, 2003; van der Pijl, 1984, 1998). Scholars and students alike have found great use in taking these concepts and applying them to the contemporary processes of globalisation and global governance, but have often not recognised the distinct, unique and contested way that Gramscian concepts are employed within them (Germain and Kenny 1998; Worth 2008). The rise of neo-Gramscianism in IR has certainly added greater depth to the ways in which Gramscian theory is interpreted and applied, but the validity and manner of its execution have attracted a great deal of criticism, both from within the discipline of IR itself and from those who have been prominent in developing Gramsci’s ideas in political theory (Bellamy 1990; Germain and Kenny 1998; Femia 2005). These criticisms are largely centred on the viability of applying Gramsci’s concepts to international politics, when Gramsci himself focused might work at an international level (Gramsci 1971: 174–7, 240–1). The purpose of this chapter is to critically outline the ways in which Gramscian concepts have contributed to debates within International Relations, and in particular within its sub-discipline International Political Economy. Whilst I which these have been applied and in particular how they have been developed, I do not follow the arguments developed by Femia that concepts such as hegemony cannot be transposed to the international/global arena (Femia 2005). Rather, 20 O. Worth

contest certain orthodox approaches that were dominant within IR at the time and, second, that it was used in a way to develop further critical positions and ideas that have been strongly associated with Cox and Gill on the one hand, and van der Pijl on the other. My main concern is that this has resulted in a largely top-down account of international politics that often ignores some of the complexities that exist within Gramscian thought. Furthermore, such accounts have largely been used as a distinct approach within IR, with notable Gramscian work

– often sidelined or not fully engaged with (Worth 2008). Rather than rejecting or criticising the applicability of Gramscian thought to the international arena, I argue that we need to go beyond current directions and engage with fuller concepts of Gramscian hegemony that have been favoured in other disciplines. By doing so, I believe that a wider and more inclusive understanding of globalisation and global civil society can be obtained. Hegemony, international politics and the Gramscian ‘turn’

As with much Gramscian research, the starting point for developing a Gramscian theory of IR is with his model of hegemony. As is well known, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony rests on the ability of a dominant class to form a consensual relationship with subaltern classes through a variety of social and cultural channels (Gramsci 1971: 55–60, 415–25). In international politics, the term hegemony has been a central concept since its development as a political term during the Peloponnesian wars in Ancient Greece. When IR appeared as a distinct discipline, hegemony took on greater theoretical prominence and became enshrined within the conservative school of realism that became prominent in the post-war understanding of international politics. Hegemony was perceived as a condition superiority. As a consequence, much orthodox IR theory uses hegemony as a key concept to explain how dominant states

systems (Keohane 1984; Gilpin 1987). For example, British supremacy in the nineteenth century and contemporary post-war US dominance can both be half of the twentieth century were non-hegemonic in international terms. From this, realists have argued that periods when a hegemon (hegemonic state) existed represent successful eras of stability, whilst eras when leading states have comberger 1981). After the post-Cold War period this position has been maintained, with both liberal (Ikenberry 2004) and conservative accounts (Ferguson 2003) 1

As a response to this literature, Cox argued that orthodox understandings of hegemony were merely reporting facts through the ahistorical lens of a ‘problemsolver’, as opposed to adopting an historical critical approach that looks at how tutional structures to complement them (Cox 1996: 97–101, 135–41). Here Cox Beyond world order and transnational classes 21

employs Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony and historical bloc to show how dominant states inspire an order which is conditioned through conducive ideas and a national’ hegemony is still one that is largely state-centric and one that does not Keohane’s realist and Cox’s critical account of history identify periods of hegemony followed by unstable periods where there is a lack of hegemony. material conditions.

Cox’s transportation of hegemony to the international arena can therefore be viewed as state-centric too; a charge that is made by sociologist William Robinson. For Robinson hegemony at the international level is generally used in four ways as (i) a realist model of international domination; (ii) a dominant nationstate that serves to ‘anchor’ and embed the capitalist world-system, an approach favoured by world-systems theorists;2 (iii) ideological or consensual forms of within a historical bloc (Robinson 2005). The third is the most generic in terms forging of hegemonic relationships between classes. Yet it is the fourth that is employed by Cox and applied largely by neo-Gramscian IR scholars. This topdown approach to hegemony became evident in Cox’s much heralded early pieces in the journal Millennium where he called for a form of critical historicism to understand the nature of power within international politics, arguing that a version of Gramsci’s account of hegemony would provide a more concrete understanding of this dynamic (Cox 1996: 124–7). He also suggested that in the absence of an international state, hegemony is maintained through international organisations, and it is through this mechanism that the dominant state transports its form of hegemonic strategy to the international community (Cox 1996: 137–40). Yet as Germain and Kenny remind us, much of this is problematic in terms of how an international hegemony might be created, fashioned and recreated (Germain and Kenny 1998). What is important to note, however, is that Gramsci was only a part of a wide range of sources used in a critique, intended to move beyond the structural Marxism of Poulantzas and Althusser that was popular in social science at the time (Cox 1996: 96). Alongside Gramsci, Cox turned to the work of diverse social theorists such as Polanyi, Braudel, Vico and E.H. Carr in order to imagine a potential alternative ontology to the Cold War positivist one, inherent in orthodox IR theory.

The majority of those who have followed ‘Coxian theory’ (in other words, those who have been labelled neo-Gramscians) have produced empirically rich studies, which have developed Cox’s earlier work on hegemony by placing them understanding of world order in his 1987 book, Production, Power and World 22 O. Worth

Order

production shaped through particular and unique historical processes. Since then, this form of historicism has been developed to explain how the contemporary world order has emerged (for a broad overview see Gill and Mittelman 1997; Gill 2003; Rupert 2000). The other central concept developed in neo-Gramscian thought is the notion of a hegemonic transnational class that evolved through the Second World War (van der Pijl 1984, 1998; Overbeek 1993). In order to illustrate the shortcomings of these concepts it is necessary to give them a more detailed examination.

World order

The idea of world order remains Robert Cox’s most innovative attempt at applying Gramsci to the international arena. Broadly speaking, a world order can be seen in the same way that Gramsci saw a historical bloc – as the sum of a strucforces’ that promote a common set of norms and values (Cox 1987: 105–9). These norms and values are often embedded through institutional treaties or organisations, constructed at the international level. Cox gives us plenty of examples of how the functions of such institutions differed, depending upon the capitalist production took on a more international form were accompanied by the pursuit of more universal objectives in international political institutions, heavily dominant mode of production saw less international economic cohesion, but the maintenance of high levels of strategic international agreements (Cox, 1987: 51–210). Mechanisms such as the British balance of power in the nineteenth century and the Bretton Woods institutions are indicative of practices of the former, whilst arrangements such as the Treaties of Westphalia and the League of Nations are institutional examples of a less harmonious world order (Cox 1987; Murphy 1994).

The contemporary world order is seen as one in which the principles of neoliberalism have been realised through a combination of inter-related processes, that have shaped state and institutional policy in often unchallenged ways. For many world-order theorists, this condition has only succeeded due to the dominance that the US has over the international state-system as a whole. After the Second World War the US was able to embed a restrained liberal economic order under the Bretton Woods system, before a more substantial project of liberal capitalism was realised in the aftermath of the Cold War. The neo-liberal doctrine may have been nurtured through the Reagan–Thatcher years in the US

and UK respectively, but it was only when the state socialist alternative diminished that the supremacy of disciplinary neo-liberalism and market civilisation as the only viable method of governance was upheld (Gill 1995). Therefore, whilst neo-liberalism as an ideology – that of a Hayekian inspired commitment Beyond world order and transnational classes 23

towards minimising the state in favour of private capital – might have promoted the retreat of the state as an agent in international politics, it was in the US that the actual hegemonic process began.

Empirical studies on contemporary world order have thus been quick to demonstrate how the current ‘neo-liberal’ world order is rooted in the American ded hegemonic project in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse (Gill 2003; Gill and Mittelman 1997; Gills 2000; Murphy 2005). Capital’s ‘victory’

against state socialism, combined with the widespread adoption of Reaganomics allowed the principles of neo-liberalism to be institutionalised. Organisations such as the World Bank, GATT (the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), and subsequently the World Trade Organization set about normalising policies such as privatisation, free trade and the harmonisation of national tax laws, through structural adjustment policies and tariff reduction mandates respectively (Lee 1995; Gill 2003; Rupert 2000). Mark Rupert’s two studies, Producing Hegemony (1995) and Ideologies of Globalization (2000) provide perhaps the best examples of how the contemporary world order has been transformed. His former work draws explicitly from Coxian historicism to explain how US postwar hegemony was fashioned, through a series of dialectical struggles that began within US civil society itself (Rupert 1995: 167–207, see also Murphy 2005: 118–32). Thus the order was originally formed in the factories and through socio-cultural arrangements in the US, before being exported as a model to be replicated internationally. Ideologies of Globalization demonstrates how this order was transformed after the Cold War, embracing and promoting individualism and free trade. Rupert pays particular attention to Gramsci’s concept of

‘common sense’ to show how American forms of Fordism were transformed to embrace the rhetoric of neo-liberalism (Rupert 2000: 42–64). Aided by the USinspired policy transformations at the World Bank, and the success of the can civil society began to embed the principles of neo-liberalism and the principle of TINA (there is no alternative), and thus became the starting point and platform for their expansion and international hegemony. The ‘globalisation’ of neo-liberal common sense might have been embedded through institutional noted that it was technological developments – coupled with the rise in global consumption and global communication – that facilitated its transformation into a hegemonic world order (Worth 2005: 51–60).

Stephen Gill has extended this analysis of the contemporary world order towards Europe and the EU. Like Cox, Murphy and Rupert, he underlines the importance of the post-war US state in the making of the European Community (through the Marshall Plan and the inception of the European Coal and Steel Community – ECSC) as a counterweight to Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, and argues that it was this that infused Western European politics with a USinspired capitalist mindset. The move towards a neo-liberal polity after the end of the Cold War in Europe – in tandem with the EU’s eastern expansion – has 24 O. Worth

the American leadership in the G7 as an example of this, arguing that much of Europe’s recent economic strategy has been shaped by ‘the broader institutional complexes of capitalism linked to the leadership of the United States in the G7’

(Gill 2003: 54). Thus, recent moves by the EU to further constitute itself as a political entity should not be seen as a project of ‘Europeanisation’, but indicative of a wider US-led world order.

Transnational classes

If world order provides a general framework to understand how hegemony is framed within international politics, then the concept of the transnational capitalist class is used as a method to explain how a particular order is constructed. The literature on transnational classes has largely emerged from the growing sub-discipline of International Political Economy (IPE), where empirical research has focused on explaining how a capitalist class in one particular state forges links with another, creating mutual interests and thus consolidating speAnglo-American business and banking groups that emerged at the turn of the twentieth century and pluralised their Lockean visions of the separation between state and civil society (van der Pijl 1998). Simply put therefore, international hegemony refers to ‘a form of class rule based on consent rather than coercion and on accommodation of subordinate interests rather than on their repression’ (Overbeek 2000: 175). The transnational capitalist class has in recent years moved towards embarking on a co-ordinated project based upon the neo-liberal model of globalisation, championed by ‘Anglo-American elites’

in the 1980s. Such a class was not merely situated in the US/UK, but has historically emerged from a number of industrial countries and become cemented together through elitist international organisations, ranging from the Freemasons to the Bilderberg Conferences and the Trilateral Commission (van der Pijl more notable and more prominent with the clear emergence of neo-liberal economics. Thus, for those who subscribe to the logic of the transnational capitalist class, international hegemony is processed through the consensual relationship forged between the transnational elites and their respective ‘national subordinate’ classes. In line with Stephen Gill’s work on world order, much of the empirical work showing how a transnational capitalist class has developed these links has been concerned with contemporary Europe, with much emphasis placed on the development of the EU as an expression of their class interests. Rather than seeing the contemporary structure of the European Union as one that was conceived and inspired by the US, proponents of the transnational capitalist class thesis argue that the idea of European integration was conceived historically by American and European elites to stave off the threat of Communism during the Cold War (van der Pijl 1984), before emerging as a transnational class struggle Beyond world order and transnational classes 25

between neo-mercantile and neo-liberal forces. The recent development of European Monetary Union (EMU) and the Copenhagen criteria for membership suggest that the latter has not only gained supremacy, but has managed to institutionally embed itself, minimising the potential for alternatives (van Apeldoorn 1998).

One of the problems with analysing the rise of such a transnational class is that much of the historical development of the concept seems to be based upon wholesale generalisations, rather than on any substantial analysis of how such classes have been formed across national barriers into a coherent whole. For example, the EU is often presented as a body that has descended into a neoliberal entity, but this ignores the various oppositional forces within the EU that contest this position. As Strange argues, this neo-liberal position has become

‘increasingly lacking in institutional or treaty foundations’ (Strange 2007: 250), and assuming its uncontested dominance depreciates the wider ongoing dialectical struggles between those who advocate a ‘social Europe’ and those on the right who argue that the EU serves to constrain, rather than embed, neo-liberal principles (Strange 2006; Worth 2007). At present for example the most vocal opposition to European integration is not from those on the left, but rather from right-of-centre parties such as the British Conservatives, Forza Italia, numerous Eastern European conservative parties and various business organisations who argue that the EU over-regulates market practice and promotes social welfare ahead of its economic commitments.3

literature. Whilst the transnational capitalist class might seek to consolidate merely expressed through the outputs of international organisations. Second, and perhaps more importantly, we are not given much indication as to how such elites, once formed, manage to gain supremacy over successive national suborthe role of the subordinate classes and the different ways in which they have –

on different levels – consented to these transnational elites. It is precisely in this their analysis, explaining more thoroughly and more broadly the processes through which hegemonic consent is gained. Whilst there has been impressive work to show how sectors and representatives of civil society, such as trade unions and the members of political parties, have consented to the forces of neo-liberalism (Bieler 2006; Cafruny and Ryner 2003; Shields 2007), few studies have emerged that demonstrate the cultural and social complexity of forging hegemony in the less formal realms of society. As the Forgacs and Nowell-Smith edited Selections from Cultural Writings (Gramsci 1985) shows, this was a major theme of Gramsci’s writings. Indeed, it is this failure to take account of the many cultural practices of building hegemony in civil society above all that leaves neo-Gramscian IR readings of hegemony appearing rather top-down and narrow in their application.

26 O. Worth

Moving beyond world order and transnational classes Criticisms of the neo-Gramscian approaches within IR have been wide and farreaching with a variety of observations and accusations being made both from tions. These have run from arguments that the application of Gramsci at the international level is at best problematic and at worse implausible (Bellamy 1990; Germain and Kenny 1998), to those from the opposite perspective who argue that the functional-structural role of the state is overplayed and accounts of hegemony merely slide back into realist forms of orthodoxy (Robinson 2005; Cammack 2007). From another angle there have been further contrasting criticisms from those who argue that the Coxian/transnational class approach remains too embedded within its traditional Marxist determinist forms (Hobson 2007; Germain 2007) to those who argue that it plays down the primacy of capital in its assumptions of class relations (Burnham 2006). However, my main concern is that the Gramscian legacy that has been created in IR does not tap into its full potential by merely situating Gramsci’s work within world order or through a wider understanding of the transnational capitalist class (Worth 2008). Recent arguments have suggested that due to the ontological construction of the neo-Gramscian agenda, certain avenues of exploration that Gramsci himself discussed at length have often been underplayed or excluded from wider discussion (for new material on this see Pasha 2005; Steans and Tepe 2008; Worth 2008; Worth forthcoming). In particular, Gramsci gave great importance to culture and the complex and diverse organisation of civil society in understanding the articulation of hegemonic practices (Gramsci 1985), yet these are often underplayed in neo-Gramscian approaches as they might disrupt the neat structural foundations inherent within world order and transnational class development. However, with global civil society, it seems to me that these can no longer be ignored. In contrast to those who conclude that Gramsci is not after all applicable for use in the international context, and those like Bieler and Morton who argue that any Gramscian enquiry must be placed back within a larger orthodox Marxist account of historical materialism (Bieler and Morton 2003; Morton 2007), I suggest that a different Gramscian approach can be taken to global politics that moves beyond the centrality of world order and transnational classes. That is not to say that we should ignore the innovations provided by Cox and Gill, but that we use the spirit of their respective calls for alternative Gramscian-inspired accounts of critical theory to produce fresh theoretical and empirical enquiries. One avenue for this is to engage with Gramscian theory produced in the areas of Cultural Studies and in particular the works of Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams. As the origins of the pursuit of a Gramscian theory in IR lie in constructing a more complex account of hegemony, it is appropriate that one should turn to Hall’s and Williams’s bottom-up models. For Hall and Williams the mechancesses that are ‘highly complex’, and ones that are ‘continually being renewed, Beyond world order and transnational classes 27

recreated and defended’ (Williams 1980: 38). In applying these complexities to the international arena hegemony thus should be developed as a concept that is more open, multi-layered and less rigid in its understanding of the relationship between capital and production and the highly complex issues of culture, identity and class that are played out at different levels within international society. Following Hall and Williams, we might argue that ‘international’ or ‘global’

hegemony – like any other form – does not require a distinct formulated set of institutional bodies in order to preside and oversee the settlement of civil society, but is formed through mostly informal, sometimes unconscious, multilayered structures, but by the wider relationships between the dominant and subordinate classes, which in turn are shaped by production. This conception of hegemony has been built on in the work of Laclau, who argues that hegemony is not a relationship formed through a repositioning of class relations, but is an organic whole that is articulated through complex interactions with the social sphere. Laclau’s concept of articulation does provide us with a category which allows us to extend our understanding of the complex play between hegemonic identities and resistance within global society (Rupert, 2000). In this model of hegemony, consent is reached through articulatory practices various shared meanings between the parties to a hegemonic alliance. This again gives us a novel approach to account for the complex ways in which identity, nationhood, religion and culture (indeed the main areas of study that Gramsci himself focused on) can be articulated, both within the nation-state and within the more general realm of global civil society.

It also leads us back to Stuart Hall’s development of Gramscian thought that is most associated with his pieces ‘Gramsci and Us’ and ‘Marxism without Guarantees’. Here he offers some support to the Laclaudian concept of articulaclasses vis-à-vis production (Hall 1996: 34–7). However, he also quite clearly rejects the Laclaudian notion that hegemonic relations can operate freely of the

‘decisive nucleus of the economic’, arguing instead that hegemony is constructed in a more loosely bounded manner with economic agents attempting to forge and consolidate their version of common sense with other cultural and social agents nonetheless also subject to the open and complex terrain of civil and social society in which institutions, structures, cultures and ideologies are formed and consolidated. It is within this sphere that identity is formed and hegemony is constructed by the manufacture of consent (Hall 1996). Ideologies of Globalization,

that scholars need to take a closer look at Hall and at the process of articulation (Rupert 2000: 3–4). This more open approach to hegemony held attractions for Gramscian scholars within IR for a variety of reasons. First, it offered the potential to develop a general formulation of hegemonic consent within global civil society (under the larger project of neo-liberal globalisation), without negating 28 O. Worth

articulated through cultural practices below the state. Second, it provided the opportunity to explore the production of hegemony beyond the realm of political economy and simplistic reproductions of neo-liberalism, opening up avenues that have been strangely neglected within IR (Worth 2009), to which I now turn to examine in more detail.

New directions

When Cox and later Gill argued for a broad Gramscian research agenda in IR

they called for a wide ontological agenda that encompassed the interlinking levels of the economic, the political and the socio-cultural (Gill 1993b: 9). Despite this, the preoccupation of neo-Gramscians with world orders and transnational classes means that their analysis has largely remained centred on the on the nation and national-popular culture that are not explored or developed within the realm of global politics despite the fact that studies on areas such as prominent in the study of IR in recent years. Indeed, this work by Gramsci seems particularly relevant since the process of globalisation has frequently been number of states. Again, whilst these subjects have often been included within neo-Gramscian research they have too often been accorded only a peripheral status within the larger class/world order. Yet the problem with this approach is that it fails to explain how the processes of globalisation and the idea of a global hegemonic project can co-exist amidst the wider increase in ethnic politics. What Williams and Hall provide us with is a potential new direction in which we might employ Gramsci’s writings and ideas on the nation and popular culture to explore this aspect of global hegemony.4

William’s posthumous collection Who Speaks for Wales? draws upon the contradictions, mythologies and class formations that are constructed within his native Wales and demonstrates how contested forms of articulation combine to construct a form of common sense that historically accounts for ‘a nation without a voice functioning in a larger non-national state’ (Williams 2003: 191–2). This gives us some idea of how certain identities within global politics might be articulated within a larger overall hegemonic order. Obviously, for Williams, Welsh identity is articulated in a manner that is both exceptional and also part of a wider project within the British state. However, for Williams, this articulation does not stop at the level of the state since wider international constraints also have to be considered in their historical context (Williams 2003: 181–2). As Williams argues in ‘The Culture of Nations’, national and sub-national constructions have constantly been reshaped, re-evaluated and reorganised by wider external material conditions (Williams 2003: 191–203). Williams’s ‘bottom-up’ approach to identity and articulation allows us to imagine a concept of hegemony that covers a variety of layers of hegemonic Beyond world order and transnational classes 29

expression. It also allows us to escape some of the state-centric tendencies that still persist in many Gramscian accounts in IR. Here the emphasis is not how the US state controls a system through coercion and consent, but rather how the material forces of neo-liberal capitalism – that might have originally been national and regional contexts to manufacture hegemonic forms of common sense. We have to consider that the cultural construction of this common sense within subaltern classes in Europe or North America (the West) might well differ from those in the Middle East or in the developing world. There have already been Gramscian accounts that focus on how developing or semi-peripheral states have drawn on their own forms of local and national social and political culture to integrate themselves within a wider external hegemonic project (Worth 2005; Morton 2007; Moore 2007), yet the approach adopted by Williams provides further potential for far more comprehensive studies to highlight the contrasting and unique practices of articulation across different parts of the global order. Similarly, by adapting Williams’s and Hall’s ‘open model’ to IR, we can also understand how resistance at various levels might be articulated and how this is either marginalised, or develops more coherently into a potential counterhegemonic strategy. Again, resistance and contestation have had a central place in the literature on Gramsci (Rupert 2000; Worth 2002), yet Hall’s critiques and observations on the project of Thatcherism – which remain one of the most original and concise reproductions of Gramsci – are often overlooked. Hall indeed argued that a hegemonic project is one that relies upon a number of agents and mechanisms for its sustainability, but these same agents can also be used to contest and counter its very existence. A hegemonic order is thus one that is constantly being challenged, contested and repositioned and as such should not be seen as something that is static or permanent (Hall 1988: 7). Students and scholars of world politics should thus be seeking to look at how neo-liberal global hegemony is constructed at its local, regional, national and international level through a variety of political, social and cultural agents. One form of hegemonic agency that has also been surprisingly omitted from recent studies within IR is that of religion. Since the events of 11 September 2001 there has been a surge of writings on religion as a new actor in the global arena, yet Gramscian scholarship has been slow to respond to this development. The move against secularisation; the transportation and conditionality of education and social welfare from the West to parts of the developing world; the fundamentalist contestation of globalisation from elements within the Islamic and Christian faiths; all these point to a need to look at Gramsci’s reading on religious grouping more seriously, and especially their organisational power and involvement in civil society. As we are aware from the Boothman edited volume Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks

cance to the role of religion as a hegemonic agent (Gramsci 1995: 4–137) and in particular its expression within the civil and social sphere of the state complex (Fulton 1987; Maduro 1981). Gramsci saw religion as a practice that could be used as either a key component in the construction of hegemony, or a tool of 30 O. Worth

contestation and resistance in the advancement of a counter-hegemonic project (Gramsci 1995: 131–4). Gramsci’s interest in religion was therefore divided into a critique of the role it played in the development of class relations and capitalism (and later of Fascism), and its potential role within a socialist agenda. Following Hall’s suggested ontology of resistance and counter-resistance we can see that religion is one important form of agency that is represented at various levels within global hegemony. As a social mechanism of hegemonic consolidation, Christian organisations such as the US-backed Evangelical movein ensuring the passive compatibility of neo-liberalism and faith. In terms of the former, this can be seen both within the Christian fundamentalist movement in the US that became so prominent in the Bush administration, whilst various Christian denominations remain active in building civil society in the developing world, often in tandem with wider social objectives set down by the World Bank (Murray 2007). The development of grassroots Christianity has also been aided by new global media outlets (such as The God Channel) that seek to articulate faith both as a vocation and as a commodity.

Religion has also been used as a cultural mobiliser for contesting neoliberal globalisation. Again, the most obvious example here is within the tradition of Islamic fundamentalism whereby the narrative of globalism is constructed opportunity (Steger 2005). Christianity can be employed similarly to contest the current hegemonic order. For example, prior to the Bush administration, many observers felt that Christian fundamentalism was being used within a wider patriotic struggle to counter Clinton-inspired ‘unGodly’ globalism within the US

(Castells 1997; Rupert 2000; Worth 2002). Moreover, more recently many tradiJustice campaigns and in the various social forums to critique and counter the governance of globalisation from a more inclusive perspective. Conclusion: towards a more ‘integral’ conception of hegemony global politics, but has also encouraged accounts that extend beyond the current parameters commonly pursued by those who have become known as the neoGramscians within IR/IPE. Whilst it is important to acknowledge the work provided by Cox in introducing Gramscian thought as a component of a wider critical alternative to existing orthodox approaches in IR, it is also necessary for us to beware emerging orthodoxies that have arisen since Cox’s original intervention. Gill and van der Pijl also made separate innovations in the development of Gramscian theory in IR studies, but their respective models of world order and transnational class only go so far in realising the full potential of the applicaconcepts, recent theoretical accounts seem content to work and develop Gramscian thought from within these parameters (Morton 2007). Beyond world order and transnational classes 31

It is also restated here that Gramscian theory entered the discipline of IR in a unique way to counter the appropriation of the concept of hegemony that was part of the dominant realist theory at the time. The result was – as Robinson and Cammack are right (albeit from different positions) to observe – the replacement of this dominance with another form of hegemony that, whilst differing in appearance, surprisingly retains much of realism’s state-centrism (Robinson 2005; Cammack 2007). As a result, the emerging neo-Gramscian framework focused more on the consolidation of power at the level of high politics and on adapted and been adapted to these developments at different levels. In order to Coxian theory towards a more inclusive account of global politics. In order to attain this, I have suggested three avenues to pursue. First, to imagine a more generic account of hegemony that fully allows for the contrasting and contradictory practices that occur at different levels of the hegemonic order. This might appear problematic to those sceptical about this possibility existing at all above the level of the state, or within an international context. However, my second suggestion, to employ the more open model of hegemony used by Hall and Williams, addresses this point quite well. As demonstrated above, they suggest ways to realise the ontological potential that Cox and Gill called for when setting out their respective visions for the development of Gramscian thought in IR. Finally, identity and religion are just two areas that I have suggested provide fertile ground for the exploration of this more diverse and inclusive Gramscian approach. However, it should be recognised that these suggested new avenues of research represent only a fraction of the various areas of civil society that need to be fully investigated before we can say that we have exhausted the full potentiality of Gramsci in the study of global politics. Notes

1 During the early part of the 1980s it was believed by many realists that the US was in hegemonic decline after the collapse of the dollar system a decade earlier. Cox’s alternative reading of hegemony was partly inspired by Susan Strange’s criticisms of the declinist school, where she argued that a hegemonic state should be assessed not only on the strength of its economic data, but also on its structural power. See Strange (1987).

2 See for example, Riefer’s edited collection (2004). 3 A key argument used by the Irish think-tank Libertas which was central in funding the successful ‘No’ campaign against the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland in June 2008. 4 It should be noted that Stuart Hall’s starting point of analysis was from the area of Cultices in Britain in the 1980s, whilst Williams’s background was in cultural and literary studies, which he applied more broadly to identity and nationhood. 3

Gramsci, epistemology and

International Relations theory

Joseph Femia

‘For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason’ (Morgenthau 1985: 5). With these words, Hans Morgenthau, the doyen of the dominant realist outlook in International Relations (IR) analysis, neatly summarised the positivist epistemology that underpinned his approach. The implicit conservatism of conventional realism, with its emphasis on national from idealistic internationalists and orthodox Marxists – a disparate collection of thinkers united only by their desire to challenge existing power relationships. Yet, for the most part, they shared the positivist assumptions of mainstream social science. Like the realists, their primary aim was to identify objective recurrences and repetitions, the systematic correlations and causal chains lurking beneath the apparent chaos of international politics. Increasing dissatisfaction with the positivist orthodoxy in IR (and International Political Economy – IPE) has steadily given rise to a new breed of critic – possibly less optimistic but no less radical than previous opponents of realism. Their ‘critical’ or ‘interpretative’ approach has been inspired either by heretical ‘Marxists’, such as Gramsci and Adorno, or by ‘postmodernists’, such as Derrida and Foucault. The postmodernist critique rests upon a principled rejection of all ‘narratives’ or methodological schemes that presume to impose order on the intractable contingency and complexity of the world. The ‘critical’ theorists, on the other hand, align themselves with the idealistic strand of Marxism, which insists upon the constitutive and transformative role of human consciousness. What unites the two schools is a relativistic belief that ‘discourse’ in some sense ‘creates’ reality, and that – to quote Richard Ashley – ‘the objective truth of the discourse lies within and is produced by the discourse itself’ rather than ‘the external object’ (Ashley 1986: 281). However, those operating within a loosely Marxist framework are reluctant to abandon all traces of foundationalism and want to claim that some discourses are superior to others because they embody the ‘emancipatory’ aspirations of the Marxist project. For all their differences of nuance and emphasis, most of these ‘critical’ IR/IPE

theorists are happy to accept the appellation ‘neo-Gramscian’. In what follows, however, I intend to show that they, or at least some of them, have basically misunderstood Gramsci’s critique of positivism and conceded too much to fashiona- Gramsci, epistemology and IR theory 33

ble ‘discourse’ theory. They are therefore in danger of descending into a kind of irrationalism that renders their emancipatory ambitions otiose. struggle against obscurantism, has become anathema to those who hate the status quo. By positivism, in this context, we refer to the received epistemological model of the natural sciences, which is presumed by positivists to apply to the 1

that there is a real world of causal relations that exists independently of human subjectivity;

language;

3

that such a language provides the basis for the prediction and control of human or natural behaviour;

4

that truth claims can be tested by their correspondence to external experience; and 5

that human subjectivity does not create any barriers to social conduct being treated as an ‘object’ in the natural world.

This model presupposes two rigid dichotomies: that between the ‘subject’ (the knower) and the ‘object’ (the known); and that between ‘fact’ and ‘value’. In other words, the ‘real’ world is separate and distinct from the theoretical conmore or less accurately – an external actuality. It is one thing to apply this model to the natural sciences; it is quite another to human beings, whose behaviour is far less predictable than that of natural phenomena. Yet the naturalistic model is unquestionably dominant in mainstream IR and IPE, and is sometimes underlined by explicit analogies that prominent scholars draw between the work of natural scientists and their own research. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, for example, liken their quantitative peace methods that medical scientists use to understand the causes of disease’ (Russet and Oneal 2001: 82).

Critical or neo-Gramscian IR/IPE theorists argue that the ‘internal logic’ of this model is intrinsically favourable to the status quo (Neufeld 1995: 1), since –

as Robert Cox points out – it encourages a ‘problem-solving’ approach, which approach, by contrast, would call the existing world order into question, by examining how it came into being and what possibilities for transformation exist within it. Concepts such as ‘national sovereignty’ and the inherent ‘anarchy’ of international relations ought to be interrogated or subjected to a process of deconstruction. But, we are told, the positivist mind-set does not allow for this. 34 J. Femia

Because the forces of nature are permanent and endlessly recurring, it is assumed that these qualities obtain in the social world as well (Cox 1986: 208). In the words of Stephen Gill (Gill 1993a: 22–3), ‘the subject–object dichotomy of positivist epistemology’ necessarily results in ‘transhistorical theorisations based upon . . . a priori categories’ (e.g. mankind is innately self-centred; the international system is anarchic; sovereign states are, and will remain, the primary actors in international affairs). The global order is presented as a natural ‘thing’, standing apart from and independent of human will and action. Ashley makes categories’ (supposedly) inherent in positivism leaves no room for the idea that men and women can ‘theorize about their lives’ or engage in ‘a continuing strugtheir agencies of collective action, and the very categories of social existence’. Indeed, the transcendent normative structures that would guide such critical stance which precludes all questions that are resistant to the objective (and conservative) logic of means–end, or instrumental, rationality (Ashley 1986: 290–1, 281–5).

bly be seen as an instrument of progressive change, with prevailing ideas or practices constantly being subject to the test of experience. To return to a previous example, Russett and Oneal would probably describe themselves as liberal internationalists, since they identify the spread of democracy as the main cause of international peace. Given their desire to propagate democracy, it would be perverse to accuse them of assigning priority to ‘systemic order and managepeace might be seen as one small step in the gradual emancipation of mankind. But the neo-Gramscian or ‘critical’ IR/IPE theorists – much like the Frankfurt School – tend to speak of ‘emancipation’ rather loosely, as if its practical meaning were perfectly clear. They seem to understand the term in an apocalypversion of a ‘good and just life, a life encompassing the values of equality and freedom’ is enjoyed on a planetary scale (Neufeld 1995: 10–11). Incremental change, guided by the principles of the experimental method, is not what they have in mind. Such a procedure would be redolent of ‘problem-solving’. For the neo-Gramscians, the key to reaching this utopia is to be found in the Italian’s ontological and epistemological critique of positivism. By insisting on the transformative capacity of human subjectivity, Gramsci supposedly provides Mark Rupert (1995: 26), this radical social ontology entails a self-understanding in which ‘humans are actively self-constitutive in the process of consciously reconstructing their internal relations with society and nature’. Consciousness is seen as integral to rather than derivative of social being. Cox, for example, derides the orthodox Marxist tendency to reduce intersubjective mentalités to an instrumental response to underlying material circumstances: ‘mind is . . . the Gramsci, epistemology and IR theory 35

thread connecting the present with the past, a means of access to a knowledge of these changing modes of social reality’ (Cox 1986: 213). He embellishes his argument by referring to Vico’s observation that ‘the world of nations’ has been of our own human mind’ (Vico 1774/1970: para. 349). The ‘data of politics’, the kind of historicist idealism for which institutions and practices are to be understood through ‘the changing mental processes of their makers’ (Cox 1986: 242). Civilisations are viewed as realms of intersubjectivity. Since social existOnce we accept that reality is constituted not by objective structures but by human ideas, we can also accept that ‘the production of knowledge must always be considered a social process linking subject and object’ (Murphy and Tooze 1991: 14). Recognising the reality of intersubjective meanings in the construction of the global order requires us, on this view, to abandon positivism in the ative content of all analysis. For positivism, knowledge is ‘true’ when it corresponds to empirical experience (the facts), and ‘objective’ when it is attained presumptions. Implicit here is a ‘Cartesian dualism’ (Gill 1993a: 22) between subject and object that is vehemently rejected by the new Gramscians. Ideas, words, languages – these are not ‘mirrors’ which copy the ‘real’ or ‘objective’

world. Theoretical preconceptions always determine what we take as ‘facts’. Nor are there any objective, a priori standards by which to judge competing knowsurable’, since there are no universal criteria or theory-independent facts by which to assess their relative merits (Neufeld 1995: 46, 68). ‘Theory’, says Cox,

‘is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1986: 207). The idea of a theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time or space, is delusional. When a familiar term in the neo-Gramscian IR and IPE literature (e.g. Gill 1993a: 27; Murphy and Tooze 1991: 13).

existence of a ‘reality’ that is independent of the processes of ‘knowledge production’, and neo-Gramscians do sometimes make gestures in this direction. However, such concessions to conventional Marxist epistemology tend to be half a priori standards or criteria for assessing the merits of contending paradigms’ (Neufeld 1995: 46). If there is no reality waiting to be discovered, if what we call knowledge is a 36 J. Femia

social or cultural construction, and if the universality of reason is a bourgeois known except through a ‘discourse’, which generates the categories of meaning by which reality can be understood and explained. Anxious to distance themselves from the ‘vulgar’ positivism embraced by ‘pathological, mechanical Marxism’ (Gill 1991: 53), many ‘critical’ or neo-Gramscian scholars of IR/IPE

adopt what is, in effect, an idealist epistemology which refuses to distinguish between positive facts and normative judgements. Notwithstanding occasional references to an independent ‘but none the less interdependent’ reality, Gill actually says that a ‘change in thinking is a change in the social totality’ – an explicit endorsement of the notion that discourse shapes reality and that no value-free the international system through a narrative of alienation and redemption, which

– he claims – ‘ entails’ a critique of realism in IR (Rupert 1993: 83). A normative commitment to eternal peace, unity, harmony and non-contradictory ‘identity’

thus becomes the determinant of ‘reality’ in the international system. What the realists deem to be recalcitrant ‘facts’ are simply ruled out of court by a prior theoretical commitment, complete with its own version of the ‘facts’. The question that is often asked of postmodernists should also be addressed to the ‘critical’ or neo-Gramscian thinkers within IR/IPE. How does one construct a people to accept your political analysis as a basis for action when you simultanis precisely what theorists like Cox and Neufeld are trying to do. Their efforts are doomed. How, for example, can they assure us that reality is malleable rather than modernists and neo-Gramscians tend to ‘solve’ the ‘problem of objectivity’ by purporting to give ‘voice to many voices’ hitherto ignored, by identifying with oppressed groups who have a ‘compelling interest in transforming the world political economy’. These voices are – according to Murphy and Tooze, prominent defenders of radical IR/IPE – ‘multiple sources of objectivity’ (Murphy and Tooze 1991: 28–9). I fail to see why. Even if – as seems unlikely – we could all of either objectivity or correctness. Perhaps their voices have been ignored because they are talking utter drivel, and the radical IR/IPE theorists have left themselves no way of proving otherwise. The new Gramscians, like the postmodernists, will have to confront the logical implication of their epistemological

‘defeatism’ – that is, ‘anything goes’. Neufeld, however, is in denial. For him, requires ‘the reasoned adjudication of the inherent value of competing normative claims’, even though there are no ‘ a priori standards or criteria for assessing the merits of contending paradigms’ (Neufeld 1995: 45–6). Alas, he gives no plausible illustration of how we can square this particular circle. If, as he says, ‘rival paradigms are incommensurable’ (Neufeld 1995: 68), if criteria of Gramsci, epistemology and IR theory 37

that paradigm A is better than paradigm B will be internal to paradigm A. To be and therefore gives us no cogent reason for claiming that paradigm A is superior to paradigm B. Of course, we could still express a preference for the former paradigm and base it on faith or sentiment. This, though, would not be the ‘reasoned assessment’ Neufeld insists upon in order to rebut the charge of irrationalism (Neufeld 1995: 65).

One can only speculate about why radical IR/IPE scholars have adopted the fashion for epistemological relativism. Needless to say, ‘fashion’, to a degree, is its own explanation – in the same way that some ‘celebrities’ are famous simply for being famous. Also relevant, I think, are the attractions of a ‘comfort zone’. Why bother to engage with or even read the dreary old realists (or ‘neorealists’) when every observation they make merely gives expression to their geois’ truth and a ‘proletarian’ truth. What the mainstream IR/IPE scholars say approach is that you end up preaching only to the converted – not very helpful when, by your own admission, you are in a beleaguered minority, hoping to persuade the majority.

True, the positivist orthodoxy is guilty of excesses. But the rejection of one extreme need not lead to the adoption of the opposite extreme. Let us look at the Humean fact/value distinction, which – radical thinkers never tire of telling us –

is hard to sustain. Facts, however ‘brute’, gain meaning within a framework of explanation that is inevitably value-laden. Moreover, language, with which we express the facticity of reality, is often morally charged. All of this is true enough. But it remains the case that there are such things as incontrovertible social facts: voting percentages, growth rates of economies, and so on. These will be interpreted in different ways; and in some instances a ‘fact’, or an objective state of affairs, cannot be described in a neutral manner. To take a simple this, however, means that we should forswear the fact/value distinction or the goal of value-neutrality. Language is built upon multiple distinctions, and this Take the distinction, dear to the hearts of all academics, between ‘pass’ and

‘fail’. Scepticism towards a hard and fast dichotomy between ‘fact’ and ‘value’

does not offer a very persuasive argument for dropping the distinction altogether. Without it, we could not distinguish between a convincing and a distorted interpretation of reality, and no one would ever have a good reason for changing his or her mind about how the world works. Political and academic debate would degenerate into a shouting match between self-regarding solipsists, unconstrained by respect for empirical evidence. 38 J. Femia

by the ‘critical’ theorists of the Frankfurt School. While they ‘borrow’ from Gramsci, they have never presumed to follow his ideas slavishly. Still, the tendency to merge Gramsci with the likes of Adorno or Marcuse is misleading and needs to be resisted.

One thing is certain: Gramsci did indeed disapprove of conventional positivism. In his view, bare ‘facts’ acquire meaning only when organised in the frame ledge is not like a photographic plate that reproduces the picture it receives, for (Gramsci 1971: 461). Even natural science, says Gramsci, is bound up with particular vision of human needs and interests (Gramsci 1975: 1457–8). Witness bizarre theories which aimed to reconcile the Bible and Aristotle with . . . experimental observations’. Only the ‘general progress of modern society’ (new technology, the decline of superstition) freed science from such misguided

‘authorities’ (Gramsci 1971: 458).

Such remarks, however, must not be taken in isolation. While Gramsci did not regard reality as a mere objective datum, external to man, neither did he attempt to abolish the dividing line between subject and object. It is worth noting that he condemned the positivists, particularly those of Marxist persuasion, for adopting ‘the conception of the objective reality of the external world in its most trivial and uncritical sense’ (Gramsci 1971: 444, my emphasis). This implies that there is an acceptable sense of ‘objective reality’, one that recognises the contribution of human thought to the way that reality is structured and accessed. His apparent relativisation of natural science, for example, never leads him to presume that the laws of nature are mere human inventions. On the contrary, he refers to ‘the simple and fundamental fact that there exist objective, intractable natural laws to which man must adapt himself if he is to master them in his turn’

(Gramsci 1971: 34). But once we discover and ‘master’ these laws, they become, to use Gramsci’s terminology, ‘humanly objective’, which corresponds ‘exactly to “historically subjective” ’. One must have ‘recourse to history and to man to demonstrate objective reality’ (Gramsci 1971: 445). Two claims are being made imprint of the organisational power of ‘man’ (understood in the collective and generic sense). The forces of nature may have existed before man, but they become ‘objective reality’ for us only when we encapsulate them in the form of all men, which is independent of every viewpoint that is merely particular or group-oriented’ (Gramsci 1975: 1456). Or again, man ‘knows objectively insofar as knowledge is real for the whole human race’. The experimental sciences furnish the model here, for they represent ‘the most objectivised and concretely Gramsci, epistemology and IR theory 39

universalised subjectivity’. As we cannot, like God, adopt ‘the standpoint of the cosmos in itself’, what counts as ‘objective reality’ is what is universally agreed to be objective reality. That it exists, however, is not in doubt (Gramsci 1971: 445–6). Moreover, the reference to universal agreement, or ‘concretely universalised subjectivity’, is an explicit rebuttal of the notion that there can be no ulti not paradigmIn order to illustrate what he means, Gramsci comments on the famous example produced by Bertrand Russell in his defence of philosophical realism: relationships and yet they would not exist without man and without the development of civilisation. Obviously East and West are arbitrary and conventional, that is historical constructions, since outside of real history every point on the earth is East and West at the same time. . . . And yet these references are real; they correspond to real facts, they allow one to travel by land and by sea, to arrive where one has decided to arrive, . . . to understand the objectivity of the external world.

(Gramsci 1971: 447–8)

scious human purposes, nevertheless imposes conditions to which human beings must adapt. It may be that these geographic designations originally represented a particular point of view – that of the ‘European cultured classes’. global dominance of these classes allowed their geographic references to be accepted everywhere. That Edinburgh is ‘north’ of London is indeed an objective fact – though it is a fact that embodies the dialectic between man and nature (Gramsci 1971: 447).

Objects of human cognition, for Gramsci, have real existence and not merely existence in the mind of the subject who perceives them. Deliberately echoing Machiavelli (the historical progenitor of realism), he was adamant that our political analyses and activities should be governed by ‘effective reality’, and not by the ‘turbid void’ of our ‘desires and dreams’ (Gramsci 1971: 172). IPE scholars might particularly wish to note what Gramsci said about social and economic forces. These were, in his words, ‘objective, independent of human will’, and capable of being ‘measured with the systems of the exact or physical sciences’. Economic variables constitute a ‘refractory reality’, a series of objective facts, against which we can assess ‘the realism and practicability of the various ideologies’ (Gramsci 1971: 180–1). Gramsci, it should be obvious, conceded the existence of a theory-independent realm of facts by which to evaluate the merits of competing theories. Ultimately theories are to be judged by the facts of the world, rather than by their ‘progressive’ intentions. One of his complaints against orthodox Marxism was that its fondness for abstract dialectical schemes 40 J. Femia

was ‘a baroque form of Platonic idealism, since these abstract laws have a strong resemblance to Plato’s pure ideas which are the essence of real earthly facts’

(1971: 430, my emphasis). The message is clear. Although our perception of perception will be determined by ‘real earthly facts’ (‘the external object’, as Ashley puts it) and not by the apparatus itself.

Gramsci was something of a moral relativist inasmuch as he believed that values could only be judged by their success in penetrating mass psychology and guiding human behaviour. His historicism led him to reject the idea of universal moral truths, valid for all eternity. Nor did he have any time for the pretentious notion that a theory is morally superior if it expresses the (supposed) interests of the oppressed. To him, the sole legitimate test of Marxist values is whether they

‘impose themselves and prevail in the end’ (Gramsci 1971: 341). But his relativism, such as it was, did not extend beyond the sphere of morality. He was by no means the sort of cognitive

insisted, imposes constraints on what we can think and do. From his perspective, to abolish this reality on theoretical grounds, as radical IR/IPE theorists tend to do, is to disappear in the mists of ‘idle fancy, yearning, daydream’ (Gramsci 1971: 172). He realised that no one had ever been emancipated by wishful thinking.

The neo-Gramscians are right to see a logical connection between epistemo- logical realism, on the one hand, and political realism, on the other. They are wrong, however, to allege that political realism is antithetical to any sort of idealism, or that it commits us to a static view of the world. The tendency to caricature IR realism in this way has already been condemned by Robert Gilpin, who points out, for example, that while realists look upon homo sapiens as a tribal species, they do not normally reify the modern state or treat it as some kind of universal or ‘natural’ category. They simply argue that, if the nation-state is to disappear, it will do so through age-old political processes and not, as critical theorists would wish, through a transcendence of politics itself (Gilpin 1986). Gramsci himself thought that the realism/idealism dichotomy was too simplistic. He maintained that the opposition between Savonarola and Machiavelli was ‘not an opposition between what is and what ought to be . . ., but one between two concepts of what ought to be: the abstract and phantasmagorical concept of Savonarola, and the realistic concept of Machiavelli’. The latter thinker was ‘not merely a scientist’; he was also ‘a partisan, a man of powerful passions’, who never doubted that the Italian people could be mobilised for progressive ends –

the expulsion of foreign troops from Italian soil, and the possible creation of a of Machiavellian realism, offering a practical vision of change. In order to clarify his argument, he made a useful distinction between two types of realism: one wants simply to manage the status quo, to sustain ‘an existing equilibrium’, thereby identifying existing arrangements with abstract necessity; the other, Gramsci, epistemology and IR theory 41

beneath surface appearances to discover ‘a new balance of forces’, conducive to 1

for its point of departure is that ‘effective reality’ is not ‘something static and immobile’, but rather ‘a relation of forces in continuous motion’ (Gramsci 1971: 172). As long as normative aspirations have a factual, as opposed to a speculative, basis, as long as they correspond to ‘historical necessity’, to real, observable trends, then they are perfectly compatible with the realist outlook (Gramsci, 1971: 130).

Gramsci was happy to confront the world with ‘ought’ propositions; but as a critic of naïve (‘abstract and phantasmagorical’) idealism, he refused to believe that politics was nothing but the creation of human will and design, or that it could be remade according to intention.2 The ‘post-positivist’ IR/IPE theorists a truly dialectical thinker who asserted the interdependence of mind and objective reality, and not the absolute priority of either. Notes

1 For a fuller discussion of Gramsci’s ‘transformative’ realism, see Femia 2005. 2 While conceding Gramsci’s Machiavellian credentials, R.N. Berki, in his study of political realism, claims that the Italian still evinced a residual Marxist idealism, since he seemed to believe that it was possible to move from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom: ‘Gramsci oscillates between a position which recognises the interpenetration of external forces and political initiatives (realism) and an idealist position which seeks to subordinate reality completely to the human will’ (Berki 1981: 261). Yet Berki is honest enough to admit that Gramsci acknowledged the limitations of Marxism, its ‘provisional’ nature, and its inability to predict the future. For him utopian faith – more a hope than an expectation (Gramsci 1971: 405–6). Although Berki – who devotes only a couple of pages to Gramsci – omits to mention it, there is also another passage in the Prison Notebooks which refers to the Communist future as

‘pure utopia’ and expresses doubts about its viability (Gramsci 1971: 263). For a supposed Marxist to label ‘the riddle of history solved’ as utopia is of course heretical. Even in the passage where, according to Berki, he embraces Marxist idealism, Gramsci simply attempts to describe the Marxist transition from ‘necessity’ to ‘freedom’, and does not in any obvious sense commit himself to the imminence (or immanence) of this

‘cathartic’ moment (Gramsci 1971: 367). Gramsci, I would suggest, was reluctant to endorse ideas that had no evident basis in existing reality, though his belief in the ‘continuous motion’ of objective forces prevented him from declaring the impossibility of the Communist utopia.

4

Trasformismo at the World Trade

Organization

Bill Paterson

Introduction

et al.

et al.

et al.

at the World Trade Organization

trasformismo

trasformismo

nebuleuse

trasform-

ismo

amicus

trasformismo

Developing trasformismo for studying international organisations

-

44 B. Paterson

trasformismo

-

at the World Trade Organization

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nebuleuse

nebuleuse

-

B. Paterson

nebuleuse

trasformismo

trasformismo

Trasformismo

at the World Trade Organization

trasformismo

absence

trasformismo

prevent

trasformismo

trasformismo

trasformismo

ideological strategy

trasformismo

Trasformismo

-

B. Paterson

trasformismo

nebuleuse

trasformismo

Trasformismo in action at the World Trade Organization trasformismo

trasformismo

amicus

trasformismo

-

at the World Trade Organization

nebuleuse

nebuleuse

Trade Justice Movement

-

B. Paterson

-

at the World Trade Organization

tras-

formismo

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nebu-

leuse

-

B. Paterson

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et al.

et al.

at the World Trade Organization

et al.

trasformismo

-

B. Paterson

A

-

at the World Trade Organization

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curiae

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B. Paterson

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trasformismo

trasformismo

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Conclusion

at the World Trade Organization

trasformismo

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trasformismo

trasformismo

Note

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5

Gramsci’s inter nationalism, the

national-popular and the

Alternative Globalisation

Movement

Mark McNally

Introduction

One of the most interesting developments in contemporary global politics is without doubt the recent emergence of an Alternative Globalisation Movement (AGM). Described as a ‘movement from below’, the AGM brings together a diverse range of social movements, NGOs and traditional political groupings (including trade unions and political parties) to form a united bloc of international resistance to the forces of globalised neo-liberalism – primarily the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the G8 – which are collectively accused of spreading inequalities, eroding social entitlements, exploiting developing countries and destroying the world’s environment (della Porta et al., 2006; della Porta and Tarrow 2004). The AGM is generally believed to have had its ‘aggregative’ moment in Seattle in November 1999 when a WTO meeting scheduled to launch a new wave of market liberalisation (the Millennium Round) was greeted with mass protest (della Porta et al., 2006: 1–7). Since Seattle the AGM – described by Paterson (chapter 4) as ‘the alter-globalisation movement’ and by others as ‘the Global Justice Movement’ or ‘the Movement for Globalisation from Below’ – has witnumerous transnational ‘social forums’ which meet regularly to coincide with the summits of the forces of neo-liberal globalisation (i.e. counter-summits) and to devise strategies for the realisation of an ‘alternative globalisation’ which is conducive rather than destructive of social life across the planet. In this chapter I set out to provide a Gramscian critique of the ‘globalism’ of the AGM, leaning in particular on Gramsci’s two related conceptions of ‘internationalism’ and the ‘national-popular’. This seems an especially appropriate discussion for the current section of this volume since one of the key bones of contention in debates about the recent appropriation of Gramsci by theorists of international relations has been precisely the viability of applying Gramsci’s ideas to the international context. Following in the tradition of a long line of Gramscian scholars who have interpreted Gramsci as essentially a theorist of the nation-state (for example, Boggs 1976; Buci-Glucksmann 1980; Martin 1998) –

if not principally the Italian nation-state (Bellamy and Schecter 1993; Piccone Gramsci’s inter nation alism 59

1983; Finocchiaro 1988) – Joseph Femia (Femia 2005) and Randall Germain and Michael Kenny (Germain and Kenny 1998) in particular have cast doubt on IR theorists’ ‘internationalisation’ of Gramscian categories such as ‘hegemony’

and ‘civil society’. As Femia puts it, this approach ‘seems to rely upon a selective and misleading interpretation of Gramsci’ (Femia 2005: 345). Indeed, Germain and Kenny have argued of Gramsci that ‘the power of his understanding of the concept of the “national-popular” ’ caused him to shun ‘a priori forms of internationalist argument’ (Germain and Kenny 1998: 14–15). On the face of it, such admonitions might well lead one to assume that the application here of a Gramscian critique to an overtly internationalist movement is a forlorn enterprise. However, it will be argued below that the tendency for this debate on the international–national perspective of Gramsci’s work to be conducted in terms of exclusionary paradigms is essentially misleading since his later writings incorporated the two. In fact, and in support of those who have previously highlighted the reciprocal nature of national and international relations in Gramsci’s later political writings (Morton, 2007; Sassoon 1987), what this chapter shows is that Gramsci developed an approach that not only included the necessity for political analysis and strategic change to begin at the level of the nation-state, but also reconciled this with a fundamentally international perspective. The latter was founded on his understanding of the interdependent nature of world capitalism and the belief that because of this only a political movement organised on an international scale could successfully defeat it. Far from indicating an abandonment of the international perspective for the national, it is maintained in particular that Gramsci’s later development of the concept of the ‘national-popular’ involved an enrichment of his international approach. From my perspective then – as so often with Gramsci – there is a certain balance between the national and the international in his work. Moreover, this Gramscian inter nation alism (or belief in a world unity that is limited by the socio-economic and cultural particularity of nations) still has the capacity to provide insights on contemporary politics – as I intend to demonstrate by providing a Gramscian critique of what I regard as the ‘globalism’ of the Alternative Globalisation Movement. In embarking on this critique, however, and in contrast to the above discussions, this essay will engage much more with social movement theorists who have been inclined to view the AGM as a transnational instance of a ‘social movement’; focusing particularly on the work of Donatella della Porta, Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca and Herbert Reiter who have taken a relatively optimistic view of the Movement for Global Justice. The chapter begins by explaining how Gramsci incorporated the ‘nationalpopular’ into his fundamentally international perspective to produce a uniquely inter nation alist approach, outlining in particular the main characteristics of the crucial concept of the ‘national-popular’. The aim here is to pay adequate attention to the historical and intellectual context in which Gramsci developed his ideas to avoid accusations of attempting ‘to transport Gramsci willy-nilly from the 1930s’ to the contemporary period (Bellamy and Schecter 1993: 167; see too, Germain and Kenny 1998: 13–14). The second part of the chapter will then 60 M. McNally

demonstrate the increasing convergence between the analytical and prescriptive dimensions of Gramsci’s hegemony and the political strategies of contemporary

‘social movements’. The main objective here is to establish a rationale for the application of a Gramscian approach to the AGM. Finally, and most importantly, the last part of the chapter will engage with the current excessive ‘globalism’ of the AGM from a Gramscian perspective, leaning in particular on Gramsci’s concept of the national-popular and suggesting that, in terms of (a) leadership and democratic organisation, (b) ideological strategy and (c) political strategy, there is still much that the AGM could learn from Gramsci’s inter nation alism. It poration of the concept of the ‘national-popular’ into Gramsci’s fundamentally international perspective.

Incorporating the national-popular in an international perspective

There can be little doubt that the early Gramsci, in the years before his imprisonment (1918–26) and largely in response to the Russian Revolution and the emergence of the Comintern, was a committed internationalist. This was a period, it should be recalled, when the leaders of the Partito Communista d’Italia (PCd’I; founded in 1921) were determined to assert their autonomy from the ‘collaborationist’ Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) – which had abandoned the striking workers of the Factory Council Movement of the years 1918–19 – by closely liams 1975: 298–9). As the name suggested, an integral dimension of this straton the nature of capitalism, the working class, and most importantly the coming proletarian revolution which, it was assumed, would only be successful if it developed on a world-wide scale. For good or ill, Gramsci never abandoned any tegic realities and necessities of his time and place by articulating them to the category of the ‘national-popular’. In what follows I trace the elaboration of Gramsci’s inter nation alism by exploring his development of this crucial concept. There is little doubt that the early Gramsci was a zealous internationalist. In fact, as early as 1919 he was asserting the principle that ‘capitalism is a world historical phenomenon’ (Gramsci 1977: 69), and the use of Marxist categories in his writings to analyse diverse Western states leaves one in no doubt that for him capitalism was the essential thread of similarity that linked the international order outside Russia. If capitalism was an international phenomenon, so too was its ‘slave labour’, and Gramsci’s early admiration for Lenin and the Russian revolutionaries placed him among the sternest critics of the Italian Socialist Party which he believed had failed in its international duty to organise itself into ‘a section of the IIIrd International, powerfully integrated into the world system of revolutionary forces’ (Gramsci 1977: 155). Indeed, this dimension of Gramsci’s internationalism was further strengthened by his experience in Moscow as PCd’I Gramsci’s inter nation alism 61

representative to the Comintern from 1922–3, dealing with the intractable paradox of a party under Bordiga that endlessly asserted its commitment to the International while refusing to co-operate in the implementation of the Comintern’s United Front strategy (Fiori 1970: 159–63). It was no coincidence that Gramsci’s successful bid to take leadership of the party was mounted precisely on this terrain of international co-operation on his return to Italy in 1924.

‘It is not enough to say that one is disciplined’, he therefore told the Party at the Como conference that year. ‘It is necessary to situate oneself on the terrain of activity indicated by the International’ (Gramsci 1978: 252). While this certainly demonstrated an excessive internationalism on Gramsci’s part in his early years and an all-too dogmatic willingness to reach for the Leninist principle that ‘every communist must be an internationalist’ in his internal Party wrangling with Bordiga (Gramsci 1978: 298), it would be wrong to suggest that it was simply a case of Gramsci submissively acquiescing in the subjection of the PCd’I to the dictates of an emerging Stalinism (Bates 2002: 287–8). In fact, it was more a measure of Gramsci’s belief that no revolution within one national territory – i.e. Russia – could survive unless it took on an international character (Gramsci 1978: 27–8). Accordingly, what was required was an international body (the Comintern) capable of organising and coordinating such a world-wide revolutionary programme. Indeed, we have no reason to assume that Gramsci ever recanted his stated conviction on the eve of the foundation of the PCd’I at Livorno that

The Italian working class knows that the condition for its own selfemancipation, and for its ability to emancipate all the other classes exploited and oppressed by capitalism in Italy, is the existence of a system of world revolutionary forces all conspiring to the same end. (Gramsci 1977: 377)

defeat of the European working classes in the aftermath of the First World War and the Russian Revolution – particularly in Italy where Fascism had all but his early taste for this somewhat abstract and schematic internationalism which he would later associate with Trotsky (Femia 2005: 344; Gramsci 1971: 84–5). Much of this rethinking took place under the category of the national-popular in the two years before his imprisonment and later in his Prison Notebooks where Gramsci recanted his early ‘workerism’ and began to see the need for the PCd’I to adopt a hegemonic strategy of ‘class alliance’ between the northern proletariat, the southern peasantry and the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia (Forgacs 1993: ambivalent support for Bordiga’s vanguardist conception of the Party and embraced the Comintern’s United Front strategy of developing a truly mass organisation (Hoare and Nowell Smith 1971a: lviii–lxvii). It was this rumination 62 M. McNally

on the necessity for the Party to build alliances and to develop a mass base that was the context for the revision of his internationalism and his development of the concept of the national-popular.

its transformative quality. It in fact indicated the necessity for the PCd’I, its intellectuals and the programmes and strategies they promoted to shed the cosmopolitanism that had for too long characterised Italy’s intellectual classes and international Marxism, and to reconnect with the socio-economic needs and cultural demands of the common people. In contrast to contemporary discussions of cosmopolitanism which tend to focus on moral arguments for embracing diversity and forging a ‘cosmopolitan vision’ in response to the development of global economic processes and responsibilities (for example, Beck 2006; Fine 2007; Held 2006), Gramsci had a much more concrete and historical understanding of this term related to the shared cultural and ideological assumptions of ency to assume oneself (like the leaders of the Catholic Church and the Roman Empire) to be a citizen of a ‘universal’ ( kosmo-) ‘polity’ ( polis) and accordingly to apply ‘universal concepts’ that have little more than ‘ “geographical” seats’ in each nation (Gramsci 1971: 117). For Gramsci what resulted was analysis and concerns of the masses. A national-popular strategy for Gramsci meant above all the need to abandon this ‘intellectualism’, and for the Party to embed itself in the national traditions of the people-nation, winning over in particular their leading intellectuals (Forgacs 1985: 196). This would not, however, require the proletariat to reject its international commitments, but rather would require this class that ‘is international in character’ and that seeks to guide ‘social strata which are narrowly national (intellectuals), and indeed frequently even less than national

. . . to “nationalise” itself in a certain sense’ (Gramsci 1971: 241). But it was not simply a question of each European Communist Party building

‘sentimental and historical links with its own people’ and respecting their national characteristics (Gramsci 1971: 19–20). In Gramsci’s view, for the Party to take on a truly national-popular character it would also have to be a popular force which alone would ensure its ability to lead a hegemonic alliance. This would necessitate a truly democratic structure within the Party which recognised, nonetheless, that in all ‘collective action’ ‘there really do exist rulers and ruled, leaders and led’

(Gramsci 1971: 144). The democratic question for Gramsci then became one of ensuring that the proletarian leadership genuinely understood and responded to the demands of the people; becoming ‘an articulation with organic functions of the people themselves’ who ‘feel tied to them’ and ‘know and sense their needs, aspirations and feelings’ (Gramsci 1985: 209). Above all it was essential to avoid the leadership’s descent into a closed, bureaucratic and authoritarian form of caste rule (Gramsci 1971: 188–90), and to protect and maintain its popularity Gramsci First and foremost, the proletarian leadership would have to divest itself of any sectarian (‘economic-corporate’) bias and become a truly ‘national’ group by gen- Gramsci’s inter nation alism 63

uinely promoting the interests and identity of all its economic and cultural allies. It was precisely this lack of a national-popular programme that Gramsci believed was missing in the Risorgimento. The Action Party, he thus argued, which ‘ought to have allied itself with the rural masses’ could only have succeeded if support was won from two directions: from the peasant masses, by accepting their elementary demands and making these an integral part of the new programme of government; and from the intellectuals of the middle and lower strata, by concentrating them and stressing the themes most capable of interesting them.

(Gramsci 1971: 74)

Second, the leadership was required to adopt an energetic, resolute and creative approach to Party objectives (‘Jacobinism’), pursuing vigorously the progressive interests of all parties to the alliance (Gramsci 1971: 66) and thereby awakening and organising a ‘national-popular collective will’ (Gramsci 1971: 131). This was again a revision of Gramsci’s early internationalism since it emphasised the need to avoid any ‘bookish’ or dogmatic application of principles across nations in the manner of Trotsky whom Gramsci accused in the Prison Notebooks of taking up ‘the “Jacobin” slogan [permanent revolution]’ in a ‘systematised’ and

‘intellectualised’ manner. By contrast, Gramsci advocated a ‘Jacobin temperament . . . derived from the new historical relations, and not from a literary and intellectualistic label’; a form of Jacobinism that ‘adhered to actual, concrete, living history, adapted to the time and the place; as something that sprang from all the pores of the particular society which had to be transformed’ (Gramsci 1971: 84–5).

What these revisions of Gramsci’s internationalism under the category of the

‘national-popular’ indicated, moreover, was the increasing strategic character of relation of forces and the need for the Party to adopt a war of position to build an alliance of forces to defeat the capitalist opposition (Forgacs 1993: 183). Gramsci’s adoption of the concept of the ‘national-popular’ in this context thus signibegin by winning the battle with the bourgeoisie on its own national terrain (Gramsci 1971: 174). The development of Fascism in Italy had in fact made each national community, especially since Mussolini had managed to integrate into his movement the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie and their intellectuals. Indeed, Gramsci believed that the PCd’I had actually facilitated the rise of Fascism through its passivity and failure to appeal to these popular elements (Gramsci 1971: 199–200). The ‘national-popular’ was therefore a strategic as tate the Party not only to win over and maintain the support of the popular masses, but also to deny and erode the support of the enemy as the Jacobins had done in revolutionary France. For they above all had understood the necessity to 64 M. McNally

place themselves ‘at the head of all the national forces’ which ‘meant identifying the interests and the requirements common to all the national forces, in order to set these forces in motion and lead them into the struggle’. This crucially not only expanded one’s own forces but also deprived the enemy ‘of every zone of passivity in which it would be possible to enrol Vendée-type armies’. It was such attention to strategy that made the Jacobins, for Gramsci, ‘realists of the Machiavelli stamp’ who adopted their tactics to meet ‘the exigencies of the French cultural tradition’, and who were therefore the archetypes from whom any movement which had a mind to become ‘national-popular’ should learn (Gramsci 1971: 78–9).

It would, however, be a mistake to regard Gramsci’s integration of the concept of the ‘national-popular’ into his theory of hegemony as evidence that he had abandoned completely his early internationalism. In fact the Prison Note- books contain adequate testimony that Gramsci continued to treat capitalism as a world-wide historical phenomenon, continued to regard the working class as having an international character, and continued to believe that only an international revolution could bring about the overthrow of capitalism and the emancipation of the proletariat. Indeed, Gramsci made clear that his development of the concept of the national-popular represented an enrichment rather than an abandonment of his international perspective. First, he insisted that his increased sensitivity to the need for the Party to carry out a rigorous analysis of the national terrain and to embed itself within it was by no means an endorsement of an uncompromising particularism, since it was also ‘necessary to take into account the fact that international relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations’

(Gramsci 1971: 182).

Second, Gramsci was careful to reject the notion that all that was required was for each national proletariat to win the battle of hegemony within its own borders. Even when insisting on the novel principles that ‘the international situation should be considered in its national aspect’ and that ‘the internal relations of any nation are the result of a combination which is “original” and (in a certain sense) unique’, Gramsci was quick to add that ‘the line of development is towards internationalism’. Gramsci, in fact, saw no contradiction in asserting that the ‘the point of departure is “national” – and it is from this point of departure that one must begin’ (Gramsci 1971: 240), and envisaging an expansion of each national revolution beyond its borders to link up with other forces working for the international defeat of capitalism.

The latter, however, required the existence of an international organisation to coordinate strategy, manage assistance and plan ahead which reveals the third prison years when completely alienated from the sectarian and totally unrealistic programme of the Comintern under Stalin’s so-called ‘Third Period’, Gramsci never lost sight of the necessity for an international movement to develop cooperation between the anti-capitalist forces at this level, which is why of course he had defended the Comintern so vociferously in his disputes with Bordiga. It Gramsci’s inter nation alism 65

is this above all that explains Gramsci’s oft-quoted declaration that ‘the perspective is international and cannot be otherwise’ for even if ‘it is necessary to study accurately the combination of national forces which the international class [the proletariat] will have to lead and develop’, this nonetheless must also be coordinated ‘in accordance with the international perspective and directives [i.e. those of the Comintern]’ (Gramsci 1971: 240). What emerges then from this analysis is Gramsci’s determination to balance national and international perspectives, producing an inter nation alist approach to political analysis and strategy that incorporated the two. It now remains to be seen just what lessons we can draw from Gramsci in relation to the contemporary Alternative Globalisation Movement. The Gramscian turn of social movements and the Alternative Globalisation Movement

There are good reasons for believing that the problems Gramsci confronted in the 1920s and 1930s in theorising the transition of capitalism, and the kinds of solutions he proffered, are so radically incommensurate with our own time that they are of little practical value today in analysing and assessing ‘social movements’ such as the AGM.1 Nonetheless, what I intend to suggest here by way of establishing a preliminary rationale for applying Gramsci’s ideas to the AGM is that although we might well acknowledge that these movements are considerably out of step with Gramsci’s concern with the capture of state power by a massbetween Gramsci’s transformative political analysis and that endorsed by social sising that some of the central characteristics of these movements and the kind of political strategies they engage in that are sometimes described as unique to late modernity were long ago advocated by Gramsci. Take, for example, the importance these movements attribute to civil society as a sphere of political mobilisation in contemporary societies. Indeed, in the early 1980s one of the most prominent scholars of social movements declared this development as inaugurating a ‘holistic politics’ marked by ‘the end of the separation between public and private areas’ (Melucci 1981: 180). Or indeed, the fundamental focus of social movements on developing ‘ a common interpretation of reality to nurture conditions for wider political change (della Porta et al., 2006: 18–19, my italics). No scholar of Antonio Gramsci could fail to recognise these principal themes of social movements as basic to Gramsci’s own thought. It was Gramsci after all who understood more than any Marxist before him the vital political consequence of winning the battle of hegemony in civil society (Femia 1981: ducting a vigorous ideological struggle of ‘intellectual and moral reform’ to

‘transform the popular “mentality” ’ and weld ‘a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims’ into ‘a single aim, on the basis of an equal and 66 M. McNally

common conception of the world’ creating in effect ‘a “collective man” ’

(Gramsci 1971: 133, 348–9). If this should already suggest that Gramsci’s ideas are a lot less alien to the concerns of contemporary social movements than is sometimes suggested, the case is made even more robust by considering recent trends in the mobilisation strategies of these movements and especially the AGM.

First, there is little doubt that social movements in Western democracies have been moving towards a more ‘institutionalised’ and ‘professionalised’ form of politics, concerned to further their aims with recourse to the more traditional loci of power whether at state or supra-state levels (Tilly 2004: 156). In this respect, they have clearly edged closer to a Gramscian approach of conducting a dual strategy of winning not only the ideological battle in civil society, but also the the days when social movements could be viewed as ‘non-institutional’ or ‘antiinstitutional’ in nature (Alberoni 1984: 15); ‘loosely structured’ and ‘short-lived’

groups engaged in cyclical protest (Oberschall 1980: 45–6); or ‘networks of informal interactions’ that barely merit the title of organisation (Diani 1992: 13); concerned mainly with defending individual autonomy from the increasing encroachment of the state in civil society (Melucci 1989). The Green movement is of course the archetypical example of the institutionalisation of social movements since the 1980s (Rootes 2005: 32–4), but it should be noted that the AGM

– despite its emphasis on protest – has also been taking a similar direction. This tions with traditional political organisations such as political parties of the Left and trade unions that live a double life of street and institutional politics (della Porta et al., 2006: 58–9), and also in the increasing willingness of the ‘social forums’, established originally as ‘counter-summits’, to engage in lobbying and more conventional forms of political activity (della Porta et al., 2006: 122; Tarrow 2005: 128–134).

Second, and particularly relevant to the AGM, is the growing awareness among social movements that declarations of a postindustrial, postmaterialist predominantly middle-class order (Inglehart 1977) – which along with the decline in class politics had been originally closely linked to the emergence of new social movements (Melucci 1989; Touraine 1978) – have proved far too optimistic. This has led many social movements – including the AGM – to reintegrate traditional economic demands in their campaigns. A recent study of the AGM thus argues:

again becoming central in the political debate. In this sense, the movement on globalisation challenges researchers to reopen the academic debate on (della Porta et al., 2006: 243–4)

Gramsci’s inter nation alism 67

This return of the economic has once again drawn social movements closer to the Gramscian paradigm. Indeed, it is tempting to contend that the AGM in particular, with its growing emphasis on ‘social justice’ and ‘social rights’, is moving towards taking up the struggle for transition as Gramsci originally advocated (Sassoon 1987: 119–25) at all three levels of the ‘historical bloc’: in the economic order, in the institutions of the state and in civil society. Finally, and closely related to the former changes, social movements can no longer be characterised as they were by some in the 1980s and 1990s as mainly

‘single-issue’ protest organisations (della Porta et al., 2006: 246) which jealously defend their right of ‘autonomy of struggle’ from the institutionalised Left in particular (Scott 1990: 20–2). The new and increasing willingness of social movements to form alliances (della Porta and Diani 2006: 2; Tarrow 2005: 211), as witnessed by the Greens at the national level and the AGM at the international line with the key strategic logic of Gramsci’s hegemony. Indeed, it is no coinciadvanced capitalist societies’ (Boggs 1986: 57; see, too, Laclau and Mouffe 1982; 1985: 165–71). There is of course no better example of a social movement that has fully embraced the Gramscian logic of alliance than the AGM; a true

‘movement of movements’ (Pianta 2001) that brings together groups that are as variegated as political parties, trade unions, farmers’ and workers’ organisations, ethnic minority and migrant groups, consumer associations, religious groups, environmental groups, peace campaigners and women’s associations (della Porta and Diani 2006: 4). The viability and potential of this coalition, however, seems best illustrated by highlighting the absence of a serious national-popular dimension to the AGM’s current alternative globalisation strategy that places it at odds with Gramsci’s inter nation alism.

Engaging the ‘globalism’ of the Alternative Globalisation Movement

As demonstrated above, the kernel of Gramsci’s inter nation alism was precisely hegemony at the level of each nation if a new international order was to be created. This required, above all, a national-popular strategy that was based on a operative in each nation-state, and the willingness to lead the popular and subaltern elements by abandoning sectarianism and elitism of an internationalist nature, and pursuing vigorously the demands of the people-nation. In my view, this vision and strategy of transforming the international order remains much more realistic and attractive than the globalism of the AGM. The following, therefore, subjects the AGM’s globalism to a Gramscian critique focusing in particular on the AGM’s leadership and democratic organisation; its markedly 68 M. McNally

cosmopolitan ideology; and its excessively global political strategy. In each case, it is my contention that the AGM has much to learn from Gramsci, and espegenre of inter nation alism that remains useful in contemporary political conditions.

Let us begin with the question of leadership and democratic organisation. Despite the increasing institutionalisation of the AGM noted earlier, it will come as no surprise to the reader that there remains within its ranks a continuing antagonism towards ‘traditional politics’ and especially organisation on a ‘professional’ or ‘instrumental’ basis. In fact, the Movement’s very identity is based on its determination to resist centralised leadership and to maintain a transparent and fully democratic structure, which for the AGM is precisely what distinguishes it from its undemocratic opponents (the WTO, the G8, the IMF and WB) and heralds the emergence of a new and more democratic global order. Observers have long noted the ad hoc quality of leadership in social movements and their resistance to hierarchy and formalisation (Barker et al., 2001) and scholars of the AGM are no exception here. In particular, they point out its determination to allow each group in the coalition to maintain its autonomy which gives it a power structure of a decidedly decentralised and multi-centric quality (della Porta et al., 2006: 28). More importantly, the persistent emphasis on participatory democracy rather than ‘corrupt’ representative democracy also militates against any attempt to install a professional centralised leadership (della Porta et al., 2006: 49–57). Indeed, maximising participation is an increasing trend within the ‘social forums’ and the AGM more generally where a ‘consensus method’

involving laborious and multi-level consultation is now frequently employed to protect ‘the unitary-plural nature of the movement as well as members’ demands for more individual protagonism’ (Fruci 2003: 169). While one might wish to commend the democratic idealism of the AGM and its determination to meet the laudable criteria of maximum and equal participation, transparency and consensus, it can be argued from a Gramscian perspective that these are pursued to such a degree that they end up undermining the effectiveness and ultimately the popularity of the Movement. Gramsci, it will be recalled, under the rubric of the national-popular, maintained that popular support required not only the avoidance of bureaucratised leadership and widespread consultation and consent, but also the existence of a measure of centralforward the programme for transformation (Gramsci 1971: 62). It is the latter element that has precisely been missing in the AGM, and it has seriously thwarted the movement’s ability to take the initiative and make swift and resofrom a Gramscian perspective since effective leadership is a vital necessity for the maintenance of popularity. The main problem of course lies in the AGM’s present determination to organise globally – with all of the above democratic safeguards – which prevents the Movement from developing a vigorous and innovative leadership and makes it unwieldy to manage and manoeuvre to say Gramsci’s inter nation alism 69

the least. Indeed, it is arguable that this tendency to become bogged down in endless consultation and negotiation while making little progress on its primary objectives is now eroding the popular support from which the Movement ini2 In sum, what the AGM has failed to recognise is that there are through a national-popular strategy related to balancing effective leadership with meaningful democratic structures, both of which inevitably suffer when attempted on a global scale.

AGM, there is moreover good reason to doubt the effectiveness of the cosmopolitan and excessively abstract quality of the AGM’s ideology from a Gramscian perspective. Particularly problematic here is its tendency to deploy a rhetoric that treats the world as a single political and cultural entity, especially given that this ‘global ideology’ is supposed to bond and consolidate its alliance and create the collective identity which would ensure enduring commitments and spontaneous mobilisation. Analysts of the AGM have tended to theorise this

‘meaning work’ under the categories of ‘frames’ and ‘master-frames’ (della Porta et al., 2006; Snow and Benford 1988; Tarrow 2005; McAdam and Tarrow 2005); a frame being a kind of ‘interpretative schemata capable of lending cohesiveness to various kinds of struggles, campaigns, and mobilisations on different issues while giving them unifying and coherent meaning’ (della Porta et al., 2006: 64). This of course is what any Gramscian scholar would recognise as the AGM’s ideological strategy, and there can be little doubt of its cosmopolitan and abstract character. Indeed, the empirical work carried out by della Porta and her colleagues on the AGM makes this all too apparent.

First, the Movement and the European and World Social Forums in particular focus their critique – or diagnostic in the language of social movement theorists –

on ‘neo-liberal globalisation that is promoted, reinforced and defended by a combination of IGOs (WTO, WB, IMF, NATO), a hegemonic super power (United States), and . . . multinational corporations’. The grievances included range from

‘exploitation of workers to poverty; from gender, racial and ethnic discrimination to environmental problems and the lack of migrant rights’ (della Porta et al., 2006: 67, 71). Moreover, analysis of the Movement’s political literature at protests in Seattle (1999), Genoa (2001) and Florence (2003) – as well as the documents of the ESF and the WSF – reveal that the AGM’s ‘alternative globalisation’

ideology is primarily organised around the idea of ‘global social justice’: as one source puts it, ‘ “everything” has to do with social justice.’ The causes which the

‘development, democracy, environment, health, human rights, workers’ rights and the rights of women and children’ as well as a demand for ‘civil society’s full participation’ (della Porta et al., 2006: 74–5). Now I need hardly point out the highly globalised and abstract character of this ideological discourse that lacks with reference to their unique and particular socio-economic and cultural demands in the manner of Gramsci’s national-popular. This demonstrates the AGM’s 70 M. McNally

determination to pursue its struggle for justice in the global language of cosmoby the movement against neo-liberal globalisation is one between two ways of being cosmopolitan; neo-liberal versus egalitarian’. It is of course only such a global and cosmopolitan master-frame that ‘is able to link very different actors from different social, political, organisational, and geographical sites’ across the globe (della Porta et al., 2006: 63–4, 234), and here again there seem serious objections that can be made to the AGM’s globalist ideological strategy from a Gramscian national-popular and inter nation alist perspective. The key charge that a Gramscian would undoubtedly make against such an ideological strategy – as we have seen above – is that it is likely to give rise to a form of sectarianism and elitism when transformed to the national arena, and therefore, will fail to appeal to the masses. While the AGM frequently vaunts its mass support base in protests against the forces of neo-liberal globalisation –

‘You G8, We 6 Billion’ at Genoa in 2001 – one is bound to wonder just how global in terms of mass support is the ‘Movement for Globalisation from Below’, to employ another of its epithets. Now that the mass mobilisations appear to be on the wane it is perhaps an opportune moment to ask if they were not after all extremely deceptive. A Gramscian, indeed, could argue that the AGM’s cosmopolitan ideology has in fact failed to resonate at the national level, and therefore remains the preserve of radical elites whose militant globalism appears irrelevant to the masses who remain embedded in nationalpopular ideological contexts. Of course, one might well argue at this point that I am applying a Gramscian critical concept – the national-popular – in an era in which it has long outlived its usefulness given the great disparity between Gramsci’s day and our own; and especially given that we now supposedly live in an economically, politically and culturally globalised world. While it is not my intention to dispute the evident and increasing development of a global economic order, the extent and inevitability of political and cultural globalisation, I believe, has been seriously overstated by many commentators and scholars of globalisation whom the AGM and its admirers have in my view followed far too uncritically. One scholar within ing the development of global political and cultural attitudes is Sidney Tarrow (Tarrow, 2005) who has anticipated much of the criticism that I am currently levelling at the AGM, no doubt largely as a consequence of the fact that he spent his formative years studying the Prison Notebooks (see Tarrow 1967). While there will be cause to return below to Tarrow’s defence of ‘transnational activism’ in terms of its ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ – a term he has borrowed from Mitchell Cohen who used it to endorse a cosmopolitanism that rejects ‘Marxism’s “abstract proletarian internationalism” ’ or what its critics call its ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’ (Tarrow 2005: 40–2) – the important point for now is that drawing on a host of sources over the last ten to twenty years including World Value Surveys and Eurobarometer polls, Tarrow comes to a conclusion that the Gramsci’s inter nation alism 71

upon. For despite the increasing talk of globalisation in journalistic, political and especially academic circles, Tarrow points out that the evidence clearly shows that ‘among both elites and ordinary citizens territorial identities are narrowly diffused, nationally contingent, and remain rooted in national and regional con- texts’ (Tarrow 2005: 72, my italics).3 This can only lead us to conclude that those who frame their ideological objectives in the language of ‘global citizenship’

and the rights and entitlements of ‘human beings’ across the planet are a marginalised elite and guilty – as Gramsci long ago pointed out – of a serious lack of realism about the political and cultural attachments of the popular masses who are likely to remain unmoved by such ideological strategies. Indeed, from a Gramscian perspective the cause of global justice is unlikely to be furthered until the AGM has developed a national-popular ideological strategy that brings home to the masses in their own particular cultural and socio-economic settings why their local variant of neo-liberalism should be resisted and replaced by a new more socially conducive economic and political order that will answer their speFinally, I turn to the most problematic characteristic of all of the AGM from a Gramscian national-popular perspective which is its strategy of political mobilisation that focuses almost exclusively on transnational economic and political institutions (the WTO, the G8, the IMF, the WB and the European Union). The global ideology outlined above is thus accompanied by a global political strategy whose most distinctive features are its counter-summits (usually in the form of social forums) and transnational protests and campaigns (della Porta et al., 2006: 26) largely emanating from civil society. Although I have noted above the increasing willingness of the AGM and social movements in general to engage with more traditional political institutions at both national and international level, the empirical work carried out by della Porta and her colleagues points to a continuing widespread feeling among the AGM’s activists that nation-state institutions are powerless and irrelevant in an era of economic globalisation. They note too an enduring antipathy towards the ‘representative’ and ‘professionalised’ style of politics practised by political parties in national institutions – including parties of the Left (della Porta et al., 2006: 199–200, 230–1). The AGM thus assumes that its contentious politics are better conducted ‘in the street’ or by ‘awareness campaigns’ against the real centres of power on the global stage. approach from a Gramscian inter nation alist and national-popular perspective. Take for example the strategic decision to concentrate the political effort on the global institutions of neo-liberalism. Even if we accept Sidney Tarrow’s view that this ‘transnational activism’ is marked by a ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ where movements which remain embedded in local contexts exploit opportunities to protest, campaign and lobby at multiple levels of governance from the regional to the national to the international – although as this ‘rootedness’ suggests Tarrow is sceptical about whether a global movement against neo-liberal globalisation exists at all (Tarrow 2005: 35–55, 74–6)4 – there still remains a grave 72 M. McNally

doubt about just what can be achieved by exploiting these so-called ‘opportunities’ for protest at the transnational level. The brutal and strategic realism inscribed in Gramsci’s national-popular strategy, I would suggest, points to a certain futility of such enterprises if they are not preceded and adequately supplemented with a serious political strategy centred on the institutions of the nation-state. For Gramsci, it should be recalled, had been deeply impressed by the organisational expertise of American and Italian Fordism in his day, and especially the notion that resources must be fully and optimally directed to achieve maximum effect. ‘Whoever wills the end, must will the means’ he declared in 1919 (Gramsci 1977: 68) and when one looks to the aims of the AGM indicated by the World Social Forum – ‘the protection and the reinforcement of the welfare state, the extension of union rights, a democratic agrarian environment and peace’ (della Porta et al., 2006: 74–9) – one could certainly argue that the current means are seriously incongruent with the stated objectives. The point is of course that not only will transnational organisations like the WTO, WB and IMF, which are committed to their own self-interest in neoliberal economics, continue to ignore and resist such protest and campaigns mounted by the AGM, or engage in the kind of co-optation and trasformismo that Paterson explored in chapter 4 of this volume. But more importantly, the EU and the United Nations (della Porta et al., 2006: 206–7) – to carry out the kind of ‘politicisation’ and ‘socialisation’ of the world economic order that they national institutions and the popular masses who elect them in individual nationstates. This is not to argue that nation-states remain absolutely sovereign in the so poignantly reminded us5 – that decisions made in transnational political institutions like the EU (and the UN for that matter) are, as Gramsci taught us long ago, inherently unstable and unlikely to carry any weight until they enjoy solid support in the democratic institutions and among the masses of at least a signiConsequently, one must conclude that if the AGM’s calls for the EU and the UN

to take the initiative in ‘socialising’ the world economic order are not to be treated as totally unrealistic, they will need to be preceded by a genuine process that occurs from below. Below in this sense – and in contrast to the AGM’s exclusive emphasis on civil society – refers primarily to the need for political parties or coalitions to be in power across a broad range of major states that have managed to win widespread support for a programme that articulates popular demands at the national level to the wider goals of an alternative globalisation. Conclusion: rebalancing the strategy of the AGM

This of course leads us back to the logic of Gramsci’s national-popular and his brand of inter nation alism outlined above, and it now seems an apposite moment Gramsci’s inter nation alism 73

to draw together the various strands of the critique made in the latter part of this chapter in relation to the AGM. In fact, this analysis of the AGM implies four general and interdependent reforms in the current strategic complexion of the Movement which are best explicated in the Gramscian language of balance.6 The favour of promoting a more nationally centralised and energetic leadership which enjoys greater autonomy and responsibility for vigorously pursuing the AGM’s objectives, taking on in effect a nodal character across the international arena – and replicating the power structure of global capitalism as interpreted by theorists like Bob Jessop and Adam Morton (Jessop 2005; Morton 2007: 75). This would come at the expense of curtailing to some extent the AGM’s current excessive emphasis on participation, consultation and widespread consensus at a global level. However, it would by no means entail the abandonment of these principles, since Gramsci saw proper democratic structures as equally crucial in preserving and building popularity, and indeed, a more federalised and autonomous organisation structure built around the nation-state would counter-balance any danger of the AGM falling prey to an equally nefarious over-centralised and correct balance between effective leadership and effective internal democracy lenge that the AGM can no longer afford to shy away from if it is not to disintegrate into a loose coalition of movements that occasionally protest about global injustice.

Second, a similar and complementary rebalancing would be required in the ideological strategy pursued by the AGM which would involve an abandonment of its excessively cosmopolitan character and a genuine effort to articulate its ideology to the themes and demands of the national-popular masses. This would and develop a realistic programme in which these could be married to the wider and more fundamental objectives of global justice. The aim here would be to create dense alliances and collective identities between progressive groups at the national level in support of a political programme that paid special attention to the ‘relation of forces’ in this arena. As we have seen above, this was the essence of the national-popular strategy which Gramsci integrated into his fundamental internationalism.

Third, and perhaps most controversially, a Gramscian reform of the AGM

would require a further and dramatic rebalancing of its mobilisation strategy towards much greater involvement in the institutional politics of the nation-state without of course abandoning the extremely valuable work that has been – and is being – carried out in civil society. There would, of course, be absolutely no point in incorporating national-popular ideological themes and demands within its programme without having access to the political machinery of the nation-state which still retains the power to deliver on many of these local issues. This implies entering national party politics which, despite the increasing involvement of 74 M. McNally

social movements and the AGM in this political sphere noted above, has so far been resolutely resisted. From a Gramscian national-popular perspective, this is without doubt the most unrealistic and contradictory characteristic of the Movement; the notion that change can somehow be effected without sullying one’s hands with the business of politics. Once again, this demonstrates a serious lack of regard for the ‘relation of forces’ reminiscent of Bordiga’s abstentionism, and indeed, recent events in Italy of all places – where control of the institutions of the state has basically been relinquished to the Italian Right as progressive politics shifts ever more in the direction of civil society – might well demonstrate the soundness of Gramsci’s conviction that there is little virtue in tactics that result in leaving vulnerable sections of society easy prey to aggressive strains of populism. While the exact form the AGM’s entrance into national party politics could take is beyond the remit of this chapter,7 a Gramscian would clearly argue that until this happens across an increasing range of major nation-states in the West there is little hope in advancing the cause of global justice. nation alist perspective suggests a new approach too in the area of global struggle. Once again, it is not a question of total abandonment of existing practice, but a rebalancing of it towards greater concentration on developing a more stable and enduring forum to coordinate political strategy between each of the national branches, at the expense of the current excessive focus on global countercampaigns and demonstrations. This body could, of course, continue to unite civil society groups and NGOs mobilising for global justice and encourage and organise protests and counter-summits aimed at the WTO, the G8, the IMF and the WB when it was judged advantageous to do so. But it would also serve particularly to build a coherent and coordinated political strategy for political parties seeking and holding power in national politics and genuinely committed to pursuing the cause of global justice in international organisations such as the European Union and the United Nations. Although it would of course take a radically different form from the Comintern in its commitment to democratic structures and non-violent politics, it would nonetheless share something in common with the vision of coordinated inter nation alism that Gramsci foresaw as the proper role of that institution before it had been reduced by Stalin to a cynical tool of Soviet foreign policy.

There is, however, little point in naively assuming that the AGM is anywhere have seen above, trends in the last ten years do suggest moves in this Gramscian direction but this also needs to be considered in light of the more recent decline of the AGM – partly as a consequence of world-wide fears over ‘international terrorism’ that have been skilfully manipulated for reactionary purposes and to discredit any movement that promotes radical change. Here again there is a need for a good deal of Gramscian realism about the current relation of forces both at the national and international level in order to avoid setting unrealistic objectives and leaving the Movement open to charges of excessive idealism. But history teaches us that radical change frequently occurs when it is least expected, and it Gramsci’s inter nation alism 75

is inevitably those forces that have most consistently promoted and predicted it –

and crucially prepared for it – that are best placed to fully exploit it. Indeed, viewed in this light it is tempting to assert that the AGM has already made one the globe – including so many young people – that ‘another world is possible’. Notes

1 A social movement is ‘a distinct social process, consisting of the mechanisms through

‘share a distinct collective identity’ (della Porta and Diani 2006: 20). 2 For example, the AGM’s protests at the G8 summit in Japan (summer 2008) and at the WTO Doha talks in Geneva (July 2008) failed to attract the kind of mass support or media attention they enjoyed in the past.

3 On the assumption that if there is anywhere in the world where one would expect to see an increase in ‘global thinking’ among ‘ordinary citizens’ it would be in Western Europe, Tarrow focuses his attention on surveys conducted here from the 1980s onwards. In a section revealingly entitled ‘Unglobal Citizens’ Tarrow shows that through the whole process of European integration in the 1980s and 1990s – creating a single market and instituting a common currency – surveys consistently found that local and national attachments maintained their salience with over 80 per cent of respondents identifying these as their primary attachments. Indeed, the more recent Eurobarometer and World Value Surveys he cites show that approximately 90 per cent of respondents continue to regard these as their primary identities (Tarrow 2005: 70–2). 4 Hence the lack of engagement here with Tarrow’s work on transnational activism. 5 The rejection of the European Constitution in France and the Netherlands in 2005 and then the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland in July 2008.

6 I explore the importance of conceptions of balance and equilibrium in Gramsci’s political thought in McNally 2008. 7 For wider discussions on the contemporary relevance of Gramsci’s ideas on agency and the role of the political party in effecting change see Schwarzmantel (chapter 6) and Devine and Purdy (chapter 12) in this volume.

Part II

Theorising the political

6

Gramsci and the problem of

political agency

John Schwarzmantel

The problem of political agency

The problem of agency is one of the most important in any political theory. By

‘agency’ is meant here the analysis of those forces and movements which bring into being the alternative society sketched out by the theory in question. The purpose of this chapter is to question whether Gramsci’s political writings offer a view of political agency appropriate to contemporary politics, in the context of a society which has changed so radically since his own time. It is argued here that Gramsci poses the problem in a way which is still relevant, even if his parnow than in his own time. distinguished itself from its so-called utopian predecessors by its insistence on Marxist theory was not merely presenting in abstract terms a picture of an ideal or perfect society, but was exploring developments in the current society which were laying the basis for the different society of the future. In the mindset of classical Marxism, the aim of its theory was to identify those forces which, within the womb of present-day reality, were creating the preconditions for an alternative form of social order. The dynamism of capitalism was leading to the centralisation, growing technological sophistication and larger scale of the means of production needed for the collective society of the future. Furthermore, Marxism classically sought to identify not just the material preconditions of the socialist society of the future, but the human agents who were to bring that new society into being, namely the organised working class or proletariat. The question of how exactly, in very practical terms, this human agency was to realise its potential as the initiator or creator of a different social order, was one which divided the working-class movement from its origins. Were the workers themselves directly to take over the means of production at the point of production? Was the emphasis to be on direct action, or rather on parliamentary action led by a mass party on the model of German social democracy? Or did this latter model bring with it the danger, as already the anarchists had charged in the days of the First International, that it would create a new socialist elite of party leaders? Such an elite, the anarchist 80 J. Schwarzmantel

Bakunin feared, would be composed of ‘former workers, who would stop being workers the moment they became rulers or representatives, and would then come to regard the whole blue-collared world from governmental heights’ (Bakunin 1973: 269). To these questions debated from the very origins of working-class politics as a mass movement were added those which were posed by the successful seizure of power by the Bolsheviks in October 1917: they owed their success, it seemed, to the agency of a highly centralised party bringing socialist consciousness to the masses, as Lenin had indicated in his text of 1902, What Is To Be Done? (Lenin 1973). The apparent success of this model of the party raised new questions of the relationship of ‘class’ to ‘party’, and the problem of what kind of party was needed to mobilise the working class and provide them with the intellectual inspiration to transcend limited and economistic aims. There is no doubt that Gramsci shared in general terms the Marxist belief in the working class as the necessary agent of revolutionary social change. In his own practical political life he was keenly aware of the problem of how to give practical expression to the capacities of the working class, in order to raise them from their ‘subaltern’ position to one in which they could become ‘directive’

( dirigente) and hegemonic. This meant transcending limited concerns of improving their economic condition within the existing order, though it did not signify that such concerns were of no importance. More particularly, Gramsci’s interpretation of Marxism as the ‘philosophy of praxis’ (even if this was a term devised to fool the censor of the Prison Notebooks, when Gramsci wanted to talk about Marxism) was one which stressed the importance of human agency. This entailed a critique of a passive ‘economistic’ reading of Marxism which saw revolution as the predestined outcome of economic forces. In his interpretation of Machiavelli, Gramsci makes it clear that he saw political action as aiming at

‘what could be’, but that this had to be on the basis of ‘what is’. In that sense, political action depended on the ability to analyse the agents present in the existing order, whose capacity could be developed to bring into being ‘what ought to be’. The active politician, Gramsci wrote,

neither creates from nothing nor does he move in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective reality, but what is this effective reality? Is it something static and immobile, or is it not rather a relation of forces in continuous motion and shift of equilibrium?

(Gramsci 1971: 172)

Gramsci developed his thoughts on agency in the same passage as follows: If one applies one’s will to the creation of a new equilibrium among the forces which really exist and are operative – basing oneself on the particular force which one believes to be progressive and strengthening it to help it to victory – one still moves on the terrain of effective reality, but does so in order to dominate and transcend it (or to contribute to this). What ‘ought to be’ is therefore concrete.

(Gramsci 1971: 172)

Gramsci and political agency 81

The question to be probed in what follows is whether Gramsci’s analysis of society very different from the one in which he developed his ideas. Gramsci writes in the passage just quoted of ‘forces which really exist and are operative’, but what exactly did he understand those forces to be, how did he see them becoming ‘operative’ in an effective way? And more importantly, once we have established what his conception of political and social agency was, are those forces still in existence and can they be made ‘operative’ in a world very different from his? Whatever one’s views of the rather vague concept of ‘multitude’

proposed by Hardt and Negri, they are right to point out that some of the basic traditional models of political activism, class struggle and revolutionary organisation have today become outdated and useless . . . The current global recomposition of social classes, the hegemony of immaterial labour, and the forms of decision-making based on network structures all radically change the conditions of any revolutionary process. (Hardt and Negri 2006: 68)

These are problems which are important not just for Gramsci’s Marxism, but for Marxism in general, and beyond that for any theory of radical politics in the circumstances of contemporary liberal-democracy. In a much more fragmented society in which the working class is both different in nature and less of a signirelevance in anything other than a historical sense? Are his views out-of-date, are operative’? If that is the case, then one might have to look for new agencies of politics and social action to realise the ends to which Gramsci aspired. Alternatively, as a more pessimistic implication, one might have to conclude that his aims of ‘intellectual and moral reform’ and of forming a new ‘collective will’

are impossible to achieve in a more individualistic and diverse society where the very idea of a cohesive transformative agent of politics is no longer a realistic aspiration. A postmodern form of analysis might well conclude that the very concept of agency is suspect, since it has dangerous totalitarian implications of a deeply sinister or illiberal in their implications, as well as lacking a social base in contemporary society. In a society highlighting diversity and identity politics, can we give any sense to such modernist perspectives of social engineering through a single-minded agency of social and political change?

Gramsci’s views on the question of agency changed over the course of his political career, and displayed tensions between a more ‘top down’ and a more

‘bottom up’ perspective. In his early writings it was the factory councils which he saw as the potential bases of a new state. In the Prison Notebooks, it was the idea of the ‘Modern Prince’, the political party as a collective intellectual, that replaced the factory councils as the chief agent of radical change. The question to be probed further is whether either of these ideas has any purchase in the conditions 82 J. Schwarzmantel

of a more fragmented or postmodern society, marked by such features as the greater hold of neo-liberalism as a hegemonic ideology world-wide, and the to Gramsci’s ideas, and makes it imperative to question his analysis anew, asking political forces at work in the world today.

Two models of political agency

One can start the task of exposition by presenting two models of political agency which are to be found in Gramsci’s writings at different stages of his political career. These two models are that of the factory councils, compared with that of the ‘Modern Prince’. Both have something in common: they were envisaged by Gramsci as agents of revolution in the sense that he saw them as institutions which could create a new mentality and diffuse a culture in opposition to the one that had been hitherto dominant. Such a new culture was, for Gramsci, a precondition for the fundamental transformation of the existing order. It was there that Gramsci’s originality lay when compared with other more orthodox Marxists or writers in the socialist school. His perspective always emphasised the importance of culture, the need for a new awareness to be diffused throughout society before political action in the narrower sense could be effective. Thus Gramsci in all his writings widened the scope of the political, extending it beyond the understanding of political action radical kind could only be effective if undertaken with a new perspective. The task of political agents was to develop this new perspective, not in any brainwashing or indoctrinating sense, but by extending individuals’ own understanding of their situation and enlarging their perspective beyond narrow economic or corporatist limits. That was certainly how Gramsci envisaged Marxism, or ‘the philosophy of praxis’ as he called it – something that would enlarge human culture and provide a new Weltanschauung which would not be the preserve of a narrow stratum of learned intellectuals but would embrace wider strata of the population. It would perform the task which the Reformation had carried out in an earlier historical epoch, as compared with the Renaissance, which Gramsci saw as restricted to the learned sections of society (Gramsci 1971: 393). If this was the task that had to be performed, the question arose of how it was to be carried out and the agencies or forces by which it could be successfully achieved. Such a new culture would not emerge automatically or spontaneously. It required an agency to develop it, some expression and be extended to larger masses of people. which could be called a model of revolution from below, a more ‘bottom up’ perFrench syndicalist theorist Georges Sorel as institutions fostering a new mentality Gramsci and political agency 83

or a new ethics of the producers. The young Gramsci in some of his writings expressed a suspicion of both political party and trade unions as agents of the

‘intellectual and moral reform’ which he advocated. The factory councils were seen as more promising agents of such reform. They operated directly at the point of production and so were more effective than parties and unions because those latter agents were more integrated into the texture of established society. The type) was prone to separate itself from the working masses. Through its electoralism it became absorbed into the parliamentary process. The history of Italian politics and of German social democracy provided classical examples of such trasformismo, whereby the party distanced itself from those it was supposed to represent and its leaders became part of the established order. The unions, similarly, were concerned with bargaining within the established framework of capitalist relations of production, so they could not be effective agents for the transformation of consciousness which Gramsci envisaged. cils, where he wrote:

Revolutionary organisations (political parties and trade unions) arise in the developments of liberty and democracy in general, and where relations of citizen to citizen still exist. The revolutionary process takes place in the sphere of production, in the factory, where the relations are those of oppressor to oppressed, exploiter to exploited, where freedom for the worker does not exist, and democracy does not exist.

(Gramsci 1977: 261)

In the same article Gramsci argued that the problem with the political party and the trade union as organisations was that ‘they do not supersede the bourgeois state’. By contrast, in his words, ‘the actual unfolding of the revolutionary process takes place subterraneously, in the murky depths of the factory and of the minds of the countless multitudes that capitalism subjects to its laws’

(Gramsci 1977: 261). Gramsci was echoing, no doubt intentionally, Sieyes’ rev nothing in the present political order but wanted to become something and demanded recognition in political terms: The revolutionary process takes place where the worker is nothing but intends to become all, where the power of the proprietor is unlimited, where the proprietor has power of life or death over the worker, and over his wife and children.

(Gramsci 1977: 261)

His view of the factory councils was that they were ‘working-class institutions of a new type’ and could become the embryonic basis of a new type of state or political 84 J. Schwarzmantel

as we know with historical hindsight, one that was not realised in practice. Gramsci insisted that there could be no political change without a cultural transformation in was the fact that he envisaged the means of such transformation as taking place directly in the factory, at the point of production where workers met and associated and could acquire the consciousness of their potentially directing role as opposed to accepting their subordinate position as a ‘given’. Drawing the conclusion from the defeat of the factory councils movement and meditating more generally on the victory of Fascism in his Prison Note- books, it seems that Gramsci remained convinced that the task to be achieved was the same (the transformation of consciousness or a Renan-like ‘moral and intellectual reform’) but that the agent or initiator of such a change had to be different. No longer was it the factory council as a form of direct democracy at the point of production, but the emphasis now shifted to the political party. This was the modern equivalent of Machiavelli’s Prince, a political organisation whose members collectively would develop the new consciousness required for successful political action of a revolutionary kind. Gramsci envisaged an organic link between party and class. His model was not so much a Leninist vanguard party, but a more differentiated one of an army which has its leaders but also has strata of the population. The party was conceived in this model as less of a vanguard and more of a channel or link between the higher intellectuals and leaders on the one hand and the broad masses on the other. The role of the party was to Gramsci puts it (Gramsci 1975: 1382), could be linked to the more sophisticated leaders who understand the subtleties of the doctrine to be diffused. It is interesting to note Gramsci’s almost admiring remarks concerning the way in which the Catholic Church succeeded in this task, doing it better than some other more modern intellectual movements: ‘The Roman church has always been the most Gramsci 1971: 328).

Gramsci contrasted the efforts of the Catholic Church in this respect with philosophers like Croce and Gentile who were ‘not able to create an ideological als’ (Gramsci 1971: 329). Gramsci insisted that a philosophy could only ‘become and to resolve’ (Gramsci 1971: 330). This was clearly how he envisaged Marxism or the ‘philosophy of praxis’ developing, as a living doctrine in touch with the masses, with the party as the conduit or channel for such a development. The party would provide the stimulus or the leadership for the ‘simple’ or the ‘early’ and the ‘later’ Gramsci. There is continuity concerning the task to be Gramsci and political agency 85

undertaken (reform of consciousness), but discontinuity with reference to the agent appropriate to this task. Gramsci moved from seeing the factory councils as the chief institutions for achieving change in the minds of ‘the countless multitudes’ to a view that it was a revolutionary communist party that had to perform unproblematic way ‘injecting’ socialist consciousness into an inherently economistic working class. What he envisaged was much more of an organic and reciprocal relationship between party and broad masses, a relationship of teacher and taught, in which as Gramsci also wrote, ‘every teacher is always a pupil and every pupil a teacher’ (Gramsci 1971: 350).

Agency in contemporary capitalism

The fact that there are these two models of political agency in Gramsci is no startling revelation, nor is the insistence on the difference between them, even though the contrast of a bottom-up (factory councils) model versus a top-down model (the party, the Modern Prince) may be both too schematic and too simplistic. The more important point is that both models of political agency are especially problematic in the conditions of contemporary politics. Whatever might have been the reasons for the failure of the Biennio Rosso in Italy in 1919–20, the hope of factory councils being the nucleus of a new proletarian state seems a remote one in the context of contemporary liberal-democratic societies. There are a number of reasons for this, both theoretical and sociological. In political theory, especially radical political theory, should reject any aspiration which challenges the realities of contemporary society. However, the demand that workers in the factories should simultaneously keep production going and constitute themselves as the ruling body of a new type of state is revolutionary indeed. It would require a degree of culture and consciousness which sets a very high standard of popular mobilisation and political will. It is hard to see this as a realistic goal for contemporary liberal-democratic societies in which there is a separation between the class of active politicians and the mass of the population, which in turn sets up considerable obstacles to achieving the ongoing and sustained mobilisation and direct participation that this model of the factory councils demands. In sociological terms, the idea that the factory councils could be the organisers of the productive apparatus of a socialist society seems to be of less relevance because of the realities of contemporary production and more generally because of the minority presence of a classical proletariat in the wider society. The factories where Gramsci saw the councils as a powerful presence were those where the classical Fordist assembly-line constituted the mode of production, where the working class was brought together in large factories and constituted a powerful social force. In contemporary society neither of these factors prevails. Therefore, the possibility of factory councils constituting an educational and creative force seems less likely because of the transformation in the nature of production and wider changes in the social structure. 86 J. Schwarzmantel

A further problem is raised by the culture of contemporary capitalism. The idea of a cohesive agent promoting a new mentality and assisting the emergence of what Gramsci calls l’uomo collettivo

to envisage in present-day society. This is precisely because of the more deeprooted presence of ideas of individualism and consumerism. What Bauman calls merly more ‘solid’ structures of work, family and nation are more unstable and cohesion of class solidarity and the bases on which factory councils were built are weaker, thus casting into doubt the possibility of such institutions as the embryo of a different kind of state. Such considerations are borne out by Richard Sennett’s recent study The Culture of the New Capitalism (Sennett 2006). He analyses the changing nature of labour in contemporary society, where what he calls ‘social capitalism’ has been challenged by a different kind of capitalism. Social capitalism was the capitalism of large ‘pyramidal bureaucracies’ of organised corporations. Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy was not entirely a repressive structure, since (Sennett suggests) it provided an enduring structure which people could adapt to their own purposes: ‘bureaucratic structures provide the can give individuals a sense of agency’ (Sennett 2006: 36). Sennett suggests that these bureaucratic structures of social capitalism have now been transformed by

‘impatient capital’. The ‘iron cage’ has been dismantled by investment capital where shareholders rather than managers are dominant and ‘call the shots’. The corporation is therefore seen as something that can be dismantled or restructured ous pressure was put on companies to look beautiful in the eyes of the passing voyeur’ (Sennett 2006: 40). What is more, ‘the new capitalist model for enterprise is applied to the public realm’ (Sennett 2006: 62). The transformed nature of this new capitalism brings with it a different culture. It encourages (again folible and adaptable, where craftsmanship and experience are of little value compared with the ability to carry out a series of tasks which may shift very result as quickly as possible’ (Sennett 2006: 52).

If these arguments by Sennett are correct, then they indicate that the nature of capitalism has changed so that the form of work has been transformed. Ideas of craftsmanship and a more permanent base in the productive process are no longer relevant. This would suggest that the idea of factory councils as embryos of a new state and as agencies of working-class transformation (ethical and political) has no social base. Sennett is explicit that the changes he describes in the workplace ‘in fact refer to only the cutting edge of the economy: high technoemployees’ (Sennett 2006: 12). Yet if he is right to argue that ‘this small slice of then the whole culture of capitalism has changed in ways which indicate that a Gramsci and political agency 87

potentially an agent of political and social transformation in the way Gramsci envisaged.

Turning now to the second model of political agency, that of the political party functioning as the ‘modern Prince’, there are reasons here too to see this as problematic in contemporary conditions. Gramsci envisaged the political party as an intellectual organisation. He saw the political party as performing tasks of an educational and cultural kind, thereby raising the whole intellectual level of the population. He saw the political party as performing a controlling or policing function, but he distinguished between a policing function of a repressive sort and one of an educational kind, hinting at the contrast between the Fascist party of his day and his view of the role of a Communist party: Does the given party carry out its policing function in order to conserve an does it carry it out in the sense of tending to raise the people to a new level of civilisation expressed programmatically in its political and legal order?

(Gramsci 1971: 155)

latter sense. The party would raise mass consciousness above the corporate or economic level and diffuse a new perspective on politics and society. This view sees the party truly as the modern Prince which spreads the myth of a new order in the Sorelian sense, inspiring people to action. The role of the party is seen above all as educational and inspirational, as representing the vision of a new order.

The problem here is that the role Gramsci attributes to the party as a collective educational force seems far removed from the role that political parties play in contemporary liberal-democratic societies. Political parties are at best organisations for getting out the vote at election time and for rallying support behind particular leaders. Indeed Weber’s view of the political party (and of Parliament) as the training-ground and channel through which leaders emerge (Beetham 1985: 107–10) seems a more realistic view of their role in contemporary liberaldemocratic societies than Gramsci’s vision of the party as both inspiring the masses and a potent educational and intellectual force. Of course, arguing from what is actually the case does not make this an iron necessity: it could be argued that the role currently played by mass parties of the Left or social democratic Left in modern liberal-democracies (a primarily electoral one) does not logically establish that they could never assume a more intellectual or educational one. Here again, as with the factory councils, one must point to deeper sociological transformations which erode the stable structures of agency which Gramsci was envisaging. In such a society politics is presented much more as a matter of indican again be referred to here, since he has a suggestive idea of ‘the consumerspectator-citizen’ (Sennett 2006: 161). He observes that ‘Platform and brand 88 J. Schwarzmantel

combine in politics to produce something other than a progressive desire for sumer choice in the market, then the role of the political party becomes a maropposing parties, and responding via focus groups to people’s preferences as they are, rather than engaging in the serious educational work which Gramsci seems to ascribe to the party. The emergence of the ‘consumer-spectator-citizen’

is part and parcel of the fragmentation of the collective agencies of social change. The structured mass party with a relatively cohesive working-class base ture the role of an educational agency. Political parties in contemporary liberaldemocratic societies function not as agents of transformative politics, but primarily as electoral bodies. In modern politics there has been a decline of parties performing the role that Gramsci ascribes to them in his scenario of the modern Prince. The reasons for this lie in the growing scepticism towards parties, the declining loyalty to the party as an expression of class politics, and more generally the scepticism towards the kind of totalistic programme for social and political change which Gramsci was defending in the form of the ‘philosophy of praxis’. The ‘postmodern Prince’

The argument so far has been rather negative, suggesting that Gramsci provided two models of political agency which are both of diminishing relevance to the contemporary politics of liberal-democratic societies. Some theorists respond to this by seeing new social movements, such as the anti-or alternativeglobalisation movement, as a more relevant agent of change, and invoking some of Gramsci’s themes as a possible ‘theorisation’ of this type of movement. This he ‘refers to a set of conditions, particularly political, material and ecological that are giving rise to new forms of political agency’ (Gill 2000: 131). He sees these new forms of political agency as ones ‘that go beyond and are more complex than those imagined by Machiavelli’s The Prince or Gramsci’s The Modern Prince’ (Gill 2000: 140). Gill suggests that the Alternative Globalisaconstitutes ‘something akin to a postmodern transnational political party’ (Gill 2000: 138). This differs from Gramsci’s own model of the modern Prince in some clear and obvious ways. New social movements and movements of alternative globalisation are evidently not political parties in the traditional sense and they make a virtue out of that fact. It is in that sense that, at least for Gill, they constitute a postmodern as opposed to a modern Prince: new social movements are much more loosely organised, and unlike political parties they do not aim at Gramsci and political agency 89

the capture of state power. The case for seeing these movements in Gramscian terms presumably rests on the idea that their purpose is to transform mass consciousness, to challenge the dominant hegemony of neo-liberalism and to promote the idea that ‘another world is possible’ (Fisher and Ponniah 2003). Such movements then have the capacity to inspire a transformation of consciousness and to perform an educative task in the way that Gramsci attributed to the modern Prince of the communist party, even though their structure is completely different. The looser organisation of a network kind and the more episodic activity of (for example) the World Social Forum make a complete contrast with the centralised nature and more sustained activity of any political party, and certainly the kind of party Gramsci seems to have envisaged as constituting the modern Prince. The parallel lies in the role which both kinds of organisation have in achieving the ‘moral and intellectual reform’, by challenging the grip of existing ideas.

However, a certain degree of scepticism seems in order concerning this particular appropriation of Gramsci’s ideas in connection with new social movements and the whole idea of a ‘postmodern Prince’. The contribution of Seattle-type demonstrations seems too episodic to represent a sustained attempt to challenge dominant ideas. While such mass demonstrations bring together a range of protestors and represent an attempt at transforming the wider public consciousness, do they bring into being a genuine political agent that could involve the mass of the people in the way Gramsci suggests? The point of his couplet Renaissance/Reformation was to contrast the popular involvement of the Obviously the parallel is not exact, but it could be said that the Alternative Globalisation Movement, while involving masses of (mostly young) activists and protestors, lacks the broader power of attraction and the sustained development of institutional structures which would be necessary for a mass movement of radical change. Because of the fragmented nature of modern society and the sodic nature (occasional mass demonstrations) of the Alternative Globalisation Movement distinguishes it from the sort of political agency that Gramsci thought was necessary to achieve radical change, though the more sceptical view of the Alternative Globalisation Movement presented here differs from a more positive of McNally and Paterson.

Gramsci and the idea of transforming representative democracy

A more fruitful way of reading Gramsci with reference to the conditions of contemporary politics might be his remarks on the nature of democracy, and the possible decay of representative institutions. Gramsci’s analysis of democracy emphasises the importance of narrowing the gap between rulers and ruled by 90 J. Schwarzmantel

giving those who are ruled the training or education to function effectively as citizens. So much seems to be indicated by two passages from the Prison Note-

books

way of looking at democracy is in connection with the concept of hegemony. In a hegemonic system, there is democracy ‘between the directing group and the directed groups to the extent to which the development of the economy and hence legislation which expresses such a development favours the molecular passage from directed groups to the ruling groups’ (Gramsci 1975: 1056). Hence even in ancient Rome there could be democracy, albeit of an ‘an imperialterritorial’ kind, through the concession of citizenship rights to conquered peoples. By contrast the closed groups of feudal society made democracy impossible. So democracy, in Gramsci’s view, involves the transition from being directed or controlled to the acquisition of rights of citizenship. Second, and in the same vein, Gramsci writes that political democracy ‘tends to a coincidence of the rulers and the ruled (in the sense of government with the consent of the governing), ensuring for each non-ruler a free training in the skills and general technical preparation necessary to that end’. For Gramsci, demoGramsci 1971: 40). This in turn raises the question of the means necessary to achieve this end. If democracy means narrowing the division between rulers and ruled, even in a sense abolishing it (‘every citizen to become a ruler’), then how is this to be attained? There is another suggestive remark in the Prison Note- books, this time referring to the role of parliament. Gramsci poses the question of whether ‘parliamentarism is identical with a representative regime and whether there could be an alternative both to parliamentarism and to the rule of the bureaucracy, with a new type of representative regime’ ( con un nuovo tipo di regime rappresentativo) (Gramsci 1975: 1708). There is of course a limit to the concerned in his political analysis with the dangers of decay of the parliamentary system and the importance of diminishing the gap between rulers and ruled, what form this would take. Certainly he was preoccupied with the weakness of parliament and representative government in the Italian context, as manifested by his remarks on the way in which, in the south and in Sicily, ‘parliaments were instruments to maintain the anarchy of the barons against the modernising attempts of the monarch’ (Gramsci 1975: 1575), and the way in which the Piedmont liberal constitution or Statuto was variously interpreted. On the one hand there were groups which tried to extend it in a radical democratic sense, while they were opposed by those who by ‘giving a restrictive interpretation of the Statuto threatened a reactionary coup d’état’ (Gramsci 1975: 1001). The point here is not to make Gramsci into a straightforward liberal-democrat concerned merely to give parliament more powers. Clearly his aim was that of a far wider political and social transformation. However, it suggests that he had a nuanced understanding of the institutions and working of liberal-democratic Gramsci and political agency 91

systems. Gramsci was aware of the possible (and in the Italy of his time actual) decay of parliamentary power, and he pointed to the possibility of different forms of representation beyond the framework of parliamentary rule. He also of radical changes in the wider society and of the function of social groups (i.e. social classes). He wrote that the relationship between parliament and government was one of both struggle and unity, and that such a relationship ‘cannot be explained by logical schemas but only with reference to the changes which have occurred in the political structure of the country, in other words realistically through a historical-political analysis’ (Gramsci 1975: 1807). His view of political agency thus took account of the potential for democratising the existing representative institutions of a liberal-democratic state, and the social conditions necessary for doing so. He also hinted at the emergence of new forms of representation which could supplement or complement the

‘normal’ representative bodies of liberal-democracy (i.e. parliament). In this way Gramsci alludes to a more ‘instititutional’ view of agency and of political action which is highly relevant to the complex workings of contemporary liberaldemocracy. He was aware of the danger of the degeneration of parliament and the autonomy of executive power, and indicated the importance of new channels of representation which could serve to deepen democracy. Different forms of representation must be fought for in order to achieve, or at least aspire to, narrowing the difference between rulers and ruled. ‘Moral and intellectual reform’

should aim at giving citizens the capacities to truly act as citizens so that they could function as rulers. Gramsci was aware of the dangers of the decay of parliamentary government. He did not follow the path to a ‘Caesaristic’ exaltation of a strong leader, but saw the importance of citizen education and reform of consciousness.

Gramsci’s ideas are thus relevant to contemporary conditions, even though changes to society have cast doubt on some of the ways in which he envisaged the problem of political agency. His theories of both factory councils and the role of the political party need to be rethought in contemporary society because of the fundamental and far-reaching transformations which distinguish our changed in ways which his writings could not have foretold. This does not mean, however, that Gramsci’s ideas are without relevance for the very different politthe Prison Notebooks, fragmentary and cryptic though they are, could be extended to give hints as to the possibility of forms of political agency and representation appropriate to contemporary politics. He suggested that the aim of democracy was to narrow the gap between rulers and ruled and how important representative institutions were in this task. Representative institutions are not at. Finally there is the insistence on forms of education and citizenship training which would achieve a new collective awareness, through which people might 92 J. Schwarzmantel

become more capable of responding to the task of being a citizen in the complex conditions of contemporary mass democracy. Gramsci does offer some relevant perspectives on this central theme of modern politics, the question of political agency and the attempt to narrow the gap between rulers and ruled in mass democratic societies.

Gramsci’s warnings or indications of the weakening of representative institutions and his call for movements of citizen education and intellectual transformation are valuable bases for a theory of political agency appropriate to our society. However, we should not look to Gramsci for a ready-made ‘blueprint’ for political action instantly transferable from his analysis of the politics of Italy (and beyond) in the 1920s to the different kind of global capitalism that is hegemonic but more some indications of problems of democratic politics and the weakening of forms of representation. These problems call for contemporary solutions no less than they did in the 1920s. What those responses might be cannot be gleaned an indication of the general nature of possible answers in his stress on intellectual and moral reform. We can learn from his idea of political structures that could reach out to masses of people, and from his rejection of Caesaristic, populist or dictatorial solutions which in their different forms have found a resonance both in his time and in ours.

7

Governing gender

The integral state and gendered

subjection

Gundula Ludwig

Introduction1

feminist state theory. In general, these are writings which focus on the gendered structures of the state and the androcentric logic of the state apparatus, the law and bureaucracy (e.g. Phillips 1991) and on the question of how the state (re)produces Sainsbury 1994). These two aspects have been of enormous importance for the development of feminist state theory. Nevertheless, I want to problematise one assumption which most of these works share: the existence of gendered subjects is assumed as a given fact beyond the state. Due to this assumption, the state’s role in the constitution of gendered subjectivity remains a topic that has only rarely been approached in a systematic way.2 In what follows, I want to argue in favour of the for subjectivity to be conceived as an integral element of state power. While within state theory the constitution of gendered subjectivity is mainly a blank space, it constitutes a central topic within the poststructural approaches of the social sciences. Representatives of these approaches argue that gendered subjectivity, and thus ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ cannot be viewed as naturally given but as a social construction. The work of Judith Butler, especially, has had effect of power relations. Interestingly, within these poststructural debates the state is seldom taken into account. Therefore, while feminist state theory rarely theorises the constitution of gendered subjectivity, the same applies to the concept of the state in poststructural approaches. What would be needed to close this theoretical gap is a notion of the state that does not reduce state power to its juridical functions and, at the same time, links the ‘personal’ realm of subjectivity to the state. For this purpose, I want to suggest that referring to Antonio Gramsci will be of great use as he offers a notion of the state which enriches feminist state theory. In order to prove this argument, I start by introducing Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. In the second part I discuss Judith Butler’s theory of gendered subjection. In the last part I discuss how central notions of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony can be applied to analyse the relationship between the state and gendered subjection. 94 G. Ludwig

The aim of this chapter is to contribute to the further development of state theory through suggesting a way of theorising the relation between the modern state and gendered subjection. Hence, I will concentrate on the theoretical and conceptional level and argue that referring to Gramsci can be instructive. It is obvious that because of this aim I will go beyond Gramsci’s suggestion to grasp hegemony as necessarily class-led. Like other feminist theorists who refer to Gramsci’s work my underlying assumption is that hegemony describes a spetions. It can also be applied in order to understand how gender relations are governed. Hence, I will argue in a way similar to Stuart Hall in his essay (Hall, 1986) about the relevance of Gramsci for the study of race and ethnicity. Hall argues that even though Gramsci has not explicitly written about racism, his key notions still can be helpful for an analysis of racism. But then paradoxically the Gramscian notions have to be developed further. This is also true for Gramsci’s relevance for feminist state theory. Within Marxist theory, Gramsci’s work offers many interesting aspects for feminist theory, especially as he is concerned in particular with the question of how everyday practices are formed through power relations – which is also one central element of feminist theory. Furthermore, his suggestion that civil society should be viewed as part of the integral state shows some parallels to another key element of feminist theory, namely the critique of the liberal distinction between the public and the private sphere. Hence, various feminists refer to Gramsci’s work in order to analyse social phenomena like the gendered division of labour and its current transformation (Haug 2007), the formation processes of hegemonic masculinities in the state and society (Connell 1995) and gendered, postcolonial forms of oppression (Spivak 1988). Nevertheless, the attempted linking of the Marxist theory of Gramsci to the poststructural theory 3 Butler

(Butler 2000) herself states that she perceives her work in the tradition of of his work. Though I do not share all the assumptions of Laclau and Mouffe’s further development of a theory of hegemony, I consider their argument that class relations (Laclau and Mouffe 1985) as useful. At the same time, I think that the legacy of Gramsci lies especially in the attempt not to view his notions and suggestions as ahistoric and eternally and literally valid. Hence, again, I want to follow Hall’s suggestion to keep in mind that because Gramsci always developed his notions referring to historically concrete phenomena it is hence necessary to adapt, renew and develop them in order to apply them to current social problems and questions (Hall 1986). Thus, I read the Prison Notebooks as an invitation to develop further the Gramscian notions and ideas in order to (of theorising the relation between the state and gendered subject). In doing this, I will similarly refer to his concepts, but also further develop them from a Governing gender 95

poststructural feminist perspective. Hopefully I will be able to show that opening a dialogue between these two theories can be useful for the development of (feminist) state theory and hence our understanding of state power and its effects on subjects.

Gramsci’s theory of hegemony

The notion of hegemony

In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci suggests a notion of the state that differs not only from liberal but also orthodox Marxist theories. His comparison of the concept of the state in Western capitalist societies and in Tsarist Russia reveals that the central aspect for the stability of the state is the development of civil society and its relationship to political society:

In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed.

(Gramsci 1971: 238, my emphasis)

The integration of civil society into the state ensures a stable reproduction of social relations even in periods of economic and political crises. By thus expanding the realm of the state, an expansion of the understanding of state power takes place, namely through the introduction of the notion of ‘hegemony’. The modern state not only exercises power in terms of repression and civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion’

(Gramsci 1971: 263).

While in his writings prior to his prison time Gramsci uses the term hegemony only in connection with the proletarian class and to describe a possible political strategy for its members, in the Prison Notebooks he associates the term with a different meaning. First, he uses it to describe the praxis of the ruling class, and, at a later stage he links the notion of hegemony to the state and hence lays the cornerstone for an elemental change in state theory. By introducing hegemony as the central form of exercising power in the modern domination. I explicitly want to point out that Gramsci distinguishes between hegemony and domination and that the former can be seen as a condition for the latter. ‘The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways, as

“domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership” ’ (Gramsci 1971: 57). By linking the principle of hegemony to the modern state, Gramsci is able to identify a form of state power that he calls educational (Gramsci 1971: 258, 350), which is a central distinction between the modern state and all earlier types of state. This educational relationship:

96 G. Ludwig

exists throughout society as a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals. It exists between intellectual and non-intellectual sections of the population, between the rulers and the ruled, élites and their followers, leaders [ dirigenti] and led, the vanguard and the body of the army. Every relation of ‘hegemony’ is necessarily an educational relationship. (Gramsci 1971: 350)

Joseph Femia elaborated on this idea by stating that consensus – the central aspect of hegemony – means that ‘those who are consenting must somehow be truly convinced that the interests of the dominant group are those of society at large, that the hegemonic group stands for a proper social order in which all men

[ sic!] are justly looked after’ (Femia 1981: 41). Thus, hegemony implies guiding Gramsci refers to the integral state not only as an educator but also as an

‘ethical’ entity, since it attempts to raise the population to a certain cultural and moral level (Gramsci 1971: 258). The achievement of this level is a necessary precondition for the success of the mode of production as well as for guiding the subjects in a certain way:

Every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes. (Gramsci 1971: 258)

It should be noted here that according to Gramsci consensus is necessarily based on social compromises (Gramsci 1971: 182). Thus, the conceptualisation of the state as educator does not entail that hegemony is only a top-down mode of leading the subjects. Rather, Gramsci suggests that the ruling class can only gain and maintain hegemony if the subaltern social groups are also socially and politically integrated. Hence, political, ideological and economic concessions are an integral element of hegemony. This implies that hegemony is both a social relation and the form through which social antagonisms become governable. Subsequently, the state as educator never leads the subaltern subjects purely according to the interests of the ruling class – it rather functions as a social relation involving compromise with other class demands.

Integral state, common sense and the ‘new type of man’

A central, if not the central motivation of the Prison Notebooks is Gramsci’s critique of ‘economistic’ theories that view economic ‘laws’ as a principal cause of social structures. He directly links the development of the concept of hegemony to this critique (Gramsci 1971: 165). Gramsci argues that the relation between structure and superstructures is interactive and reciprocal. There is no automatism that ensures the reproduction of the mode and the relations of production.4

Governing gender 97

The structure requires the superstructures – and thus the state, its ideologies and hegemonic apparatus – in order to successfully reproduce itself. In ‘American–which Gramsci observed in Henry Ford’s Motor Company in Detroit in the 1920s and which later was extended to what came to be known as the Fordist feeling life’ (Gramsci 1971: 302) and, accordingly, a ‘new type of worker and man’ (Gramsci 1971: 302). In other words, life in the Fordist industry demands a housing, customs, etc. Gramsci describes how the state introduces and reinforces certain norms and ideas of a ‘good way of life’, which are built on stability, 5 is therefore the

precondition for the reproduction of the mode of production. Gramsci argues that this ‘adaptation to the new methods of production and work cannot take place simply through social compulsion’ (Gramsci 1971: 310) but rather that a certain way of guidance is needed to get people to consent to the new ways of working and of living. To achieve this, campaigns against alcoholism and to promote monogamy were started, and the images of the male breadwinner and the female housewife became the dominant social ideals which provided a certain psycho-physical equilibrium for the workers. Apart from that, I want to emphasise another aspect of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony: Gramsci refers to the state as ‘ethical’ not only because it raises the population to a certain cultural and moral level required for the mode of production, but also because it leads the subjects in a certain way. The form of leaderhegemony is organised is always related to the mode of production. Hence, the way hegemony was organised in Fordism, for example, corresponds to the distinctive discipline and hierarchy of this particular mode of production and society in general.

His notes on ‘common sense’ (Gramsci 1971: 323n.) can be interpreted as the subjects. Gramsci describes common sense as social and historical. Its social element is rooted in the fact that every human being belongs to a certain social group due to his or her own worldview – hence all humans are ‘conformists of some conformism’ (Gramsci 1971: 324). Thus, common sense is not anthropologically but socially determined. Further, he views common sense as historical because knowledge, ideas and perceptions from prior experiences and historical events form part of our everyday thought. Hence, common sense is ‘bizarre’ and an ‘historical product’ (Gramsci 1971: 324).

Gramsci theorises common sense as an area where the values and morality that pervade civil society are integrated. In this process of integration, ideologies and worldviews materialise as forms of thinking, feeling, and perceiving which structure our everyday actions. This internalisation of hegemonic worldviews is both an action by the individual and an ‘externally directed’ process. As common 98 G. Ludwig

sense can be seen as the crucial element for organising consensus, hegemony also implies that through the activity of the subjects, state power is reproduced. I agree with Joseph Femia who states that

behaviour and choice externally, through rewards and punishments, it also affects them internally, by moulding personal convictions into a replica of prevailing norms. Such ‘internal control’ is based on hegemony. (Femia 1981: 24)

This implies further that the state as educator creates and instructs norms and knowledge whose acceptance by common sense is the precondition for gaining ability to act and become part of society. Ideologies and worldviews are thus modes of socialisation. Individuals gain subjectivity through and within the hegemonic worldviews and ideologies. Hence Gramsci not only considers human ‘nature’ as the ‘ensemble of the social relations’ like Marx did before him (Marx 1972: 6), but goes beyond Marx and connects this theorem with the Based on the premise that the state plays a crucial role in the constitution of a how the educational

relationship between the state and the subjects is exercised. He argues that the aim of the ethical state

is always that of creating new and higher types of civilisation; of adapting the ‘civilisation’ and morality of the broadest masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production; hence evolving even physically new types of humanity.

(Gramsci 1971: 242)

This leads Gramsci to the question of ‘how (. . .) educative pressure [will] be applied to single individuals so as to obtain their consent and their collaboration; turning necessity and coercion into “freedom” ’ (Gramsci 1971: 242). In his answer he suggests focusing on the law, but not in a narrow sense. He proposes widening the notion of the law in order to include techniques of normalisation: this concept will have to be extended to include those activities which are at civil society; the latter operates without ‘sanctions’ or compulsory ‘obligations’, but nevertheless exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality, etc.

(Gramsci 1971: 242)

Thus, as a consequence of his theory of hegemony Gramsci suggests that subjectivity is not only formed through repressive juridical mechanisms but also Governing gender 99

through techniques which mould the subjects.6 Here the double anchoring of hegemony as I read it in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks becomes obvious: Hegemony is produced both in political society and in civil society. The notion of the integral state suggests that repression and force need to be secured by consensus and also that consensus can never be separated from its protection by ‘the armour of coercion’. Hence, I would like to follow Gramsci’s suggestion to understand the distinction between political and civil society, and respectively way of exercising power. Even the law and thus the state’s possibility of acting out legal forms of violence need to be consented to. Therefore, I think it would be a reduction of Gramsci’s thoughts to argue that hegemony is produced only within civil society since it is, according to my interpretation, produced within the integral state which entails both civil and political society. Gender as performance

only between the state and subjection, but, more accurately, between the state and gendered

refer to Judith Butler’s theory of gendered subjection. The starting point of her argumentation is a critique of the feminist premise that only gender is constructed socially, while the ‘biological’ sex remains beyond power relations. Butler argues that gender and hence gendered subjectivity are not a result of

‘biologically’ and ‘naturally’ sexed bodies. Therefore, assuming a coherent gender subjectivity is already in itself an effect of power relations which materialise in mental dispositions as well as in psychic and bodily acts. In other words, acts, gestures, and desires produce the effect of an internal core or substance, but produce this on the surface of the body, through the play of signifying absences that suggest, but never reveal, the organizing principle of identity as a cause.

(Butler 1990: 136)

Sex as well as gender are therefore a reiteration of hegemonic norms, which is why Butler suggests viewing gender as performative (Butler 1993: 107). In order to describe these norms and power structures more precisely, Butler introduces the notion of the ‘heterosexual matrix’ as a key structure of social discourses for the achievement of subjectivity. With the term heterosexual matrix she claims ‘to designate that grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalized’ (Butler 1990: 151). This matrix simultaneously produces a domain of intelligible subjects as well as abject beings, whom she describes as ‘those who are not yet “subjects”, but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the subject’ (Butler 1993: 3). Hence, sexuality and gender play a key role in the process of subjection as ‘ “persons” only become intelligible through becoming gendered in conformity with recognizable standards of gender 100 G. Ludwig

intelligibility’ (Butler 1990: 16). Paradoxically then the reiteration of gender norms is both subjugation and a form of gaining identity. One’s formation as a of what a subject is (Butler 1997: 2).

Butler notes that this form of gendered subjection always implies violence which is at the core of the process of subjectivation as the notion of a (gendered) subject is built upon a ‘constitutive constraint’ (Butler 1993: xi), since some speviolence is repeated through the reiteration of norms in daily practices. The state and gendered subjection

In her work, Butler only rarely takes the state into account. When she does, she refers mainly to a rather narrow understanding of the state which is probably why she does not discuss the position of the state in the process of subjection. In notion of power – which remains mainly an abstract and ahistorical concept in Butler’s work – more accurately. In the following I will elaborate on this suggesButler’s theory of gendered subjection can be connected in order to theorise the role of the state in the process of subjection; and subsequently, I will demonstrate how the relationship between state power and subjects can be understood more thoroughly in accordance with this interlinking of theories.

Bringing the state back in

Gramsci argues that in the modern state coercion is not the only way of exercising power and also not the primary way, since the notion of hegemony implies that coercion and consensus cannot be separated and that the subaltern have to consent to ‘legitimate’ forms of coercion. He shows that the reproduction of a class society requires the consensus of hegemonic truths and worldviews as a medium of the ability to act. In what follows, I want to suggest applying the notion of hegemony also to gender relations.

With the concept of gender relations, I am referring to social relations, which

– beside class and ethnic relations – fundamentally structure modern societies. Social tasks – like the reproduction of a society and access to economic and political resources – are organised through gendered attribution (Acker 2006; Barrett 1980).7 Since the central role of the state is the reproduction of a given social order, from a feminist point of view it can be stated that the state, in doing (Connell 1990). To put it differently: if the state is considered as playing a central role in the reproduction of the relations of production, then this implies that gender relations are also reproduced by the state as they are an integral part of the relations of production.

Governing gender 101

Based on these assumptions, the crucial question is: how does this gendered structure of society gain its stability? If we follow Butler, the existence of two genders cannot be viewed as naturally given. Hence, the question how a given gendered structure gains its stability cannot presuppose the dichotomy of

‘women’ and ‘men’. From a theoretical perspective which tries to connect the Gramscian theory of hegemony with Butler’s theory of gendered subjection, the question has to be shifted from asking how men and women are governed to asking how femininity and masculinity are produced and achieved as a preconto the forms of subjectivity. Butler argues that the dichotomy of the female and the male sex is not naturally given but socially and culturally constructed. I want to add that the integral state plays a central role in the construction of this Belonging to either the male or the female sex is necessary in order to become recognised as an intelligible citizen. As a consequence, the subjectivity of intersexed people, for example, is not recognised until they can be ‘subsumed’ either under the male or the female sex. Thus, intersexed people are subjected to surgical and medical ‘treatments’ in order to make them belong to one of the two sexes. However, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony suggests that people have to consent to coercion which is organised in civil society. Gramsci describes the modern state as ‘hegemony protected by the armour of coercion’ (Gramsci subjectivity are viewed as ‘natural’ and legal. But this juridical and repressive dimension is not the only form through which the gender regime is secured. The dichotomy of gender also has to be reinforced and consented to in various everyday practices. The media, the education system, architecture, the clothing industry, as well as medical discourses, initiate and repeat the ‘truth’ about the dichotomy and binary nature of sexes as ‘natural’ and reasonable, and individuals absorb this perception into their common sense. As subjects consent to a hegemonic truth in their common sense which becomes the basis for their self-perception as well as their perception of the environment, the norm of gender dichotomy thus gains its stability not through force but through hegemony.

meanings, such as gendered attributes, which are diffused through state policies as well as within worldviews. Gramsci, in his critique of economism, suggests the mode of production. From a feminist perspective it has to be added that this Gramscian ‘type of man’ is always also gendered – a fact which Gramsci seems to tackle in his analyses of Fordism, but which he does not think through. Thus, relations are an integral part of the capitalist mode of production, gendered attributes and gendered norms about an ‘appropriate’ division of labour are also required in order to reproduce the capitalist mode of production. The subjection 102 G. Ludwig

under gendered forms of subjectivity initiated by the integral state is the condition for the reproduction of a given gendered structure of society and thus for a Referring to Gramsci opens up the possibility of understanding not only that the jigsaw pieces of the ‘type of man’ – or rather, ‘type of human’ – are related to the mode of production, but also to comprehending the ways in which indito remember Gramsci’s statement about the ethical state. I have argued above hegemony is to lead the subjects in such a way that they voluntarily meet the how subjects are led

political forms of guiding the subjects mirrored the strict and clear discipline and hierarchy of society in general. However, a central characteristic of the current form of governing is that the state disclaims responsibility for individual lives and every individual has to take on responsibility for his/her own fate. Due to this new form of leading subjects, not only employment and life-styles but also normalisation lie modes of guiding the subjects which are mainly built on the idea of self-governing individuals. Since they are encouraged to use their ments of the neo-liberal subjectivity.8 Prohibition, rigidity and ‘external forms’

of discipline have been more and more replaced by strategies to encourage the subjects to take responsibility for themselves. This shift is well documented in shows that this cannot be viewed as a withdrawal of the state or power, but rather as a restructuring of the way of acting out state power.9

Currently, the ways in which gender relations are governed are also changing. Direct forms of gender discrimination have decreased. Women are encouraged to enter the labour market (as shown, for example, by the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty) and the attributes of what femininity should be have expanded. However, on the other hand, women are still seen as primarily responsible for the realm of reproduction, and femininity is still closely related to caring for the next generation, listening, loving, being empathetic, etc. But the way this is realised in everyday practices in civil society has become much more subtle than in the period of Fordism. Hence, parallel to changes in the mode of production, the forms of how gender are governed have also changed from explicit forms to much more subtle ones. Nevertheless, neither the abstract dichotomous form of subjectivity (as only female or male) has changed, nor has the hierarchy between men and women.

In the context of these changes it is important to note that from a Gramscian down process, since the hegemonic notion of subjectivity and its gender dimension also involve social struggles. It is interesting to see that central elements of Governing gender 103

how subjects are led today are based on promises and concepts such as autonomy, freedom and responsibility. All these elements were also central aspects of the women’s movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Gramsci introduced the notion power within the integral state. As hegemony requires consensus, the demands of social struggles also become part of it. Thus, it is necessary to integrate critique from social struggles in order to introduce new forms of acting out power. For the last two decades we have been able to observe that the integration of the critique of social movements, including the women’s movement, also led to new forms of guidance and new role models of subjectivity. The feminist critique of the dominant notion of work in the Fordist society and the hierarchal structures of society of paternalism, authoritarianism, standardised working times and new forms of moulding subjectivity on the basis of ‘freedom’. out power it becomes possible to identify a perception of the state that focuses on the aspect of leading the subjects to a certain way of living and being. With his notion of hegemony Gramsci reveals the relationship between the state and the constitution of subjectivity. Furthermore, Gramsci suggests linking the histion. Referring to Gramsci opens up the possibility of concretising Butler’s forms of the state and modes of production. At the same time, by referring to Butler, it becomes clear not only that governing gender implies governing an already existing binary of men and women, but that a central aspect of the state is to initiate a certain form of gendered subjectivity. By connecting Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Butler’s theory of subjection, it becomes evident that within the process of gendered subjection the integral state plays a central role. crucial to focus on the constitution of gendered subjects as this turns out to be

Turning state power upon oneself 10

Referring to Butler in this context not only means the ability to theorise the gendered dimension within the process of subjection. Additionally, she offers intersubject can be understood. I will elaborate on this point by focusing on three aspects.

First, Butler does not conceptualise power as static, but as something which requires actions by individuals. In this sense, her argumentation is in line with Gramsci’s theory of hegemony that states that everyday actions are the precondition of the reproduction of power. As she herself points out, her aim is to link her theory of performativity to the theory of hegemony as both of them stress the importance of social actions for the stabilisation of hegemony (Butler 2000). But 104 G. Ludwig

Butler radicalises Gramsci’s notion of hegemony when she argues that power –

and, from a Gramscian perspective, I would like to add state power – needs to be between power and the subject because this would imply that hegemonic norms work in a deterministic logic upon the subjects. Instead, she suggests understanding the relation between power and subjects in terms of reiteration. According to this approach, gender and gendered subjectivity are to be considered as the reiteration of ideals. In this process, norms are not internalised but transferred from social norms to psychic regulations that turn the subject upon oneself. Paradoxically, this implies that the subject has to withdraw from power in order to turn the norms on itself. Accordingly, subjectivity as a result of hegemonic discourse is not to be viewed as internalisation of the state but as the turning of state-initiated norms upon oneself so that these regulations can no longer be considered as external (Butler, 1997: 191). Third, it is important to remember that Butler emphasises that the social and gendered ideals can never be achieved, they can only be imitated. According to her, this also means that every reiteration always implies the possibility of resigtic as it needs repetition through actions in order to remain powerful. To conclude, Butler shows that in order to become a subject, the individual has to turn upon the hegemonic categories of subjectivity and recognise him-or herself as female or male. At this point, Butler not only highlights the gendered structure of subjection, but also offers instructive ways on how to view the relation between power and the subject which go far beyond Gramsci’s writings about common sense. Even though Gramsci offers interesting ideas about the relationship between the state and common sense, Butler’s work opens up a way of thinking about the integration of hegemonic norms into common sense and hence into one’s own perception in a more detailed way. Linking the Gramscian notion of state with Butler’s theory of subjection thus reveals the possibility of understanding gendered subjectivity as the result of the process of turning state power upon oneself, which is the precondition for the reproduction of an existing gendered social order. Conclusion

Feminist state theory has pointed out that the state is a form of social control not only with regard to class relations but also in the sphere of gender relations. Poststructural theories have confronted feminist state theory with the dilemma that the existence of gendered subjects cannot be assumed as a given fact beyond the state. I have argued that linking Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Butler’s theory of gendered subjection can enrich feminist state theory as it opens the possibility of theorising the importance of the state in the constitution of subjectivity. In particular, I drew attention to three aspects of Gramsci’s Prison Note- books as they offer instructive ways of theorising the state and state power. First, Governing gender 105

I showed that with Gramsci’s understanding of the state the importance of the (integral) state in the constitution of subjectivity can be theorised. As I have argued, with the introduction of the integral state Gramsci not only expands the ryday life of subjects, their ways of perceiving, thinking, feeling, believing and historical form of how hegemony is organised and hence how subjectivity is governed is related to the mode of production. Third, Gramsci suggests theorising state-initiated forms of subjectivity also in relation to social struggles. Referring to these aspects can enrich feminist state theory, especially as the in order to appropriate these notions for a feminist theory of the state, it is necessary to go beyond Gramsci and to expand his ideas. For the theorisation of the relation between the state and gendered subjection two aspects in particular of a poststructural feminist perspective have to be revisited. First, the state initiates not only forms of subjectivity but gendered subjectivity. In order to theorise this, I suggested linking Gramsci and Butler as she argues that gender, and hence,

‘men’ and ‘women’ are already the effect of power relations. Hence, the stateinitiated constitution of gendered subjects turns out to be the precondition for production. It is not just about how (‘already existing’) men and women are treated differently by the state, for example in wage policies as well as in social security systems. It is also a question of how femininity and masculinity are formed. I have shown that the integral state plays a key role in this process, as it individuals to consent to the norm of gender and the normality of the binary heteronormative structure of subjectivity. Second, I have argued that we need to use Butler’s ideas to go beyond Gramsci in his understanding of state power. To view the relation between state regulations and psychic norms as internalisation (as Gramsci did) would be reductive. Rather, this process has to be described as reiteration of norms. With Butler’s notion of reiteration the understanding of state power also needs to be shifted. State power is not as static and deterministic as Gramsci suggested because it needs to be cited and repeated in everyday practices in order to remain powerful. And precisely in this reiteration there always lies the possibility of destabilisation.

Hence, I have shown that linking Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Butler’s theory of subjection is not only fruitful for the further development of feminist state theory, but also that it can close gaps in each theoretical approach so that we can grasp the notion of the state as well as the relation between the state and the subject much more precisely. Hence, with his notion of hegemony as a spehis suggestion of linking these forms of subjectivity to the demands of capitalism as well as to social struggles, Gramsci laid an interesting cornerstone for 106 G. Ludwig

theorising the relation between the modern state and subjectivity which can still ideas it is also necessary, as Stuart Hall emphasised, to continue to develop his notions and to go beyond Gramsci in order to keep his ideas and legacy alive. Notes

1 I thank Bernadette Ludwig for her comments.

2 Exceptions are e.g. the works of Brown (1995), Connell (1990) and Pringle/Watson (1992).

3 I am aware of these differences as well as of the different concepts of political agency underlying the two theories. Due to the limited space, I cannot discuss these differences here and will hence focus on the question how linking them can be productive. 4 Hence, I view Gramsci’s description of his project in the Prison Notebooks as ‘philosophy of praxis’ not just as a notion caused by the censorship of the prison, but as an attempt to point out that social structures only become relevant through actions. Therefore, Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks can be viewed within the tradition of Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach (Marx 1972).

5 Gramsci uses neither the notion of subjectivity nor that of subjection; instead he uses

‘type of man’ (Gramsci 1971: 302). Nevertheless, I will speak of subjectivity as a catexistence. 6 Gramsci tackles an interesting aspect here which much later Michel Foucault and other poststructural political thinkers have emphasised. Foucault argues that law and behaviour and actions: ‘We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes”; it “represses”; it “censors”; it “abstracts”; it

“masks”; it “conceals”. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth’ (Foucault 1977: 194). Feminists such as Judith Butler also draw on these assumptions that law not only represses but is also productive. I will return to this aspect later in this chapter. 7 Interestingly, in his writings about Fordism, Gramsci includes the dimension of gender relations, as he writes that the model of the male factory worker ‘needs’ a loving and caring wife who watches out that her husband does not waste his money and leads a stable life (Gramsci 1971: 303).

8 This of course, cannot be stated generally, as beside these tendencies it can be observed that there are also areas where the state increases coercive functions (like has changed.

9 What remains rather open in most of the works within governmentality studies is the attempt to link these transformations of techniques of leading subjects to transformations of the mode of production – a step which could be done by linking the governmentality studies to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. Lemke’s work is an exception and he has repeatedly suggested linking Gramsci’s theory of hegemony to Foucault’s studies of governmentality.

10 In the following, all references to the state are to the integral state, meaning both repression and leadership.

8

Civil society and state in Turkey

A Gramscian perspective

Hasret Dikici-Bilgin

Introduction

The general elections in Turkey held on 22 July 2007 resulted in the landslide victory of AKP (the Justice and Development Party) (Turkish Supreme Electoral Board 2007), and started a second four-year ruling period for the Party. Islamist movement in Turkey previously; therefore, the victory of the Party which were held just a few months later, has been interpreted by some commentators as the reaction of civil society to the intervention of the military in Interpretation of the elections as such, indeed, reveals one of the mainstream evaluations of civil society in Turkey. The debate over civil society, which has ceptualises civil society as a democratisation mechanism against the military’s persistence in politics, identifying the military as the prominent representative of the Turkish Left such as Birikim, Zemin and Yeni Gündem However, today, this kind of conceptualisation is mostly embraced by liberals, This chapter acknowledges that the interactions in civil society might lead to society as a counter-hegemonic force in the Turkish case from a Gramscian perspective. It argues that civil society is rather a site for hegemonic struggles and that these struggles determine the outcome which might not necessarily result in any further democratisation of domestic politics. The chapter begins with an evaluation of Antonio Gramsci’s views on civil society. The study then turns to the state tradition and emergence of civil society in Turkey in its historical H. Dikici-Bilgin

opposed to the military and the state, and to reveal the dialectical relations between Turkish civil society and political society. The main aim of the study is to interpret the interactions between civil society and state in Turkey from a Gramscian perspective.

Antonio Gramsci and civil society

The importance of Gramsci’s views on civil society for the interpretation of contemporary politics in Turkey lies in the fact that Gramsci discusses civil society not as a separate sphere, as is the main tendency in Turkey, but rather within the other words, the Gramscian evaluation of the relationship between state and civil society diverges from liberal accounts in which the borders of the state and civil Gramsci focuses on the contingent nature of these relations and emphasises that the relations between civil society and state might take multiple forms across time and space. The agencies in civil society might develop in opposition to the to the continuous interactions that are dialectical in nature so that, in reality, state of Gramsci to our understanding of state and civil society relations in contemporGramsci recognises that civil society and political society can be in adverse relations, yet he clearly warns that the nature of the relations is dialectical and depends on the circumstances; a view which is crucial for interpreting the Turkish case in the following pages.

While the society Gramsci was concerned with was quite different from that layers and interactions. At times in the Prison Notebooks, civil society is conTherefore, differentiation between civil society and state in Gramsci is, on the while on the other hand it implies that each sphere might have relative autonomy in certain historical conditions as was the case during the French Revolution In the section of the Prison Notebooks

conceptualisation of civil society and the state for methodological purposes. He in

“civil society”, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called “private”, and Civil society and state in Turkey

state in the wider sense might function as the totality of civil and political sociesociety and the state and their interactions. The fact that Gramsci does not sight, as a lack of coherence in his writings. However, it is actually a major strength of his elaboration of the concept of civil society. Gramsci refrains from that these relations are conditional, and that there are continuous interactions between these spheres as both civil society and political society are part of the hegemonic struggles.

Prison Notebooks in accordance

with Gramsci’s discussion of civil society and state relations . In some places, in other places, it is about creating and maintaining leadership (Hoare and which aims at forming a collective will and a particular understanding of the protected by the armour of coercion’, as the state here is used as the sum of politsociety becomes the site for the struggles for hegemony, a sphere in which the political analyses which see the state as an instrument of the ruling class and as the entity that monopolises the use of force in and on society. Nevertheless, Gramsci does not deny the state’s function for ruling or the fact that the state ing of the state acknowledges coercion and domination, yet it goes beyond coercion and indicates that ruling has (and should have) a consensual base. Indeed, for Gramsci, ruling is about organising consent and certain tools for organising allows us to realise that ruling classes do not operate only in terms of their society; it is also about acquiring consent. This of course makes conceptualising civil society purely in opposition to political society unrealistic, since acquiring consent implies a dialectical relation between the two spheres. Having stated that state and civil society are organically connected, one ques- H. Dikici-Bilgin apparatus of the ruling group’ which was illustrated by the Church in the Middle Ages. It includes material relations, but moves beyond them to ideological and society includes all kinds of private organisations ranging from clubs, churches argues that belonging to any social organisation engages one in the organisation of hegemony. Here a caveat should be added that the Gramscian conceptualisation of civil society is not a negative concept. Indeed, the absorption of political conceptualisation of the state in relation to hegemony relies on both consent and coercion, a weakening of civil society will leave the state only with coercion trate that civil society is the site for hegemonic struggles. Bourgeois hegemony has a consensual base at the social level which should be acknowledged by the working classes so as to develop strategies for forming a collective will and a conception of the world in civil society. In advanced capitalist societies, state civil society as a sphere in which the working classes might become hegemonic by developing a counter-hegemonic world conception and collective will, thus organising and directing a counter-hegemonic view of the social order and knowledge, not as an elitist formation but in dialectical relation to the masses for struggle, so that any other class which succeeds in developing ideological and cultural leadership might also operate within that sphere of struggle. From Gramscian conceptualisation has democratising potential, but it is also an arena To sum up, the contribution of a Gramscian perspective to our understanding of contemporary societies is that it goes beyond a simple dichotomous evaluation of the relations between civil society and the state (or political society). It provides a framework in which we can see state and civil society both as a whole and as different but interacting spheres, and understand these relations in the hegemonic struggle of acquiring consent in addition to force or domination. Since the Civil society and state in Turkey

era of Gramsci, the nation-state has gone through many transformations and civil gained more importance as electoral democracy became the dominant form of tions between civil society and the state then provides us with an analytical tool for interpreting and criticising contemporary mainstream approaches to Turkish politics which evaluate and analyse state and civil society as two separate spheres, with the former seen as solely involved in the imposition of force on the latter and depiction of the development of state and civil society in Turkey. The state tradition and civil society in Turkey

Development of the state in Turkey is interpreted in various ways by scholars. However, one common point is the reference to a strong state tradition (Kubicek reproduced over time, which puts more emphasis on aspects of ruling concerned with force or domination rather than on attempts at acquiring consent. regard, Mardin2

society that could operate independently of central government and based on 200), which also marked the initial period of Turkey. However, in Mardin’s interpretation, it is implied that the state tradition operated on the wider terrain of society. In the process of establishing a strong state tradition, there was an intention to construct a new conception of the world and form a collective will in republic tried to constitute and develop new values against the old values, the was not only about sustaining order by force, but was also about establishing hegemony within the domain of civil society. Indeed, Mardin indicates that systematic use of force was not a characteristic feature of the Turkish Revolution independently from civil society (it seems that civil society is used here in the sense of the sphere formally outside the state as political society), Heper’s idenof the ideal of the strong state and the attempt to gain the consent of the ruled for H. Dikici-Bilgin

fore, in Gramscian terms, establishment and consolidation of the Turkish state involved forming a basis of consent in civil society and becoming hegemonic the attempt to consolidate the state, but this was accompanied by the aim of acquiring the consent of society for republican values and norms. To put it more clearly, it was not only about coercing people to abide by the consequences of the above-mentioned three pillars, but also about transforming society so that the people would internalise the republican values.

and face down the remnants of the ancien régime (the phrase is used by Heper hegemonic leadership of values with a new organisation of knowledge. Here, Gramscian thinking helps us understand the establishment and consolidation of the Turkish state tradition not as a mere act of the state imposing a new system on society by force, but rather as a process in which the state goes beyond resorting to force, and tries to form values and a collective will in civil society through the pillars of the constitutive republican ideology. It is a process of transforming of Turkishness.

This of course is not to deny the coercive aspect of the state, as Gramscian theory also acknowledges. Beginning from the early years, political parties chalment of professional organisations and other associations based on social class for establishing a society which would give its consent to be a part of the repubamong which Halkevleri (community centres) and (village rooms)

of the republican period, when resistance to republican values, in particular secularism, was more frequently answered by force, there was an attempt to win might be quite different from that of the West in the same period, and might lack the political agencies and entities of Western civil society, yet there had been some interaction between civil society and political society in Turkey. Trans- Civil society and state in Turkey society organisations, including business chambers, trade unions and township (the

From a Gramscian perspective, the state and civil society relationship in the which the coercive aspect of rule is more salient as state-building was prioritised. However, through the agencies of political parties, intellectuals and nongovernmental organisations an attempt was made to integrate and balance civil successful in acquiring consent. The apparent use of force, most notably the military interventions, overshadows these initiatives for forming consent in the attempt to form a multi-party system and to disseminate its founding principles through the intellectuals in the organisations operating on the terrain of civil society, no matter how strictly controlled they were by political society. The proponents of the view that opposes civil society to the state emphasise (the Confederation of

with the political parties. Furthermore, civil society organisations, students, academicians and civil servants were prohibited from political activity by the limited to coercive measures, and this is often underestimated in current debates. The scope and intensity of coercion again overshadows hegemonic struggle on might be better interpreted within a Gramscian perspective in comparison to the previous periods, since the salient use of force was increasingly replaced by ideological struggle for hegemony. Although the military interventions and postmilitary intervention periods have been often interpreted in terms of their destructive effects in the Turkish case, the constitutive and ideological conand an emphasis on the dangers of ideological fragmentation not only of the state synthesis focused on Islam as a consequence of the realisation that religion might H. Dikici-Bilgin

tary barracks became the privileged institutions of the newly introduced ideology; (the Association of Intellectuals’ Heart), the education system ideology in the domain of civil society. This interpretation supports Gramsci’s analysis that law as well as the education system and other institutions become Additionally, new Quranic schools (private Quran courses and vocational religious high schools) were opened; religious courses were made compulsory; the employment of imams (prayer leaders at mosques) increased; and the autonomy as the attacks on the state got stronger; a pro-status quo civil society was coercion, but on the other hand, attempts at forming consent did become more central through institutions and ideology. Given that the military interventions political society, hegemonic struggle might be argued to have become more vital for the protection of the state. This certainly requires more struggle on the site of civil society.

A Gramscian interpretation of the relations between civil society and the state highlights a number of aspects of these relations in the Turkish case. Different between the state and civil society in Turkey have taken multiple forms. This also indicates that civil society cannot be considered as a sphere or a monolithic unit that can be conceptualised only as opposed to the state. Rather, there are different political agencies in civil society which respond to such constitutive principles as secularism and Turkishness in different ways. For those agencies which challenge the constitutive republican ideology, civil society becomes a sphere opposed to society is a sphere in which an attempt has been made to constitute a new concepwith corresponding familial values. Thus civil society and state have been in varying degrees of interaction from the early years of the republic, which makes it unrealistic to analyse civil society and the state as separate entities in Turkey. From the 1990s to today: contemporary discussions According to a recent report on civil society organisations in contemporary foundations, trade unions, state workers unions, chambers and co-operatives Civil society and state in Turkey

thinking which has resulted in the emergence of alternative modernities to the ities of civil society organisations and corresponding constitutional reforms in which the state’s response remained slow and the activities of civil society organisations were also transformed. As a consequence of migration, identitypolitical struggle is now transformed into ethnic, cultural and religious problems which paved the way for civil society organisations to become increasingly apoethnicity, such as those of the Kurds and Circassians, or on religion such as those of Islamists and Alevis, as well as more nationalist or militarist associations. In terms of the categorisation of civil society organisations, organisation type is one criterion. Bayraktar categorises civil society organisations as those of capital

–

men’s Association, TESK – the Confederation of Turkish Craftsmen and Trades) those articulated with the state, those against the state and those that are formally such as Kemalism, Islam and socialism, and those having ties to the state which have boundary problems in terms of their relations with the state in Turkey, which H. Dikici-Bilgin

of the state with the society’ as it is illustrated in the participation of civil servants inviting children from underdeveloped areas for holidays are also mentioned within a strategy to become hegemonic and win the consent of the minorities in the GramThis line of argument sees Islam as a new form of counter-hegemonic politics coup’ in the media, against the Islamist coalition partner in government (Berkan which challenge the military-bureaucratic elite

society organisations work together with the military-bureaucratic elite against the rise of political Islam. During the political crisis over the Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party, a pro-Islamist political party that was a coalition partner in the government in (the Turkish Confederation of

oration with the military elite in order to force the Refah to resign (Karaman and (BBC News 2007) against the AKP government’s policies and in support of secularism are alleged to have been organised by groups that have relations with the become more salient recently.

From a Gramscian perspective, this last line of interpretation is quite important. It implies that state and civil society are in reality organically connected in Turkey, ventions and military ultimatums reveal that force has been a part of the state, it still needs to be recognised that the ruling classes historically made some compro- Civil society and state in Turkey state in the narrow sense and civil society, and the attempt of the ruling elite to become hegemonic are both more discernible.

these interpretations of civil society and state relations is that most of them rely on an understanding which tends to see civil society and the state as separate. However, the course which these relations have historically followed indicates their mutual interactions and penetrations. More importantly, these interactions do organisations or reproducing values. There are also civil society organisations which interact with the agencies within the sphere of political society in an attempt the trade unions and the bureaucracy and also allegedly the military against an Atatürkist Thinking Association, Association for Modern Thinking and daily Cum- huriyet – are engaged in awareness raising activities through press releases, meetings and rallies against the rise of political Islam. Islamists, on the other hand, have elections, Refah

and today, as mentioned above, the AKP also presents itself as the representative of Turkish civil society. Turban (veiling) rallies and religious-based civil society dimension of this side.

Civil society in Gramscian thinking, however, is not only seen as a sphere for web of relations in advanced capitalist societies and to propose a strategy for a Refah has organised in the neighbourhoods with street representatives and quite valuable asset for the Islamist intellectuals. Thus, there are multiple layers the relations between civil society and the state.

Conclusion

with an analytical tool to understand power relations in terms of the interactions within the layers of civil society and between civil society and the state. Each interpretation of contemporary civil society and state relations in Turkey indeed has some truth. Nevertheless, these perspectives overemphasise individual aspects. H. Dikici-Bilgin

A Gramscian perspective, on the other hand, allows us to interpret all these develchapter, these are all part of the varying relations between the state and civil society, ranging from opposition to the state to support for the state, and including, coercion is the armour of the state. There has, in fact, been a hegemonic struggle in Turkish civil society since the early republican period up until today. The relationship between civil society and state from this perspective cannot be conceptualised as a mere relation of opposition so that each move from civil society will be unconditionally democratising. The Islamist civil society organisations with their strong criticism of the republican secularism might indicate opposition to the republican state tradition, yet Islam has become an aspect of politics allowed in again by political society. More importantly, the state does not use force only, but holders of state power also penetrate into civil society through non-governmental organisations. These interactions correspond to what Gramsci means by arguing tions between civil society and the state supplies us with an approach which goes cive state and civil society activities which necessarily lead to democratisation. Rather, Gramsci provides us with the crucial insight that civil society is a site of struggles between competing conceptions of society. The activities of agencies in civil society are related to the agencies in political society. Thus, the direction of politics depends on the outcome of the interactions between these competing ignores the fact that values, beliefs and ideologies are also at work. In this Turkish state as one interacting with civil society rather than one which ignores it. Notes

din’s works on the formation of civil society, which are provided in the bibliography in full detail, are acknowledged as seminal for the subsequent studies on civil society in Turkey. The majority of later studies rely on his interpretation.

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9

Populism as counter-hegemony

The Israeli case

Dani Filc

Introduction

Antonio Gramsci developed the concept of hegemony in order to address the question of power and socialist struggle in the West. His main aim was to understand the failure of a socialist revolution in Western countries and in doing so he developed the idea of power as hegemony, the centaur that combines force and consent. Since his political intention was to overcome the capitalist hegemonic regime, the idea of alternative or counter-hegemonic forces was central to his view of the social. We could even claim that, maybe paradoxically, one of the strengths of the concept of hegemony is the way it throws light on the subordinated social groups and their counter-hegemonic practices and struggles. The present chapter proposes to understand populism as a form of counterhegemony. In order to support this claim, the paper follows some of Ernesto Laclau’s ideas on populism understood as a struggle between historical blocs (Laclau 1977, 2005), and it builds on a neo-or post-Gramscian understanding of to develop the idea of hegemony in non-essentialist, non-reductionist ways Likud Party in Israel as an example of a counter-hegemonic, populist movement. double-sided concept: as both praxis and structure. The second section proposes a typology of populism as composed of inclusive and exclusionary ‘subfamilies’, where the former plays a counter-hegemonic role. The third and fourth sections present the Israeli case as an example of the theoretical claims. The third section exposes the main characteristics of the labour movement’s hegemony in Israel and the fourth one shows the ways in which subaltern social groups constituted themselves as political subjects through their participation in an inclusive populist movement which succeeded in posing a counter-hegemonic alternative. Finally the chapter discusses the limitations of populism in the construction of a durable hegemonic project and its implications for current Israeli society and politics.

120 D. Filc

Hegemony

both the process by which, and the state in which, a way of life, a way of organising the distribution of resources and ways of thinking and understanding become dominant in a social formation. Hegemony is the introduction of ‘a new morality in conformity with a new conception of the world’ (Gramsci 1971: 366). Hegemony is a concept which includes two perspectives: the hegemonic praxis, the struggle to stabilise society around a hegemonic project (which expresses the fundamental interests of the dominant social groups but also takes into account the interests of the subordinated groups); and the hegemonic situation: the partial and temporary stabilisation of the social structure around this project. From the point of view of hegemony as a process, hegemony combines the double supremacy of a social group, as both domination and intellectual and moral leadership (Gramsci 1971: 55). From this perspective society is composed subjects by forming ‘historical blocs’. The constitution of the historical bloc corresponds to the political moment in Gramsci’s analysis of the relations of force. This is the phase of confrontation of forces, the phase in which ‘a single combination [of germinated ideologies] tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself over the whole social area – bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity’ (Gramsci ism there are two historical blocs, with the proletariat and the bourgeoisie respectively at their core. Gramsci states that ‘hegemony is political but also and above all economic, it has its material base in the decisive function exercised by the hegemonic group in the decisive core of economic activity’ (Gramsci 1975: 461). The present chapter, while using Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony as a starting point, represents a reading of his main ideas as further developed by societies, the a priori claim that class is always the core of the historical bloc hegemonic project has ‘ceased to have any necessary link with class’ (Laclau articulation as ‘any practice establishing a relation among elements such that occurs when social relations are antagonistic. Indeed, in contemporary societies, the very question of which subject positions will be articulated in a certain hegemonic bloc, and which subject positions will be the core of the historical bloc, is hegemony, as a logic of articulation and contingency, has come to determine the

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Populism as counter-hegemony 121

torical bloc is both the subject of hegemonic practices and the effect of these practices. In a historical context in which one cannot determine a priori which social group is dominant, hegemony is also the stabilisation of a certain hierarchy between the different subject positions within the historical bloc. In each society the kernel of the historical bloc is that subject position relevant to the If hegemony’s aspect of struggle underlines the role of social agents, hegemony’s facet of stabilisation of a certain project underlines the role of structure. From the point of view of hegemony as the stabilisation of the social, we need to consider society as a contingent totality in which institutions represent the sedimentation of past processes. This dimension emphasises the institutional aspects that produce and reproduce hegemony, and are also an expression (stable through time) of this hegemony. It emphasises how the ideological structure of a ruling class is actually organised: that is, the material organisation meant to preserve, defend and develop the intellectual and moral leadership of a social group over subordinated groups (Gramsci 1971: 57). Hegemony’s facet as the stabilisation of a certain project underlines the role of all those structures – school, law courts, libraries, media – ‘which form the apparatus of the political and cultural Hegemony is, therefore, not only the struggle by which a social bloc succeeds in imposing its project, but also the situation in which this project has already become dominant. A project becomes hegemonic when its view of reality pervades all the different layers of society, namely, its institutions, its private life, its morality, its customs, its religion and the different aspects of its culture (Wilsystem of practices, meanings and values, including expectations, beliefs and understanding of reality, up to the level of ‘common sense’. As quoted above, hegemony ‘propagate[s] itself throughout society – bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims but also intellectual and moral unity . . . and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of and the

state in which conceptions and social practices which respond to particular interests become the ‘natural order’, in such a way that hegemonic strategies appear as natural properties of humanity. In its double condition as struggle and state, hegemony mediates between agents of social struggles and institutions which stabilise hegemonic projects.

consolidation of the historical bloc. Second they seek the stabilisation of society around a project that not only expresses the fundamental interests of the dominant social group (or groups), but also takes into account the interests of some of the subordinate groups. Hegemonic struggles may adopt a variety of political forms, but they always take place around two interconnected (but analytically distinguishable) axes: redistribution of power and resources and the struggle for recognition (Fraser 1995).

122 D. Filc

the interests of the historical bloc, especially of the group – or groups – which prevail within it. These interests are expressed in all the spheres of the social, and are not limited to the political in its narrow sense, nor to the economic. the social is impossible; in democratic societies the locus of power is always around a hegemonic project is always partial and temporary. Every hegemonic project is threatened by alternative hegemonic projects, hegemony always implies counter-hegemony. This chapter claims that populism is one of the political forms that counter-hegemony takes in periods of hegemonic crisis. Populism as counter-hegemony

can be better understood as a ‘family’ of phenomena rather than as a single one is ical movements that have been characterised as populist, this chapter proposes a family of movements that share common characteristics, but also some differences. Those differences allow us to divide the populist phenomenon into two different ‘sub-families’: inclusive populist movements and those movements which Hans Betz called exclusionary populism (Betz 2001). The traits common to all populist movements are: (1) they emerge in historical situations where conrepresent a medium through which social groups can constitute themselves in an and virtue; (4) populist ideology combines three different meanings of the term

‘people’: people understood as the whole nation; people understood as the plebeians opposed to the elites; and an organic, ethno-cultural conception of people (Hermet 2001: 52, 5). In both types of populism, the leader embodies the people, representing it in a seemingly unmediated and unproblematic way. there are essential differences between the two populist sub-families. Inclusive populist movements allow for the political integration of excluded social groups and challenging the hegemonic distribution of power, resources and recognition. In this sense, inclusive populist movements are counter-hegemonic. The term

‘inclusive populism’ refers to movements that provide a way for subordinated social groups to constitute themselves as political subjects. In so far as they succeed in constituting themselves as a collective political subject, the subordinated political groups may be able to – partially – overcome their exclusion in two ways. First, as a collective political subject they become an active part of the Populism as counter-hegemony 123

political community. Second, as a political subject they are able to put forward claims to material or symbolic inclusion. However, this inclusion is always partial, since populist movements do not structurally modify the unequal distrigrounded on universal claims (as are liberal or socialist claims), but on a particularistic claim: ‘We too are the people’. The grounding of claims to inclusion on a particularistic basis means that inclusive populism always has an exclusionary people always refers to an excluded ‘Other’ who does not belong to the common we. ‘Exclusionary populist’ movements, on the other hand, privilege the organic understanding of the ‘people’ as an ethnically or culturally homogeneous totality. Exclusionary populist movements express the reaction of certain social groups to the threat of exclusion and the dissolution of their identity and subjectivity. This type of populist movement confronts these threats by excluding weaker groups, i.e. migrant workers or ethnic minorities. Building on Laclau’s seminal works on populism (Laclau 1977, 2005), I propose that we understand ‘inclusive populism’ as an alternative hegemonic project by and through which subordinated and excluded groups constitute themselves as political subjects opposed to the dominant bloc. This new historical the result of manipulation by the elites nor an expression of the masses’ ‘false consciousness’. Rather, it is a democratising process, as it enlarges the boundaries of participation and social belonging. As such it produces a partial redistribution of resources or a broadening of the frontiers of recognition. This process of partial inclusion has material, symbolic and political dimensions. When in government, inclusive populism usually improves the material conditions of the subordinated groups. Inclusive populist movements usually changes in the social structures that produce and reproduce the unequal distribution of resources. Populist movements symbolically include subaltern groups by appealing to the lective through the simultaneous understanding of the term ‘people’ as the whole nation and as the plebeians. The rhetoric and rituals characteristic of inclusive of ‘us vs. them’, the appeals to a mythical common past – are all strategies that evoke a sense of belonging and ‘[give] back to the subordinate and the poor the self-worth and recognition to be at the centre of the nation’ (de la Torre 1999: who, through the representation act, ‘creates the [represented] group which in its turn creates him [as its representative]’ (Bourdieu 1990: 62). In other words, the populist leader becomes the embodiment of the excluded group. Through his discourse and his political success, he creates the group (as a politically included subject), which in turn creates him as a successful leader and as the group’s 124 D. Filc

representative. Finally, populism includes the previously excluded groups as active political subjects, since group members become part of the populist movement’s leadership. Successful populist movements that partially include an excluded group both symbolically and materially, modify the power relations at the level of redistribution of resources and at the level of recognition, and thus can be considered counter-hegemonic. It should be noted that Gramsci himself most likely would not consider populism a true hegemonic alternative. He probably would consider it part of the history of the subaltern class, situated somewhere between ‘the birth of new parties of the dominant groups, intended to conserve the assent of the subaltern groups’ and ‘the formations which the subaltern groups themselves produce, in order to press claims of a limited and partial character’. In a strict sense, a counter-hegemonic movement would be only those

‘formations which assert . . . integral autonomy’. However, if we accept Laclau no real moment of ‘integral’ or complete autonomy. Thus, we can consider political movements that, from the point of view of their political development, are situated between a (partial) subordination to the ruling class and the assertion of the ‘autonomy of the subaltern groups, but within the old framework’ (Gramsci movement constituted an inclusive populist historical bloc which represented a counter-hegemonic alternative to the Labor movement hegemony. The Israeli case: the hegemony of the Labor movement The Israeli Labor movement succeeded in consolidating a historical bloc that pushed forward a ‘national-popular will’ which became hegemonic already in the pre-state years. Its characterisation as a ‘Labor movement’ notwithstanding, this was not an historical bloc constituted on a class basis. The project which became hegemonic was an ethno-republican one that combined nation-building with a collectivist conception of the ‘common good’ (Peled 1993; Kimmerling the combination of ethno-national and ideological characteristics. It was a social group composed of immigrants from Russia and Poland, motivated by an ideology that combined nationalist and collectivistic features (with certain socialist elements). During the pre-state and early state years the core of the historical bloc included blue-collar and white-collar workers and agricultural workers who were members of the different co-operative communes.1 Their nucleus was in national religious sectors were subaltern members of the historical bloc. included the consolidation of a capitalist market economy with a very strong public sector (in the 1970s the public sector produced 60 per cent of the GNP) and Populism as counter-hegemony 125

project, since the nationalisation of land functioned as a form of exclusion of the Israeli Palestinians. The General Workers’ Union was one of the strongest institutions in the country. The General Workers’ Union was not a traditional trade company), sports teams, cultural enterprises and trade unions. In the 1970s the economic activity of the Workers’ Union represented 30 per cent of the GNP

(Kimmerling 2004; Ram 2007; Shalev 1992).

The cultural and ideological elements of the hegemonic project included the idea of Israel as the national state of the Jewish people (though the idea of the can collectivist conception of the political community. In this view the ‘pioneer’

century were the equivalent of the republican virtus (Kimmerling 2004; Peled 1993; Shapiro 1976, 1996). The ethno-national character of this project and the republican view of the political community structured a system of concentric circles of belonging. Thus, the Palestinian minority in Israel enjoyed individual rights but lacked group rights and suffered from structural and direct segregation (Peled 1993; Kimmerling 2004; Yiftachel 2006). They were not considered part of the common ‘we’ in the sense that the Israeli Jews were part of it. Jewish immigrants from Arab countries ( Mizrahim) were considered part of the common ‘we’, but were in a subaltern position and, as a group, they did not belong to the hegemonic bloc. The hegemonic bloc treated the Mizrahim in clientelist ways, not acknowledging them as an autonomous political subject, Jewish population.

Hegemony was produced and reproduced by both structural and cultural means. The land regime excluded the Israeli Palestinians, some 20 per cent of spatial segregation and inequality and consolidating their exclusion. The state centralised policy of population allocation consolidated also the spatial segregation of the Mizrahim, who were allocated to ‘development towns’ in the periphery (Yiftachel 2006). and Mizrahim worked in the labour-intensive sector which paid low wages. The Party controlled both the state and the General Workers’ Union, thus having power over credit, most of the country’s agricultural and industrial production and the trade unions.

reproduced by a broad cadre of organic intellectuals composed of teachers, army 126 D. Filc

In a country where immigration doubled the population in a few years, the socialisation of immigrants was central for the reproduction of hegemony. This socialisation was achieved by two main tools: the school system and the army. the people’s army. Thus it assumed not only military but also educational goals. the people’s army and the Israeli people as ‘a nation in uniform’. The conception central to the school and the military was that Israel was a melting-pot for all immigrants. The idealised result of the melting-pot was the republican virtuous citizen-soldier, where virtue was represented by the ‘pioneer’ values and practices. In fact, both school and army were the means by which individuals were organic intellectuals and the consolidation of state institutions, allowed the Labor movement to forge a ‘national-popular’ will that remained hegemonic for almost half a century.

In this hegemonic model Mizrahim and Israeli Palestinians were excluded as collective subjects and only differentially included in clientelist ways: indiobjectifying and depoliticising way of inclusion, similar to what Gramsci denominated transformism. This term, used by Gramsci to refer to the Depretis contrast to Labor’s clientelist forms of inclusion, the constitution of the Mizra- him as a collective political subject was to be achieved by their participation in the populist counter-hegemonic bloc.

The Likud: a populist counter-hegemonic movement The Labor movement hegemony not only excluded Israeli Palestinians and Miz- rahim but also the nationalist Right, a group whose sociological characteristics were similar to those of the hegemonic elite, but which was ideologically and politically opposed to the hegemonic bloc. In its origin, this nationalist Right, politically represented by the Herut (Freedom) Party, was moulded in the frame of the European nationalist Right of the early twentieth century (Shapiro 1991). and organisational change in order to articulate the national Right’s claims with those of the Mizrahim. For Herut, this meant abandoning their ‘avantgardist’

conception of politics and adopting a populist one, aiming at an alliance with the Mizrahim. 2 The shared exclusion from the hegemonic bloc facilitated this process of articulation.

Begin’s leadership was central in the consolidation of a populist inclusive movement that became the main counter-hegemonic force in Israel. The core Populism as counter-hegemony 127

ideological element of this counter-hegemonic populist project was nationalism. Jerusalem. To save, without any previous selection, our North-African brothers. The war on poverty. State support for families with numerous children. The return to Zion of Soviet Jewry’ (Begin 1959). Begin’s goals articulated nationalism with claims to material inclusion (war on poverty, state support) and symbolic inclusion (absorption in Israel without selection). Herut’s nationalism was articulated with many of the main motives of populism: anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, the idea of the people as the depositary of truth and virtue and as a homogeneous unity, a unity embodied by the populist leader. Those elements were combined in such a way that Herut (which in 1973

merged with other small right-wing parties and changed its name to Likud) became the means for the symbolic and political inclusion of the Mizrahim. As we will see below, once in government the Likud complemented symbolic and political inclusion with a certain degree of material inclusion. As with all inclusive populist movements, Begin’s discourse symbolically included the Mizrahim

above, inclusive populism broadens the borders of the term ‘people’ in order to include previously excluded groups. The simultaneous use of the term to indicate the whole nation and the ‘common people’ functions as a symbolic way to integrate the subaltern groups to the common ‘we’. However, as mentioned above, populism’s inclusion is always partial, since it is grounded in particularistic claims (‘we are also this people’) and not in universal ones. This partial inclu‘Jewish people’ or ‘Jews’. By speaking about the Jewish people, instead of the Israeli people, he included the previously excluded Jewish immigrants from Arab countries. But he did that by deepening the exclusion of Israeli Palestinians. In the Beginist discourse, the people was simultaneously understood as the whole Jewish nation, comprising the Jewish popular classes and an ethnoconfronting external and internal enemies, the external ones being the Arab countries, the internal one the Labor movement’s elite.3

The hegemonic narrative extolled the part of the ‘pioneers’ in nation-building. Immigrants from Arab countries had no place in this narrative, since they arrived

‘too late’. By emphasising the fact that the Mizrahim did not take part in primordial nation-building and were not part of the ‘virtuous’ pioneers, the hegemonic one, a narrative by which the Mizrahim were included into the common ‘we’. declared:

Do not say that the mass immigration that arrived after the establishment of the state did not participate in the Zionist revolution. Do not say that those immigrants only want to receive but they are not ready to contribute. Those D. Filc

are terrible words. I do not want to open old accounts about who contributed and who received during the last 60 years. But even if it is true that the mass immigration arrived after the establishment of the state, this means that they only received? That they did not contribute? Is it not enough to remind ourselves that since they arrived here there were many wars? The Sinai War, the Six Days War, the War of Yom Kippur? Our brothers, the immigrants, did not shed their blood? Didn’t they risk their lives? They did not die in combat? Didn’t they mourn their loved ones? Didn’t they become orphans?

Begin’s alternative narrative extended the ‘pioneer’ era up to the present, thus including in it the immigrants from Arab countries. In this alternative narrative the Mizrahim were also pioneers, they also possessed virtus. As early as 1959 he discursively transformed exclusion into a source of pride: Our rivals claim that our force rests mainly in the poor neighborhoods. They claim that we receive the support of those who have no means, of the sufferers, of the wretched. The truth is that we get our support from all the echelons among the people . . . we are the party that tries to emphasize all those class or a single group but the nation as a whole, without differences. But if someone will ask us whether we also receive support for our cause from the propertyless, from the sufferers and the wretched, we shall answer with pride: yes, they give us their support! They support us because we bear the banner of justice.

(Begin 1959)

Fourteen years later, analysing the 1973 elections in which the Likud vote increased the number of members of Parliament, though not enough to defeat the Labor party, Begin said: ‘[T]o whom do we owe our growth? To the believers and to the poor. We are proud of our voters’ (Begin 1973b). These quotes exemand ‘believers’. Begin linked poverty, belief and exclusion, and built a chain of equivalences to the view of the Jewish people as an organic cultural unity. The simultaneous contributed to the constitution of a counter-hegemonic historical bloc formed by the right-wing nationalists, the believers and the poor. The link between the poor, the believers and himself as the leader of the Likud drew the borders of the historical bloc opposed to the Labor movement’s hegemony led by secular elites who excluded and discriminated against the Mizrahim. Populism as counter-hegemony 129

Begin’s speeches emphasised the opposition between the exclusionary hegemonic worldview and the counter-hegemonic populist narrative which he embodied. The peak of this discursive construction was the speech that closed campaign, one of the speakers, in order to emphasise the difference between the Labor Party and the Likud supporters, appealed to the ethno-republican narrative and the combatants, tomorrow [at the Likud’s meeting] there will be the “campguards” ’.4

The following day, at the Likud meeting, Begin made use of the Labor Party speaker’s expression to underline once more the differences between the inclusive, counter-hegemonic populism he led and the elite’s exclusionary hegemony. He ended his speech by saying:

Yesterday at this square stood a young actor . . . and in front of 100,000

Labor Party supporters he said: ‘The hoodlums are in the Likud, [in the of the combatant units.’ I will tell you the truth. Until yesterday I did not hear that word, hoodlums . . . Shall we accept that a mercenary actor paid by the Labor movement will desecrate every sacred thing? We are all brothers, all of us Jewish, all of us equal. All of us! The Mizrahim are among the army’s best combatants. Hoodlums, hoodlums he called them. And everyone who was there cheered . . . Nobody said such heretic words as those, nobody insulted one of our tribes so deeply, as the Labor Party did here yesterday. All the Israeli people must know it, only one sentence: the hoodlums are all in the Likud. Yes, and we are blessed that they are with us.5

Begin’s phrase ‘we are all brothers, we are all Jews, we are all equals’ employed the three meanings of the term ‘people’ in order to make clear the existence of two opposed historical blocs: ‘We are all brothers’, i.e. members of an organic unity; ‘we are all Jews’ – the ‘people’ means the (Jewish) nation as a whole; and

‘we are all equal’, i.e. the people includes also the excluded Mizrahim (while the reference to the Jewish people and not to the Israeli people deepened the exclusion of the Palestinian minority). Begin used the derogatory term ‘hoodlums’ to underline the differences between the hegemonic and the counter-hegemonic projects, transforming it from a derogatory term to a source of pride, in order to emphasise that the Mizrahim are a central component of the counter-hegemonic bloc (‘we are proud that the hoodlums are in the Likud’). The second way in which populism includes excluded groups – and constitutes a counter-hegemonic bloc – is political inclusion. This form of inclusion marks the real difference between clientelism and populism. Political inclusion transforms the excluded subaltern groups into political subjects and emphasises the counter-hegemonic character of the historical bloc thus constituted, in so far as it challenges the hegemonic model’s distribution of resources and recognition. 130 D. Filc

The Labor party did not consider the immigrants from Arab countries as political subjects. The Labor movement’s elite addressed the new immigrants in clientelist ways, guaranteeing material gains for local leaders or notables in exchange for political support. This clientelist relationship was an objectifying one, since It was only through their participation in the populist movement that the Mizra- him constituted themselves as a collective political subject. This process of subamong the subaltern excluded group; the active participation of the subaltern as ical collective subject with its own voice.

The Labor movement political culture did not allow for the emergence of a Mizrahi leadership. As opposed to this, the Likud provided a friendly environment for their development. Young Mizrahim careers within the Labor movement but became national political leaders as Likud members. When they understood that they could not progress within the Labor Party, since they were not considered equal political subjects, they left that party to join the Likud. All Labor governments until 1977 had one Mizrahi minister (as a symbol of ‘inclusiveness’) but the relation to him was always condescending and clientelistic. David Levy, who as a Likud member was part stature while voicing the claim of the excluded. As a Mizrahi Likud supporter put it ‘At last we have a leader of our own . . . he erased the image of the Mizrahi

The second characteristic of the Mizrahim’s constitution as a collective political subject within the counter-hegemonic bloc was their entrance into the politthe latter included many more representatives of the lower middle and lower academic education and more than half of them (52 per cent) were Mizrahim, Mizrahim (Herzog

6

The third dimension of political inclusion was the recognition of the Mizra- him as a collective subject with a voice of its own. The populist discourse is an interplay between two voices: the leader’s and the people’s voice. We already saw how Begin’s speeches aimed to speak in the name of the excluded. But the Likud movement also made conscious use of the vox plebis as expressed by the people itself. The people in mass assemblies played a contrapunto to Begin’s people’s voice in its electoral propaganda. They appealed to the voice of the subaltern groups as a way of grounding the truthfulness of the Likud’s claims. For Populism as counter-hegemony 131

electoral campaign using a plain style to expose their problems and their views vox plebis, and not the party speaker or the public Levy expressed it some years later, ‘the development towns and the [poor]

force, a force that must be taken into account, a force with which you must diaWhile the Likud’s inclusive populism rested mostly on the symbolic and the political dimensions, during the Begin years in government it presented also some elements of material inclusion. This aspect, however, is the most controversial one. The Likud’s ideological vision was contradictory, combining freemarket rhetoric and economic liberalism with support for state provision of basic welfare (health, education, housing and minimum income). Once the party was in government this contradiction was expressed in three different economic proeconomy and the rolling back of the public sector, which would reach its peak in the 1990s and after 2000. However the Likud also implemented some important guaranteed a very basic income, made high-school education free and mandatory, and implemented an ambitious programme for the improvement of housing measures inequality of income distribution, slightly decreased between 1977 and quality, the government policies brought a slight improvement in income distrigoods allowed the lower middle classes access to electric appliances which they could not afford before.

The combination of symbolic, political and very partial material inclusion united to consolidate the political identity of the Mizrahim as members of the populist, counter-hegemonic movement. For them the Likud became the way in which they constituted themselves as an autonomous political subject. This is Begin gave his speeches everywhere, and all of us shouted Begin, Begin . . . and in the elections the Likud won, and a leader of the Labor Party said

‘Today the lights went out in Israel’. But we, from the moment Begin thing was OK.

(Y.K.: interview with the author)

Conclusion

In what sense can we say that the Likud’s inclusive populism presented an alternative hegemonic project to the Labor movement’s hegemony? In strict 132 D. Filc

Gramscian terms, populism is not an alternative hegemony, since for Gramsci the only alternative to capitalist hegemony is the ‘philosophy of praxis’, the core of the alternative historical bloc is the working class, and the heart of any real hegemonic alternative is the core interests of the [counter] hegemonic group (Gramsci 1975: 461). From a ‘strict’ Gramscian perspective, populism could be characterised as a passive revolution, a ‘revolution without a revolution’. A being introduced into the country’s economic structure . . . without however From this perspective, a project that does not challenge the structure of the relations of production is not really a hegemonic alternative. As Gramsci explains in reference to his analysis of the relation of forces, a passive revolution is a process which takes place only at the second moment (equilibrium of political forces) and not at the politico-military moment (Gramsci 1971: 106–7). In my opinion, however, a non-essentialist reading of the concept of hegemony does allow us to consider inclusive populism as an alternative hegemony. There are even references in the Gramscian text which permit an understanding of passive revolution as a form of hegemonic struggle. In note 11 in Notebook 15, Gramsci asks whether ‘the concept of passive revolution . . . [can] be related to the concept of “war of position” in contrast to war of manoeuvre’ or ‘at least does there exist . . . an entire historical period in which the two concepts must be ing of hegemony as a way of explaining struggles in Western societies, in which the main form of struggle was the ‘war of position’. Thus, based on his claim that passive revolution is identical to the latter, we could state that populism may represent an alternative hegemonic project. This claim is even stronger if we and if we accept that the core of a historical bloc is not always a priori a social class; if we accept that power struggles are not organised in the last instance sider populist inclusive movements as counter-hegemonic. It is in this sense that we can consider the Likud’s (partial) inclusive populism as a counter-hegemonic movement that was instrumental in overcoming the former Labor movement’s hegemony. Still, when it arrived in government its internal contradictions made it very unstable and unable to consolidate an alternative hegemony. Begin’s period in power was relatively short. Though re-elected formed a ‘National Unity’ government that put forward an economic programme neo-liberal socio-economic hegemonic model in Israel. This hegemonic project analysis of which goes beyond the limits of the present chapter. However, pop- Populism as counter-hegemony 133

ulism, both in its inclusive and its exclusionary expressions, remains a constant central.

Notes

1 The political and cultural hegemony of these groups translated, especially in the late 1960s and 1970s, into economic progress, providing the basis for a new bourgeoisie, which would increase its power with the neo-liberalisation processes which has taken 2 G. Di Tella characterised populism as the alliance between an excluded sub-elite and subaltern social groups (Di Tella 1965).

3 As with other populist movements, Begin too presented the internal and external enemies as allies of a sort.

much lower than those who served in combatant units. 5 Begin used the term chahchahim, a derogatory slang word used to name Jews who immigrated from Arab countries.

subaltern group.

Part III

Gramsci and contemporary

British politics

10 Prince of modernisers

Gramsci, New Labour and the meaning

of modernity

Will Leggett

Introduction

During the 1980s neo-Gramscian thinking, pioneered by Stuart Hall, was central to the British Left coming to terms with Thatcherism. It is therefore no surprise that analysis of New Labour has similarly been haunted by Gramsci’s thought. In addition to the burgeoning mainstream political science and social policy literature, there has been a distinctively neo-Gramscian body of work that has attempted to understand the New Labour project. This has again been led by Hall (1998; 2003), complemented by others working in a similar vein (Finlayson 2003; Leggett 2005; Newman 2001; Bewes and Gilbert 2000; Coddington and Perryman 1998; Hassan 2007; Steinberg and Johnson, 2004c). After more than a decade of New Labour in power – and at a time of writing (summer 2008) when the project appears to be in terminal decline – this chapter considers what Gramscian thinking has contributed to understanding the complex New Labour phenomenon, as well as possible paths beyond it. At the same time, it also asks what analysis of New Labour tells us about the continuing relevance of Gramsci’s thought. In so doing, there is of course a risk of simply going through a ‘shopping list’ of Gramscian concepts in a manner that does violence to his original context and intent. However, in this I follow Hall, who cautions that ‘I do not claim that, in any simple way, Gramsci “has the answers” or “holds the key” to our present troubles. I do believe that we must “think” our problems in a Gramscian way – which is different’ (Hall 1987: 16). It is precisely the richness and attempting to capture live political projects; it is worth pushing some of his ideas a little – even if this does depart from their original deployment – to see what they can do for us today.

Gramsci’s analysis of the economic and social revolutions he was witnessing, and New Labour’s reading of late modernity. Using a range of Gramsci’s concepts (italicised here), it is argued that far from being just ‘spin’, the New Labour project was authentically hegemonic in intent. While the pragmatic and tactical –

conjunctural – context needs to be fully recognised, New Labour sought to win a battle of ideas and instil a new political 138 W. Leggett

common sense. In the form of the Third Way, this was based on a fundamental –

organic – reading of rapid social, economic and cultural change, and its political implications. New Labour attempted intellectual and moral leadership in trying to instil this common sense and construct a ‘ collective man’ for a new era. Despite New Labour’s potentially Gramscian aspects, the politics of the project have been a bitter disappointment to progressives. The second section thus explores neo-Gramscian accounts of the political character of New Labour, and here some of the relative strengths and limitations of Gramscian analysis come into sharper focus. Much has been made of the concepts of transformism and passive revolution in understanding New Labour as a vehicle for neoliberalism. However, these illustrate some problems in Gramscian analysis, mainly concerning the extent to which the ruling group exercises effective agency in the face of wider economic and social constraints: a problem of volunGramsci himself offers some theoretical resources to address this issue. In getting to grips with the meaning of New Labour, Gramsci’s division between the organic and conjunctural levels is extremely useful. The distinction enables us to separate the world-historical project of neo-liberalism from the more parochial New Labour project, of which Blairism can itself be seen as a further frac378–472) offer a way of thinking through the relationship between social change and political action, as progressives seek paths beyond New Labour. By way of an example, the chapter concludes by pointing to the theme of individualisation as having potential for a neo-Gramscian political intervention, reclaiming it from its neo-liberal variant for a more progressive politics. New Labour as a hegemonic project

A frequent claim made against New Labour from its critics on both left and right was that ‘the project’ was nothing of the sort. Instead, the whole exercise was portrayed as representing the triumph of style over substance in a postideological age, and Blair himself as embodying the vacuity of 24-hour media political philosophy for New Labour – the Third Way most closely associated and a smokescreen for a complete lack of ideological or moral core. Against this view and drawing on some of the many concepts bequeathed to us by Gramsci for analysing political formations, we can see that whatever our political feelings about New Labour, it should be seen as attempting a genuinely hegemonic polupon New Labour, the dominant strand was a sociological account of a ‘changed world’ which the centre-left must adapt to. This reached its fullest expression in the Third Way associated with Giddens, but can be traced back to, ironically, the Gramsci-inspired analysis of Stuart Hall and others in the journal Marxism Today. What follows begins by acknowledging the shorter-term, conjunctural Prince of modernisers 139

background to New Labour’s emergence. It then traces the development of its sociological account of politics, and the ways in which it showed what Gramsci referred to as intellectual and moral leadership towards creating a new ‘collective man’ for new times.

The conjunctural context

Gramsci stressed the central importance of being able to distinguish between those moments and movements that are conjunctural in character, and those epochal, possibly playing themselves out over decades (Gramsci 1971: 178). The conjunctural aspects of the creation of New Labour are well rehearsed. ‘Old Labour’ had been decisively rejected by the electorate during the 1980s, was out of touch with modern Britain and was apparently unable to resist the tide of Thatcherism. The party gradually began to drop those aspects of its policy and rhetoric that were alienating the voters it needed. Following the death of John Smith in 1994, it found a young, ‘modern’ new leader who intuitively understood the anxieties and aspirations of Middle England. It is arguable that, confronted with a tired fourth term Conservative administration, Labour would have won the election in 1997 regardless of its modernising changes. But the modernisers sought nothing less than to irreversibly reconstruct the British centre-left and become the ‘natural party of government’

for a generation or more. Gramsci noted that

The decisive moment in every situation is the permanently organised and situation is favourable (and it can be favourable only in so far as such a (Gramsci 1971: 185)

The New Labour project was not suddenly born in 1997. It was precisely the at party modernisation in the 1980s. Indeed, the close circle of modernisers revmised in the titles of their mini-manifestoes such as How the modernisers saved the Labour Party (Gould 1998). Below we shall see how Gramsci’s theoretical repertoire helps us to capture the full hegemonic intent of the New Labour project.

New times: creating a new common sense

Gramsci expanded our conception of the political by showing how, in complex modern societies, the struggle for hegemony or to develop a new common sense is played out not just in the formal institutions of the state but in the labyrinth of civil society. Hall’s eerily prescient (1979) analysis of the social climate of the 140 W. Leggett

late 1970s showed how that period was vulnerable to colonisation by the ‘authoritarian populism’ of the Thatcher project. Later, Hall (1988) noted how an intellectual revolution – in the universities, think-tanks, national press and business opinion – had established the neo-liberal thinking associated with Hayek and Friedman as a new orthodoxy for solving the crisis of ‘ungovernable’ Britain. Gramsci argued that ‘the philosophy of an epoch cannot be any systematic tendency or individual system. It is the ensemble of all individual philosophies sense’ (Gramsci 1971: 455). New Labour is rarely characterised as having ridden the crest of an intellectual wave to the extent that neo-liberalism did; the modernisers could not draw on such a fully formed philosophy as had been available to the neo-liberal pioneers. However, it is possible to discern from the late 1980s onwards a number of intellectual currents – ‘philosophical tendencies’ – which amounted to a new understanding of British society and politics in general and the role of Labour in particular. This was allied to an emerging common sense that while Thatcherism had introduced a new dynamism into the British economy and society via freeing up markets, the social costs (e.g. an emerging underclass) had been too high and needed addressing. Most striking is that what ultimately came to inform the Third Way were not ideas imported from political philosophy, or any vision of the good society, but a set of sociological claims about the fundamental social shifts of late modernity and how the Left needs to adapt to them (Finlayson 2003; Leggett 2005). This indicates an attempt to get to grips with social forces that go beyond the merely conjunctural, and to grasp a hegemonic project.

Central to this political-sociological understanding was the heavily Gramsciinspired journal Marxism Today in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Around the broad organising theme of ‘New Times’, writers such as Hall, Martin Jacques, Geoff Mulgan and others developed a relatively disparate but compelling analysis of how the rapid social, economic and cultural shifts of late modernity were rendering traditional collectivist politics obsolete. Changes were pointed to in consumption and identity, production and organisations, political collectivities and the form of the state (Hall and Jacques 1989). The thrust of the analysis was that, while the Left should maintain its critique of neo-liberalism, it was mistaken to bury its head in the sand about these transformations. The political genius of the Thatcher project was the way in which it had tapped in to the new individualism and the decline of deference, and stamped it with a neo-liberal worst celebrating Thatcherism, and doing the ideological work of the New Right by consigning socialism to history (Rustin 1989). However, a clear division opened up. On the one hand were those such as Hall who, following Gramsci, sought to identify counter-hegemonic practices for steering these emergent social as being inevitable, and saw the emergence of a formation such as New Labour Prince of modernisers 141

Mulgan and Charles Leadbeater, who went on to become key New Labour insiders (Finlayson 2003). This ‘there is no alternative’, sociologically reductionist approach eventually found full expression in the Third Way elaborated by Anthony Giddens and adopted by New Labour.

The sociology of the Third Way has been covered extensively (see Townshend in this volume; Leggett 2005) and needs only summarising here. For Giddens (1994a; 1998), the key feature of late modernity is the unstoppable ‘juggernaut’ of globalisation. Economic globalisation undermines the capacity of nation-states to manage their own economies, especially on Keynesian lines. As a result, governments must create favourable conditions for business, and equip the society and economy to compete in the global free market. A series of related process and act on the basis of multiple new types of knowledge. Under such conditions, claims to authority and expertise of the traditional variety (‘it’s right because it’s there’/‘we’ve always done it this way’) are forced to justify themselves – a process of detraditionalisation. This in turn feeds individualisation: the growing decoupling of individuals, their worldviews and practices, from traditionally binding social structures such as the family or the mass political party (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001).

While the empirical veracity of these sociological theories is contested, crucial to understanding the Third Way are their alleged implications for politics and the centre-left. Under detraditionalised conditions, publics are sceptical of any ‘totalising’ ideologies (such as socialism) which claim to offer universal solutions. While this threatens the established ideologies of Left and Right, the Left faces the further problem that its top-down, command-and-control model of politics is obsolete under conditions of increasing social complexity. The entire against the tide of apparently irreversible social change. were appropriated to meet the political requirements of the sociological analysis. In particular, other traditions have been used to address the Third Way’s appar values, and/or to differentiate it from its opponents on Left cance of society, but in a non-statist way (Hale 2004). This was allied to thinking which stressed the importance of strong social relations for making markets work effectively (e.g. through trust and social capital); similar themes were pursued in the stakeholding approach associated with Will Hutton (1999). Reaching back to more traditional political theory, there was a resurgence of Hobhouse and Tawney (Vincent 1998). What such approaches held in common was an acceptance of free markets, with the proviso that rather than social justice being seen as antithetical to their effective operation, it should be embraced as integral to it. In the policy focus of New Labour, this was captured in the image 142 W. Leggett

of the enabling state, in contrast to the ‘top-down’ state of Keynesian social democracy and the laissez-faire state of neo-liberalism (Giddens 1998). New Labour’s belief in the political imperatives presented by a changed world echo Gramsci’s own modernism. While critical of the social costs of capitalism, Gramsci was clearly admiring of its productive capacity, and dismissive of those who had not grasped new times and who tried to resist industrialisation by harking back to an imagined lost past:

mode of thought elaborated for a past which is often remote and superseded? When someone does this, it means that he is a walking anachronism, a fossil, and not living in the modern world, or at the least that he is strangely composite.

(Gramsci 1971: 324)

tion for capitalist restructuring, Gramsci is explicit that the task of theory is precisely to highlight the reality of actual historical developments, in order to increase their effectiveness:

the identity of theory and practice is raised especially in the so-called transitional moments of history, that is, those moments in which the movement of transformation is at its most rapid. For it is then that the practical forces expansive; and that theoretical programmes multiply in number, and demand selves assimilable into practical movements, thereby making the latter yet more practical and real.

(Gramsci 1971: 365)

If we regard New Labour as a ‘practical movement’ operating in a period when

‘the movement of transformation is at its most rapid’, the Third Way appears as Gramscian in its intent to grasp the direction of new times.

Intellectual and moral leadership: creating a new ‘collective man’

Both Gramsci and New Labour, then, were admiring of modernity’s progress through the realisation of its productive capacities. There are further similarities in their agreement that the state should act to meet the requirements of the productive apparatus. This is to be achieved by constructing a new type of worker, and indeed the act of work per se is highly valued by both Gramsci and New Labour.

Gramsci leaves us in no doubt that state interventions are driven by the development of the mode of production, and the class interests that lie behind it: Prince of modernisers 143

every State is ethical in as much as one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling classes. (Gramsci 1971: 258)

In his work on ‘Americanism and Fordism’ (1971: 277–318), Gramsci explains how economic development requires the construction of new types of worker –

or ‘collective man’. And just as with the productive forces themselves, Gramsci is not an outright critic of this necessity. In particular, in stressing not only the economic but also the social, humanising, potential of work, Gramsci again foreshadows the work-centrism of New Labour: What is the point of reference for the new world in gestation? The world of production; work. . . . Collective and individual life must be organised with a view to the maximum yield of the productive apparatus [as this] will permit new possibilities for self-discipline, i.e. for freedom, including that of the individual.

(cited in Gramsci 1971: 242, n. 42)

Gramsci argues that the rise of American Fordism is rational and should be generalised, notwithstanding the need for a change in social conditions and ‘in the way of life and habits of individuals’ (Gramsci 1971: 312). The sense of inevitable progress through work is further illustrated when he observes that Fordism will itself be superseded by the creation of a psycho-physical nexus of a new type, both different from its predecessors and undoubtedly superior. A forced selection will ineluctably take place; a part of the old working class will be pitilessly eliminated from the world of labour, and perhaps from the world tout court.

(Gramsci 1971: 302–3)

The parallels with New Labour are striking, although in their case progress is no longer represented by Fordism, but its displacement through globalisation, Similarly, Gramsci’s emphasis on the productive role of the state is mirrored in New Labour’s insistence that today the state must be the facilitator for free markets and entrepreneurial activity – and indeed model its own activities upon them. New Labour also has its own vision of ‘collective man’ for new times, manifesting itself in ways more subtle and intricate than even those envisaged by Gramsci. As Finlayson vividly suggests, under New Labour, government is ‘no longer the base of the CEO of UK plc; it is the personnel management department’ (Finlayson 2003: 138). With its ‘no rights without responsibilities’ discourse, New Labour has attempted to recast the relationship between state and citizen to better meet new economic and social conditions. The state is to act as 144 W. Leggett

enabler, and no longer in the top-down fashion of the Fordist era. The citizen is preneurial and a good consumer: a citizen-consumer (Giddens 2007; Needham 2004). Entrepreneurship, consumption and extreme wealth have been idolised, knowledge economy, but what the citizenry actively aspire to. Gramsci argued that ‘Intellectual and moral reform has to be linked with a programme of economic reform – indeed the programme of economic reform is precisely the concrete form in which every intellectual and moral reform presents itself’ (Gramsci 1971: 133). This sense is illustrated by New Labour’s sharing of Gramsci’s enthusiasm for the moral value of work. ‘Middle England’ has become interchangeable with ‘hard working families’ as the imaginary idealised Gordon Brown’s actions as Chancellor and Prime Minister, in measures including the minimum wage, working families’ tax credits, the New Deal and a plethora of other supply-side measures. These aim to use work to regenerate not just the economy, but also the national psyche. Interestingly, where Gramsci pointed to the limits of coercion in achieving the Fordist worker in America, and the primary necessity of incentives (good wages), New Labour has found it necessary to supplement its celebration of work with a critique of ‘the unproductive’

as large as it did under Thatcher, and election chief Alan Milburn (2005) warned ominously in his ‘contract for a third term’, ‘Play by the rules, and you’ll get a chance to progress’.

Like Gramsci, then, New Labour embraced sweeping economic and social change, sought to build a politics in response to it, and was highly critical of outaddition, New Labour tried to deliver a new ‘collective man’ – a subject that was appropriate to meet the productive requirements of the new economy and New Labour’s political character: a passive revolution?

Despite the Gramscian elements of New Labour’s analysis, Hall (1998; 2003) and others became bitterly disappointed at its failure to fully elaborate its hegemonic potential on progressive lines. However, neo-Gramscians do not simply present New Labour as being Thatcherism mark II – they argue that account must be taken of its centre-left heritage in understanding its actions. At the same time, though, New Labour is presented as advancing the neo-liberal project by draw on the concepts of passive revolution and transformism, which emerged from Gramsci’s diverse historical analyses. Passive revolution refers to the capacity of the ruling class, during periods of upheaval, to make political changes ‘from above’ which diminish oppositional forces and enable the repro- Prince of modernisers 145

duction of core capitalist economic and social relations. Such a revolution uses state intervention to secure the interests of the ruling class, often by making farreaching social changes, but without including the subordinate classes in the process. Gramsci used the related concept of transformism to account for what did happen to oppositional elements during a passive revolution. He observed that a variety of mechanisms are used to co-opt, fragment, and dilute oppositional actors and demands (Gramsci 1971: 109). New Labour’s own passive revolution is held to consist in its various interventionist measures, many of which would ostensibly be anathema to neoliberals (as they involve state action), but which at the same time facilitate the ongoing neo-liberal restructuring of society. This movement – of being simultaneously a social democratic party that must maintain progressive support and a that ‘New Labour does have a long-term strategy, “a project”: what Antonio Gramsci called the “transformism” of social democracy into a particular variant of free-market neo-liberalism’ (Hall 2003: 12):

The fact is that New Labour is a hybrid regime, composed of two strands. However, one strand – the neo-liberal – is in the dominant position. The other strand – the social democratic – is subordinate. What’s more, its hybrid character is not simply a static formation; it is the process which combines the two elements which matters. The process is ‘transformist’. The latter always remains subordinate to and dependent on the former, and is constantly being ‘transformed’ into the former, dominant one. (Hall 2003: 19)

This form of passive revolution lends itself to duplicity and manipulation. Steinberg and Johnson note that it ‘often involves grandiose national projects. . . . Yet, at the same time, it puts a premium on “politics” in its narrowest and “dirtiest”

meaning: striking deals, presenting issues cleverly, not giving too much away, a certain instrumentality or “realism” in the “machiavellian” sense’ (Steinberg and Johnson 2004a: 13). It is this necessary recourse to Machiavellianism which explains the problem of spin and manipulation widely associated with New Labour. While Hall acknowledges that spin represents a general problem of ‘the reduction of politics to public relations’, it also has a clear and necessary function in New Labour of ‘ “squaring circles”: re-presenting a broadly neo-liberal project . . . in such a way that it can mobilise the popular consent of Labour voters and supporters. . . . The New Labour phenomenon of linguistic slippage is thus a function of its double-pronged mode of address’ (Hall 2003: 23). Gramsci made it clear that transformism would often involve the ruling group making genuine concessions. Thus, commenting on New Labour’s claims to a ‘what matters is what works’ type of non-ideological pragmatism, Hall suggests that, ‘Pragmatism is the crafty, incremental implementation of a ground when the opposition is hot, tactically revising your formulations when 146 W. Leggett

necessary’ (Hall 2003: 13). Similarly, Steinberg and Johnson note that the

‘sense of social progressivism attached to New Labour/Blairite rhetoric has, moreover, been lent substance – it is not just spin – by its occasional concessions to social democratic/democratising values’ (Steinberg and Johnson 2004b: 31). It is such concessions, combined with the two-faced character of Gramsci: disorganising and disorienting the opposition. Thus, what Steinberg and Johnson refer to as ‘the seductive promise of progressivism’ does just enough to prevent revolt from more progressive elements both inside and outside the party (Steinberg and Johnson 2004b: 33–4). With opposition thus incorporated or diminished, New Labour remains the ‘only game in town’, while the wider docility of British political culture is reproduced: passive revolution par excellence (Smyth 2004).

Ideas of passive revolution and transformism help us to account for much that is complex and paradoxical about New Labour, particularly its relationship to both neo-liberalism and social democracy. Such analysis manages to focus on the epochal or organic broad historical canvas that concerned Gramsci, while precise balance of forces in play. However, the concepts present analytical problems around structural determinism – seeing New Labour as inevitably reproducing neo-liberalism – and voluntarism – seeing the project as more coherent, purposeful and, indeed, devious than it is. Thus, at times it appears in neoGramscian critiques as if New Labour is fully aware that it is serving the interests of a ruling capitalist class/system, to the extent of a conspiracy theory. At other moments, it seems as if, regardless of its intentions, New Labour can’t but help serve capitalist imperatives, which suggests the kind of economic reductionism that Gramsci was so critical of. The voluntarism perhaps derives from the centrality that Gramsci gives to the state in developing hegemonic projects, therefore exaggerating the coherence of the ruling party. This neglects the messy, uneven and contradictory process of a transition such as that from ‘old’ to ‘new’ Labour. This in turn can tend towards granting almost unlimited agency to its leading actors, as if Blair et al. were able to implement a ‘blueprint’, regardless of their operating context. Such an agencycentred analysis lends itself to the charges variously made against New Labour of betrayal and duplicity. On this view, New Labour is of neo-liberal intent and was only constrained from the wholesale privatisation of the public services, for example, by remaining Old Left opposition such as residual trade union power and public attachments to the NHS. Considerable evidence in favour of this interpretation emerged as Blair and other hypermodernisers began to reveal their true colours as time wore on (Leggett 2007). Blair’s personal odyssey with regard to Iraq, and subsequent confessions about the key role of his religion, were the most obvious examples. But the ‘respect’ discourse, plans for the third term to be dominated by welfare restructuring, the dogmatic insistence on choice in public services and further privatisations also suggest the possible real agenda of the Blairite inner circle.

Prince of modernisers 147

Alternatively, the more structurally determinist reading implies that, whatever its intentions, New Labour couldn’t help but reproduce neo-liberal capitalism. Hall argues that New Labour delivers a ‘ “social democratic variant of neo- liberalism” (in exactly the same way that Thatcherism delivered a “neo-liberal variant” of classic Conservatism). No prizes for identifying the common thread!”

(Hall 2003: 22). Here, social democratic intentions and strategies, if not necessarily actively colluding to further capitalist interests, will always be at best the junior or subaltern partner. The constraining context (or, at least, New Labour”s reading of it) may include an initially friendly but ultimately still conservative public, with no appetite for radical Left reforms. More fundamental are the structural constraints a capitalist economy places upon all administrations and, in parsocialist economic policies. It is one thing to identify New Labour as having sought to create new types of political subject and to reorder the relationship between state and citizen. However, it is quite another to see this as an inevitable adaptation to the requirements of capitalist reproduction, in order to maintain relations of domination/subordination between what Gramsci would call the

‘fundamental groups’ (classes) of capitalism.

The application of ideas of passive revolution and transformism thus overcoheres ‘the project’, and can veer between both voluntarism (in the form of conspiracy theories) and structural determinism. Ken Jones interestingly notes that the attribution of passive revolution is ‘a recognition of the rationality and success of your antagonist’s programme, and a coming to terms with the weakness of your own. In this sense, it is a concept self-consciously devised from the vantage-point of the defeated’ (Jones 2004: 39). This insight might explain how, in the wake of the defeat of the Left, there may well be a tendency for it to exaggerate the coherence of its adversary (New Labour), pour scorn on its motives (voluntarism) and/or present its emergence as somehow inevitable (structural determinism). Matters are not helped by the lack of consistency with regard to the level at which the concept of passive revolution is applied: we see it used in the contexts of the world-historical project of neo-liberalism (Hall 2003; Steinberg and Johnson 2004a); the domestic political strategy of the New Labour himself offers us a way through the limits of his own concepts, and that this can be applied to the contemporary context in thinking beyond New Labour. Counter-hegemony: Gramsci and the Left beyond New Labour between the deep (organic or epochal) and the surface (conjunctural) levels, we can distinguish between the fundamental analysis of long-term change embodied process; and Blairism as a still more ephemeral moment of New Labour. In some 148 W. Leggett

enable us to pay due attention to the importance of political agency, while also recognising its complex interplay with social change and economic imperatives. In theorising these relations, Gramsci’s observation that no political formation is for Left alternatives from within the context of neo-liberalism. This is illustrated by the sociological process and discourse of individualisation, which has been read by New Labour as neo-liberal individualism, but could be rearticulated with democratic socialist themes as part of a post-New Labour progressive project.

Distinguishing Third Way/New Labour/Blairism

Steinberg and Johnson make the useful distinction between neo-liberalism – as the epochal and organic project to fully marketise the institutions and culture of the globe – and New Labour/Blairism as the latest vehicle for implementing that tions, New Labour/Blairism is necessarily incomplete, unstable and contradictory. ism discussed above, Steinberg and Johnson suggest that ‘New Labour’s hegemony and the hegemony of Blairism within New Labour are best seen as a new or different phase within the drive towards a neo-liberal world’ (Steinberg and liberalism is inevitable, and that New Labour was always destined to be determined by it. This is unfortunate because, in common with many others, what clearly attracts Steinberg and Johnson to Gramsci’s work is the space it opens up for political agency (Steinberg and Johnson 2004a: 12). To address this, I want to draw on the distinction between neo-liberalism and the New Labour project, and also elaborate on the suggestion that Blairism is a dominant fraction within New Labour. There is no doubt that the deeply embedded economic, social and political changes associated with neo-liberalism are what Gramsci referred to as epochal in nature. However, they are by no means inevitable. The success of neo-liberalism has lain in its articulation with other aspects of late modernity, such as the increasing individualisation described in the sociology of Giddens and others, and returned to below. However, neo-liberalism is not the only reading of or response to these fundamental shifts. We might envisage Third Way sociology (if not the Third Way as practised by New Labour) as potentially offering a countercompete with neo-liberalism at the organic level. On this view, the New Labour from being a mechanical extension of neo-liberalism, had the theoretical and political resources to offer an alternative. The reasons for its ultimate failure to do so are of course many and complex, and will doubtless be debated ad nauseam. further distinction between New Labour and the leadership practice of Blairism. To understand Blairism as a moment within New Labour, Gramsci’s brief observations on caesarism as a strategy within modern parties offers some strik- Prince of modernisers 149

ing insights (Gramsci 1971: 219–23). We should be clear, of course, that Gramsci applied the concept in the context of Fascism, having developed it in relation to other historical examples (such as Bonapartism) that are far removed from modern liberal democracies. Nevertheless, much of the analysis resonates with the Blair ‘revolution’. For Gramsci, the social context for caesarism is a crisis of representation, in which parties or similar formations become detached detraditionalised, post-ideological scenario depicted since the late 1980s appears to capture exactly such a period, reinforced by the much longer observed trends of a decline in class voting and political partisanship. We have already noted Gramsci’s impatient calls for political actors to align themselves with the leading edge of social and economic developments. He suggests that what is vital is a party’s ‘capacity to react against force of habit, against the tendency to become appropriate political initiative is always necessary to liberate the economic thrust from the dead weight of traditional policies’ (Gramsci 1971: 168). In this respect, it seems Gramsci would be sympathetic to the view of New Labour modernisers that they needed to bring the party (and country) kicking and screaming into the new era. But what of how they conducted themselves in government? Commenting on the Italian situation Gramsci noted how The government in fact operated as a ‘party’. It set itself over and above the parties . . . to detach them from the broad masses and obtain ‘a force of nonparty men linked to the government by paternalistic ties of a BonapartistCaesarist type’. (Gramsci 1971: 227)

This encapsulates criticism of Blair’s presidential style of government, including his obvious disdain for his own party, the politicisation of the civil service and the proliferation of ‘non-party men’ roaming between think tanks, journalism and special advisor positions (Crouch 2004). Gramsci suggests that the political character of a caesarist strategy is not predetermined, and can have a progressive (e.g. Napoleon I) or reactionary (e.g. Bismarck) character (Gramsci 1971: 219). But vitally, Gramsci notes that given their conjunctural character, caesarist movements are themselves

of the Blair project but the continuation of New Labour – and it is possible that Third Way political-sociological analysis will outlive both. The clearest evidence of this possibility is the adoption of key Third Way tenets, most notably the and social cohesion (at least rhetorically) by David Cameron’s Conservatives (Giddens 2007). In looking to rebuild a progressive project, then, while certainly Blairism and to a lesser extent New Labour can be abandoned, the more fundamental analysis of late modernity that Third Way sociology grappled with continues to demand critical engagement. This is because, as Hall notes, ‘It still constitutes the “horizon” which everybody

– including the left – is required to address’ (Hall 2003: 11). 150 W. Leggett

Gramscian politics between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’

For the Third Way to be reimagined as a counter-hegemonic diagnosis of our times, New Labour’s sociologically reductionist version of it must be abandoned. Instead, there needs to be recognition that the social transformations it can co-opt and shape in different directions. We have seen that in Gramsci’s fragmented writings, and in neo-Gramscian analysis, the familiar problem of structural determinism/voluntarism looms large. Gramsci’s sense of the historical inevitability of a certain type of modernisation comes through in his analysis of Fordism, while elsewhere he makes strongly voluntarist claims such as that

‘reality is a product of the application of human will to the society of things. . . . Only the man who wills something strongly can identify the elements which are necessary to the realisation of his will’ (Gramsci 1971: 171). However, Gramsci clearly grapples with the interface between the facts of social and economic structures, and the capacity of political interventions to shape them. At his best, Gramsci suggests an ontology which provides a way of identifying structural opportunities and constraints and the space for politics. Gramsci offers many vignettes in this respect, but it is worth citing one at length (see also Schwarzmantel in this volume, who also cites the following passage): The active politician is a creator, an initiator; but he neither creates from nothing nor does he move in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams. He bases himself on effective reality, but what is this effective reality? Is it something static and immobile, or is it not rather a relation of forces in continuous motion and shift of equilibrium? If one applies one’s will to the creation of a new equilibrium among the forces which really exist and are operative – basing oneself on the particular force which one believes to be progressive and strengthening it to help it to victory – one still moves on the terrain of effective reality, but does so in order to dominate and transcend it (or to contribute to this). What ‘ought to be’ is therefore concrete; indeed it is the only realistic and historicist interpretation of reality, it alone is history in the making and philosophy in the making, it alone is politics. (Gramsci 1971: 172)

continuous motion and shift of equilibrium’ but which are subject to political intervention given that, as he remarks elsewhere, ‘reality does not exist on its own, in and for itself, but only in an historical relationship with the men who modify, etc.’ (Gramsci 1971: 346). The art of politics, then, becomes the identiwith what ‘ought to be’ – a set of values or ideology. It is precisely this view of the relations between social change and political action which has animated the neo-Gramscian critique of New Labour. To understand this, we need to return to the ‘New Times’ analysis outlined above as integral to New Labour’s formation. We saw that a strategic division emerged: on the Prince of modernisers 151

one hand, there were those such as Hall (1998) who saw grasping the leading edge of social change as only half the task; the other was to develop a popular politics, based on democratic socialist values, that demonstrated how the new times could be steered in more progressive directions than simply capitulating to the market. On the other side, those such as Giddens read social change in a profoundly depoliticising manner, turning it into a ‘there is no alternative’ style polemic that was used to rubbish alternatives and present Blairite modernisation as the only game in town. On this reading, it was the task of New Labour to defeat ‘outmoded’ thinking on left and right in order to smooth the (inevitable) transition to the neo-liberal global knowledge economy. The task for neoGramscians looking beyond New Labour is thus to retain what was valuable in its sociological analysis, and what resonates with people’s experiences of the world (their ‘common sense’), but to articulate this with more recognisably democratic socialist themes. This is precisely what Thatcher was able to do so successfully for neo-liberalism. By way of illustration, we might reconsider the role that indi- vidualisation plays in Third Way social theory, and examine how this deeply embedded sociological process could be reclaimed for a progressive politics.

Thinking individualisation in a Gramscian way

seated (organic) sociological processes which characterise late modernity. It is detraditionalising pressure upon institutions, ideas and practices (Beck and BeckGernsheim 2001; Giddens 1994a). Sociological theories of individualisation tend to be optimistic, in that they point to the aspects of the process that should appeal to progressives. The earlier (1994) social theory of Giddens suggested that the decline of traditional social structures in late modernity, the rejection of claims to knowledge on the basis that ‘we’ve always done it that way’ and the subsequent demands of a more dialogic reasoning for justifying beliefs and practices point to develop their human potential free from the distortions of entrenched interests, Left as a goal for the individual in a freer and more equal society. Some of the most optimistic echoes of the individualisation thesis are found in thinking about the nature of work and organisations in the knowledge and working practices, which in turn deepen the individualisation process itself. To be sure the decline of command-and-control systems, and the emergence of network type organisational structures, hold out the potential for greater individual control over the work process and new forms of collective working. Sim-152 W. Leggett individual creativity – all facilitated by the IT revolution. Indeed, these are arguably very Old Left objectives, reminiscent of Marx’s famous observations on creative labour in his 1844 manuscripts, as well as Gramsci’s own belief in the higher purpose of work and its liberating potential. In this vein, Unger (2005) puts new creative technologies and ways of working at the heart of his sweeping manifesto for the contemporary Left.

However, under both Thatcherism and New Labour, the sociological process of individual isation has been articulated with the political ideology of possessive individual ism

vidual has been elevated above all else, and is a far cry from the more developmental post-traditional individual originally envisaged by Giddens. This is evident in New Labour’s attempt to remould institutions and behaviours along neo-liberal lines: individuals are to see themselves as commodities, operating Labour not only presumes but actively creates the neo-liberal version of individualisation. In his most recent work, Giddens observes that, ‘In the next phase of globalisation, competition occurs at the level of the individual job, or type of job, rather than at industry or trade level . . . [with the result that] . . . The winners in longer working hours, the blurring of the work–life distinction, work-related stress and its attendant social problems (Coats 2007). New Labour’s neo-liberal assumptions are further evident in the insistence that choice be the organising principle for reform of the public services, even where evidence suggests public ambivalence about choice in this context. But by continually insisting on this

‘reality’, New Labour ushers it into being. As Bauman notes, Blair may be

‘into a fairly precise description of the real world, as seen from the inside of its inhabitants’ experience’ (Bauman 2007: 62) – it has become common sense. The of character’, and the prevalence of self-directed behaviour in the workplace and wider culture (Sennett 1998; 2006).

Given the above, it is hardly surprising that there is scepticism on the left over individualisation; the gut reaction is that it is anathema to more traditionalist leftist goals of solidarity and equality, evidenced in its all too easy co-option into a neo-liberal discourse. However, just as we saw that for Gramsci there was no going back to a simpler, pre-Fordist mode of production, today there can be no return to an imagined lost world of more homogenous and collectivised workers, operating in larger and more stable units of production which are the source of their communal identity. The sociological as well as political processes which have given questions of individual identity and autonomy centre stage cannot be wished away. As Hall notes, ‘When a conjuncture unrolls, there is no

“going back”. History shifts gears. The terrain changes. You have to attend,

“violently”, with all the “pessimism of the intellect” at your command, to the Prince of modernisers 153

“discipline of the conjuncture” ’ (Hall 1987: 16). Gramsci’s life and work were all the more impressive because he pointed to ways of striving for a Left hegemony from within the context of a hostile capitalist – indeed in his case Fascist –

environment. The same mindset can be adopted with regard to the apparently universal triumph of neo-liberal individualism; Gramsci shows us how this ary, a modern progressive political party has to engage with individualising processes, the decline of traditional collectivism and new demands for and practices of autonomy. However, there are other ways of imagining the politics of individualisation and autonomy from a Left perspective. There are two elements to a more progressive rearticulation of individualisaconditions. This could be achieved, for example, by valorising forms of individual development beyond just hard work and consumption, and exploiting the mounting sense of dissatisfaction and resentment in the ‘Feelbad Britain’ pointed to by Devine and Purdy in this volume. The second, related track is to show that it is neo-liberal individualism which is in fact preventing individual autonomy quality, disadvantage and domination, as well as reintroducing the idea of community; the individual only makes sense in the context of a cohesive and more equal society, which requires a democratic socialist politics. ing out of the professional ethos, there has been a resurgence of interest in the craftsmanship. Similarly, Finlayson suggests that in public service reform, instead of the quest for constant innovation (bound up with the New Labour horizon of permanent ‘change’), what may actually be required is

of existing skills and practices,

drawing on the knowledge and values of the workers themselves (Finlayson 2007: 44–5). Indeed, New Labour’s own review of the future of the NHS on its sixtieth anniversary made – at least rhetorically – the quality of healthcare and the patient experience key goals, in a move away from the target culture (Darzi 2008). Furthermore, the contours of an agenda beyond the work-centrism characteristic of neo-liberalism, New Labour and the ‘productivist’ Left generally are re-emerging. This is evident in moves to better recognise activity beyond what is traditionally implied by ‘hard-working families’, such as the care work which is also vitally important to the economy. More broadly, concerns over the work–life balance and the socially corrosive effects of a workaholic society have become widespread. Even Giddens has acknowledged, in referring to Beveridge’s original analysis of the social evil of idleness, that ‘Idleness . . . can sometimes be a virtue in itself – if it means the capacity to relax, or even [ even! ]

daydream’ (Giddens 2007: 123). Taken together, these tendencies point to a pol-154 W. Leggett new terrain is encapsulated in the title of the programme for Compass, a thinktank and pressure group looking beyond New Labour to a more radical social potential of individualisation, the second

task is to harness it to democratic socialist objectives. This is urgent as the agenda of individualisation, work and quality of life could as easily be seized by modernising Conservatives as by the Left. There has always been a tension between the neo-liberal assumption – and even celebration – of self-directed behaviour in the market and a simultaneous bemoaning of its deleterious social effects. This was evident in Blair’s critique of 1960s libertarianism and the insistence on ‘no rights without responsibilities’ – and has been taken up by Gordon Brown’s invocation of ‘duty’ as well as David Cameron’s critique of the ‘broken society’. But whereas for the likes of Blair, Brown and Cameron the solution is to be found in moralistic gestures towards ‘community’ that leave the status of the market untouched, a democratic socialist narrative needs to link the two together. The task is to show that it is precisely the encroachment of the market which is damaging individuals and their conduct, and that a robust public realm is required to both set limits to the market and create the more equal and cohesive society which To this end, the defence and elaboration of a public realm and public goods is being taken up once again by a number of centre-left authors (e.g. Crouch 2004; 2007; Marquand 2004; Shah and Goss 2007). What unites them is the vision of a public realm that operates on the basis of a different logic from that of the market, and indeed it is from within such a public space that democratic decisions about the appropriate reach of the market can be made. Of course, most shades of political opinion claim to be in favour of the public realm per se. Giddens (2007) himself has come to acknowledge that some areas of social life eron’s Conservatives have consistently invoked civil society contra the state. But what distinguishes the democratic socialist perspective is the analysis that the market tends to colonise other areas of social life, and the advocacy of measures to counter it. It is thus from within a strong public realm that political decisions can be taken to re-regulate economic processes and, where appropriate, to decommodify or roll back the market. Individualisation, of course, is held to pose great problems for collective decision-making or the idea of a public realm, let alone more substantive social democratic objectives such as reregulation. However, the political task again is to show how greater equality and collective provision are in fact a prerequisite for the meaningful autonomy upon which such a premium is placed in late modern societies. As Bauman notes, For most people, freedom of choice will remain an elusive phantom and idle dream, unless the fear of defeat is mitigated by an insurance policy in the name of community, a policy they can trust and rely on in case of personal defeat or a blow of fate.

(Bauman 2007: 64)

Prince of modernisers 155

Conclusion

We began by considering how, like Gramsci, New Labour perceived the importance of building a political project upon the leading edge of social change and, in their own way, developed a hegemonic politics on this basis. It was suggested that neo-Gramscian analysis of New Labour has successfully captured its complex and paradoxical character, but has in places veered between structural determinism and voluntarism in assessing it. However, it was shown how Gramsci himself offers a way out of this familiar theoretical impasse, with his reading of the relationship between social change and political agency. This enables a rearticulation of a sociological process such as individualisation away from neo-liberal individualism. More than a decade after New Labour took shibboleths that have dominated pubic discourse for so long are looking vulnerable. We might recall that the Third Way was in part premised upon a critique of the overreach of markets and the damaging effects of an unchecked neoliberalism; Blair initially sought to elaborate his ‘social-ism’ as a doctrine of the individual only making sense in the context of strong communities. However, this aspect of the discourse became subsumed under an increasing market fundamentalism, with the social problems arising from neo-liberal individualism seen as externalities to be addressed through disciplinary state measures. What is striking is that as the New Labour electoral and governing project has faded, the belief of the hypermodernisers in their most dogmatic assertions over choice and marketisation has hardened, evident in Blairite calls for Brown to extend this agenda. This brings to mind Gramsci’s observation that at the point of hegemony’s disintegration, ‘and to react against it, the system of thought perfects itself as dogma and becomes a transcendental “faith” ’ (Gramsci 1971: 370). At the very moment when the social and individual costs of an unchecked neoliberalism have created an appetite for alternatives, New Labour is hubristically wedded to both marketisation and the centralising state, entirely out of step with today’s ‘new times’. If anything, it is Cameron’s Conservatives who have taken up the Gramscian method, by articulating concerns over quality of life with their (still clearly anti-state and pro-marketisation) modernising conservatism. However, in response it would be mistaken for the Left to simply see the New Labour years as an aberration, and to reject the important sociological analysis of late modernity that the Third Way offered. The nature of individual autonomy and well-being is becoming the key political battleground in late modern societies. Using Gramsci’s insights into the relationship between organic social change and political interventions, the Left needs to show that this agenda is intricately linked to its longstanding objectives of challenging the subordination of the social to the market, and pursuing greater equality and cohesion. Rearticulated in a Gramscian fashion, individualisation could move from being an agent of neo-liberalism within New Labour, to the basis of a more progressive project beyond it.

11 Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ and

Gramsci’s ‘passive revolution’

Jules Townshend

‘Mrs Thatcher had a project. Blair’s historic project is adjusting us to it.’

(Hall 1998: 14)

Although the actual expression was not used, Stuart Hall’s seminal essays on Thatcherism and New Labour bore all the hall-marks of Gramsci’s concept of

‘passive revolution’ (Hall 1979: 4–20; Hall 1998: 9–14; cf. Finlayson 2003: 116–18; Leggett 2005: 130–3; Callinicos 2001: 62).1 Hall saw Thatcherism as a

‘hegemonic project’ in response to the ‘organic crisis’ of British capitalism, with the Left unable to understand the ‘present’, and therefore unable to win support for its own version of the ‘modernisation’ of British society. This chapter takes its cue from Hall’s observation, suggesting that New Labour’s historic role has been in effect to consolidate the Thatcherite ‘passive revolution’. It will spell out in more detail how Gramsci’s concept can help us to understand the relation between the politics of Thatcherism and New Labour, as well as the context in which Anthony Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ theorising took place after his political ‘turn’ in the early 1990s. Although Hall considered Giddens in one of these essays, his purpose was to explore Giddens’s ‘semantic inexactitude’ stemming from his attempted Left/

Right ‘triangulation’ (Hall 1998: 10). This, according to Hall, enabled Giddens to avoid the political tasks that would have to be undertaken by a genuinely centreleft ‘modernising’ government, requiring a confrontation with the rich and powerhave been clear, and they have served to justify ‘Blair’s historic project’ of adjusting ‘us’ to the Thatcher project. This chapter, after using Gramsci’s concept of

‘passive revolution’ to understand New Labour’s political project, will look more closely at various intellectual moves that Giddens makes to legitimate this enterprise. Then it will challenge what has effectively become in broad terms the new

‘common sense’ amongst the main British political parties. Gramsci’s concept of ‘passive revolution’

This concept can be seen as part of Gramsci’s larger intellectual and political task, which involved constructing some form of ‘progressive’ intervention in Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ 157

Fascist Italy and elsewhere in Europe. Although he was fond of quoting Roman Rolland’s phrase ‘pessimism of the intelligence, optimism of the will’ (Fiori 1970: 279), in reality Gramsci was far more dialectical than this statement suggests. He used his intelligence to develop a set of concepts that would explain (as well as name) the political processes that surround contestations of power absent in economistic and fatalistic versions of Marxism in order to construct an effective political strategy. He used his intelligence to give reasons to be hopeful. Contrary to much orthodox Marxism, he is rightly famous for seeing the relationship between the economic ‘base’ and the political and ideological

‘superstructure’ as complex. The post-First World War economic and political crises in Germany and Italy did not ‘inevitably’ lead to a successful proletarian revolution. As he noted, economic crises would not force the bourgeoisie ‘to abandon their positions, even among the ruins’ (Gramsci 1971: 253). As is well-known, he contrasted the ‘backward’ political terrains of the ‘East’

(Russia) and the ‘West’ (Europe), with its ‘massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society’ (Gramsci 1971: 243). Given these ‘trenches’ and ‘permanent forrather than a ‘war of movement’ that had been successful in Russia. Although he was fully aware of the repressive nature of Western regimes (after all he was imprisoned by one of them), he saw these ‘massive structures of the modern democracies’ in hegemonic terms, as generating the active consent of the ‘subaltern’ classes. Thus, however much the economic structure, or indeed the political superstructure, was in crisis, if these subaltern classes had internalised the notion that no other type of political, economic and social regime was possible, then the domination by the minority over the majority would in some form continue, as would the split between the political and economic realms that characterised capitalist societies. At this point the concept of ‘passive revolution’ becomes relevant (see Sassoon 1980: 204–17; Sassoon 1982c: 130–7). Perry Anderson’s comments about the conceptual ‘slippage’ surrounding Gramsci’s concept of hegemony at one level could equally be applied to this concept (Anderson 1976/1977: 25). Thus, in the Prison Notebooks he employed it to show how the Italian bourgeoisie in the Risorgimento of the 1850s came to power in a way that differed from their French counterparts in the 1790s (Gramsci 1971: 104–5, 114–15, 118; Sassoon 1980: 205). In France the revolutionary process was explosive and involved much popular participation, whilst in Italy it was ‘molecular’

(Gramsci 1971: 109), involving a complex class alliance between the northern industrialists and southern land-owners, as well as political manoeuvres (piecemeal reforms and political patronage) that incorporated radical democratic opposition ( trasformismo), thereby ‘decapitating’ the enemy’s elite. He also noted the incompleteness of the Italian form of revolution as ‘revolutionrestoration’ with the ‘dominant’ bourgeoisie leaving the ‘leading’ or governing to the old aristocratic class (that was now a ‘caste’) through Cavour’s Piedmontese Moderate Party (Gramsci 1971: 115). By the same token he saw the 158 J. Townshend

changes in the Soviet Union as a form of incomplete socialist revolution, as a

‘passive revolution’ with the intelligentsia ruling on behalf of the working class (Sassoon 1982c: 127–9).

However, for Gramsci ‘passive revolution’ could refer to something else, to new forms of bourgeois domination. This could be at the superstructural level as in the case of Fascism. Here, the state intervened legislatively to ‘plan’ and socialise 1971: 119–20; Sassoon 1980: 208). Or it could occur within the production process itself as with Fordism, with its high wages and interchangeability of labour in order by the state as an attempt to produce a new kind of Fordist worker (Gramsci 1971: 279). In using the term in this sense Gramsci was keen to situate it within Marxist theory. In the absence of a working class that was becoming hegemonic, there was always room for the bourgeoisie to come up with new solutions to their problems, whether economic or political (Gramsci 1971: 222; Sassoon 1980: 210). Although Gramsci therefore seemed to attach different meanings to ‘passive revolution’, his intention is clear and consistent. Passive revolution occurs when the masses are not prepared to take power or take independent political initiatives, and can thus be contrasted with his regulative ethico-political ideal of proletarian self-emancipation and the liberation of other subaltern groups.2 It generally refers to changes in forms of domination of the majority in society by the minority, or wars of position by the dominant groups. Thus, he states that the concept is not a ‘programme . . . but . . . a criterion of interpretation, in the absence of other active elements to a dominant extent’ (Gramsci 1971: 114). Thatcher’s project and New Labour

Gramsci’s criterion for a ‘passive revolution’ as a changing form of bourgeois domination can fairly obviously be applied to the Thatcher project. It transformed the mode of political and economic domination in response to the crisis of the symptom of this crisis. Ruling-class hegemony was threatened as a result of trade accepting wage restraint. The economy had experienced relative long-term decline at an international level (Gamble 1983: 111; Driver and Martell 2006: 59). Thatcher and her supporters dispensed with the post-war ‘Butskellite’, fundamentally social democratic settlement built upon a tripartite consensus between the state, the employers and the trade unions. The post-war settlement held that the state was directly responsible for the welfare of its citizens, and was a key economy to ensure full employment either through Keynesian-inspired demand running industries or various ‘monopoly’ public utilities. The state was also directly responsible for health and education, as well as the welfare of the unemployed and retired and those in poverty. Finally, the state had an ethical role in Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ 159

promoting social solidarity in its capacity to tax the better off and distribute to the less well off in different ways – thereby creating greater equality – and in upholding universalistic welfare principles. The Thatcher neo-liberal ‘revolution’ drastically altered the terms of the postizens in order to strengthen the economy at an international level. The corporatist, tripartite form of economic and social regulation was broken up, and trade union power severely weakened not only through direct physical confrontation with industrial militants, but also through unemployment and legislation curbing industrial action, thereby increasing the employers’ ‘right’ to manage. In terms of economic management, the state was no longer responsible for full employment allowing trade unions too much power); markets could not be ‘bucked’ (with the (Coates 2005: 32). It was no longer the role of the state to create jobs. Rather, it for social solidarity in a distributive sense (‘tax and spend’ ‘disincentivised’ and because it fostered economic competitiveness and growth. However, in so far as the welfare state contributed to social solidarity, it no longer had to be a direct the possessive individualism of the ‘new’ independent, aspirational subject who owed little to society, but a lot to their own hard labours (or luck!). New Labour did not challenge the fundamentals of this ‘passive revolution’.3

It accepted the new ‘aspirational’ hard-working individual as having representational priority; the non-tripartite mode of economic and social decision-making, the diminished power of trade unions, ‘supply side’ economic management, the privatisation of state-run productive assets and public utilities, the minimal regulation of the distribution of wealth and income. Yet it saw itself as having a basic difference: Thatcher’s neo-liberalism had caused enormous social dislocation. Thus, its role was to produce policies and slightly recast the role of the state to increase social solidarity or ‘social inclusion’, whether through voluntary or compulsory means. The only element of ‘moral economy’ in the spirit of Old Labour was the introduction of the minimum wage. Overall however, New Labour broke with its social democratic past at a fundamental level: it was no longer capitalism’s critical and ambivalent friend, but its loyal supporter, intent upon consolidating Thatcher’s ‘passive’ revolutionary legacy that involved new forms of domination by the minority over the majority in society. Giddens’s ideological consolidation

this consolidation by steering between the ideologies of neo-liberalism and ‘old’

160 J. Townshend

social democracy. Giddens saw his task as preserving ‘Leftist values’ through a revision of ‘social democratic doctrines’, because the Old Left had failed to understand the contemporary world (Giddens 2000: 29–30). Giddens wanted to alter dramatically what it meant to be ‘on the Left’, which involved a displacement of the Left’s view that capitalism was in many ways the key obstacle to rily a matter of values: ‘In the absence of a redemptive model, to be on the left is hostility to markets’ (Giddens 1998: 38). Thus, although Giddens did not spell out what he meant by ‘social democratic doctrines’, I take this to mean its anticapitalist ontology, its belief that capitalism was the chief obstacle in achieving its cherished values of self-realisation, social solidarity, equality and democracy. We should add that he also attempted to embrace the values of New Social Movements, especially feminism and ecology. What we shall see is that Giddens’s project involved not only a novel description of the world, but also a partial reformulation of social democratic values. We will show how he dispenses with the Left’s anti-capitalist ontology and reinterprets its values. Then we shall consider how successful he was in fundamentally altering the meaning of what it meant to be ‘on the Left’.4

The Left’s anti-capitalist ontology

Before looking more closely at how Giddens jettisoned the traditional Left’s –

summarise what it was and why it was deemed so important in relation to achieving its ethical goals.5 The classic Marxist critique of liberal-democratic capitalism was grounded on what is known as ‘immanent critique’. Such regimes inherently cannot deliver what is promised, namely, freedom, equality and material wellbeing for all. Thus, central to this is the notion of condition-dependency, that these values can only be realised under certain economic, social and political conditions, when society’s productive assets are under some form of democratic control. The political and ideological framework created by capitalism prevents this possibility, because of the inextricable connection between economic and political power. There is too an ideological critique of how capitalist societies interpret these values by making them ‘formal’ or ‘abstract’ (Can legal and politform of rights?), or too narrow (Is freedom primarily about freedom of choice?). Turning to social democracy, which Giddens explicitly sought to refashion, retaining its values whilst reformulating its ‘doctrines’, it has traditionally been committed to the ideals of self-realisation and social solidarity. These two values were buttressed by others such as equality and democracy. Although social ownership of the means of production had been viewed as important in promoting solidarity, from the 1950s onwards mainstream social democracy viewed the distribution of wealth and income as more important as a means of achieving this end (e.g. Crosland 1956: 485, 496–7). Material equalities were thus seen as Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ 161

crucial in fostering solidarity. The other key area was the welfare state, especially health and education where universalistic principles were viewed as encouraging a solidaristic ethos. In other words, for both versions of the Old Left, the ontological (a shorthand term referring to how the social, economic and political worlds actually work) and the ethical (a shorthand term for the values that the Left hope to achieve) are powerfully interlinked.

In his debate with his anti-capitalist critics, Giddens maintained that there was no ‘concentrated source of the ills of the world’ (Giddens 2000: 38). Yet, although he did not take this Marxist cue and become an anti-capitalist, his overall intellectual strategy had much in common with Marxism by insisting on Zeit-

geist and on giving a particular meaning to leftist values. His sociological/

historical perspective led him to suggest that his chosen values were potentially immanent in reality, in the ‘age’. Like orthodox Marxists he was committed to

‘utopian realism’, holding that there existed ‘utopian features’ corresponding to observable trends, a potential unity of fact and value (Giddens 1990: 154, 162–3; Giddens 1994a: 101). Yet contra Marxism these ideals were not immanent in a capitalist

stage in the development of modernity, ‘high modernity’ (Giddens 1990: 163), coined to grasp the newness of the era (Giddens 1994a: 3, 78, 97). there was globalisation, which increased the interactions across time and space, between the ‘local’ and ‘global’, binding the destinies of everyone on the planet, in the area of global warming. Second, the ‘end of nature’ had occurred, as nature was no longer a separate, dominating external force, as for example with human reproduction (Giddens 1994a: 47). People were now far more knowledgeable about themselves (their minds and bodies), about their society and nature. Indeed, the world was now full of ‘clever people’ (Giddens 1994a: 7). Thus they had to project’ (diet, relationships, children, and the like) (Giddens 1994a: 82). Giddens in which people have a different relationship to their futures, their bodies, their social and economic involvements’ (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 163). ‘Emancipatory politics’ (freedom from tradition, for example) had been superseded by ‘life politics’, or ‘life-style’ politics, decisions about how to lead individual and colwhen he referred to the needs of ‘citizen-consumers’ and ‘consumer-citizens’

(Giddens 2007: xi). Thus, we can see that Giddens had overturned the traditional 162 J. Townshend

leftist ontological/ethical connection that made capitalism the key obstacle in achieving its goals. Instead he focused on how individuals experienced the world as ‘high modernity’, full of challenges and opportunities. The emergence of ‘life-style’ politics, he held, had a profound impact on the nature of politics in the contemporary world, causing ideological exhaustion and distribution, had been replaced by new allegiances and new issues more closely associated with the New Social Movements. Welfare thinking had to move away from redistribution of wealth to facilitating favourable conditions for wealth creation, and at the same time maintain social cohesion (Giddens 2000: 2–4). Such thinking also mirrored global technological changes, not merely connected with the communications revolution, but also with the decline of manufacturing and the rise of the ‘knowledge economy’, thereby reducing support for the ‘old’

social democratic agenda.

Giddens did not give priority to the distributive issues traditionally associated with social democracy because in his view they bore ‘no particular relation’ to human happiness which was about controlling the ‘inner experience’ (Giddens 1994a: 181). Although a number of the ‘goods’ he wanted to achieve were within the ethos of the New Social Movements – those concerned with ecology, peace, feminism, ethnicity and identity politics generally – his primary focus was on how state policy could realise what he saw as the classical social democratic values of self-realisation (or ‘self-actualisation’) and solidarity (or ‘social integration’, ‘social inclusion’), whilst maintaining economic competitiveness. The demand for self-realisation was the product of greater individuation in modern societies. Central to this was the development of the ‘autotelic’ self, together ‘with a sense of ontological security’, deriving from ‘basic trust’, which

‘allows for positive appreciation of social difference’ (Giddens 1994a: 192). An

‘autotelic’ self was able to turn ‘potential threats into rewarding challenges’. Being happy involved ‘facing up to challenges’, whether self-induced or external. ‘Risk is confronted as an active challenge which generates self-actualisation’

(Giddens 1994a: 192). Thus, he linked the ethic of self-realisation to the ontology of risk. He then suggested that the sustaining of a ‘coherent sense of selfidentity’ required interaction with others on the basis of ‘active trust’, which created new solidarities (Giddens 1994a: 126).

We can see that Giddens wanted to ensure that self-realisation was counterment, he wanted to reconcile autonomy and interdependence in the social and economic spheres (Giddens 1994b: 29; Giddens 1994a: 13, 126). Democracy had a crucial role in fostering a communal sense through participation and citizenship, creating new solidarities. This reconciliation of the individual to the community had however to take into account the fact that there were ‘no rights Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ 163

without responsibilities’, especially for the unemployed who had to search for jobs or retrain. Giddens acknowledged that the promotion of social solidarity required some sense of equality. In keeping with the communitarian motif, he inclusion and inequality as exclu-

sion’ (Giddens 1998: 102). However, unlike mainstream social democracy, which stressed the link between substantive equality or equality of outcome (involving a redistribution of wealth and income) and solidarity, he emphasised the other strand in this tradition, namely equality of opportunity. He thought that a substantial redistribution of wealth and income would involve too much statism and would not encourage diversity. Furthermore, it would be electorally unpopular and act as a disincentive for the ambitious; nor would it help job creation. In any case, he held there was ‘no particular relation’ between wealth and happiness. Instead, Giddens advocated some form of equality of opportunity or

‘generative equality’, which was the most fruitful way to talk about equality, offering everyone equal ‘life-chances’ (Giddens 2000: 85–6; Giddens 2002: 17, 39; Diamond and Giddens 2005: 108).

stantive equal opportunity of self-realisation, giving people the chance ‘to (Giddens 2000: 89), and admitted that ‘economic inequalities are certainly not irrelevant to exclusionary mechanisms and we don’t have to give up on reducing them’ (Giddens 1998: 106), approving government attempts to reduce intergenerational inequality with heavy inheritance taxes, as well as shareholder measures to curb the aggrandising behaviour of boardroom ‘fat cats’ (Giddens 2002: 40). He based his argument in favour of inter-generational equality on the Old Labour and New Liberal position that the production of wealth was a ‘coopwhole’, and not the result of individuals working on their own (Diamond and Giddens 2005: 108). He also saw the need for ‘social justice’. Again he shied away from pressing for any substantive equality of outcome, and associated social justice, or what he called a ‘new egalitarianism’, with the overcoming of poverty, especially through a government-promoted ‘active labour market’ to achieve full employment as well as the reduction of child poverty (Giddens 2007: 105). In other words he wanted all equally to ‘aspire’. Overall we can see that Giddens’s emphasis when discussing equality was in its procedural dimension, embodied in the notion of ‘life chances’ or equality of opportunity, especially in relation to the labour market. Nevertheless, ‘life chances’ also meant something substantive in allowing all an equal capacity for self-realisation. Furthermore, substantive equality did matter in so far as it impinged on procedural equality, especially in the inter-generational sense; hence, unlike in traditional social democracy, such equality was not in itself directly intended to promote social solidarity. Finally, the focus of Giddens’s

‘new egalitarianism’ was improving the lot of the poor, to help them help them-164 J. Townshend From theory to practice: embedding values

For Giddens, progress was not inevitable. It was up to ‘individuals and groups’ to

‘make a difference’, or ‘make things happen’ (Giddens 1994a: 15). His Third Way proposals were intended to encourage a ‘generative politics’ that would produce a society (global and local) that would be good for the individual – body and soul –

and that was socially cohesive and good for the planet. Broadly speaking he wanted to bring about a cultural shift, a change in people’s attitudes or psyches, ial distribution (Giddens 1998: 117). In keeping with his notion of how an ‘autotelic’ self developed, Giddens wanted a society based on active citizenship of

‘responsible risk takers’ in the spheres of government, business and labour markets, as well as in the ‘social and civic’ arenas, requiring the ‘same drive and creativity’ (Giddens 2000: 75). Nevertheless, there needed to be some protection against risk, especially for the vulnerable. He held that risk united the disparate issues of politics and welfare state reform, including the responses to technological change, ecological problems and geopolitical transformations (Giddens 1998: 63). An active stance to risk required trust (solidarity) which was built on the principles of ‘dialogic democracy’. This involved negotiation with the ‘other’, whether in personal relationships or in ‘expert systems’ associated with technology and science, as well as at the state and ‘cosmopolitan’ levels. Through ‘diasocial integration. In practical terms this meant getting the voluntary sector more involved in promoting self-help groups and local initiatives. Civil society would be strengthened through collaborative policing and by using tax concessions for

‘democratization of democracy’ involving the decentralisation of decisionmaking as well as citizens’ deliberative forums. Constitutional reform would make the British state more open and democratic (Giddens 1998: 72–5). To avoid creating a dependency culture, Giddens wanted the welfare state to be replaced by a ‘social investment state’, which invested in ‘human capital’

(something markets were not good at). The state was responsible for the ‘supply side’ of the labour market, encouraging workers to take a far more active attitude towards risk, whilst at the same time presumably developing their ‘autotelic’

selves by rising to the challenge of unemployment or getting out of a dead-end job. Welfare systems should not ‘discourage [the] active search for work’, or more active risk-taking (Giddens 1998: 65). He advocated active welfare policies that he (perhaps mistakenly) contrasted with the Beveridge ‘negative’ after-theevent welfare (Giddens 1998: 117). He wanted ‘redistribution of possibilities’, rather than of wealth. Work was central to social inclusion, and education was crucial not only to ensure that people had a ‘second chance’, but also for global competitive reasons. Indeed, work was so central that Giddens wanted to abolish the retirement age and get single mothers to work (Giddens 2003: 22). middle classes from the welfare state by improving the quality of public educa- Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ 165

tion and providing a well-resourced health service as well as safe public amenities by controlling levels of crime (Giddens 1998: 107–8). He stressed the importance of consumer choice and competition within the public services to improve standards and prevent ‘producer capture’ to avoid middle-class opt-out (Giddens 2003: 19–20). Additional policies to enhance social cohesion could promote a sense of a ‘cosmopolitan nation’ and a ‘responsible business ethos’

(Giddens 1998: 107). The ‘effort bargain’ (or ‘life-style pact’) between rich and poor to supersede the ‘class compromise’ of ‘old’ social democracy could also include mutual responsibility for collective ‘bads’, especially environmental devastation, and the need for life-style changes, for example in attitudes towards work, as well as the need to diminish the obsessive ‘productivist’ working culture, in that way helping to create a ‘post-scarcity’, ecologically aware culture (Giddens 1994a: 194).

Giddens however recognised that the activities of the big corporations might fall outside his communitarian remit. The government had to ‘face down’, or

‘control’ or ‘regulate’ interest groups and the ‘powerful’ by dealing with questions of taxation, transfer pricing and competition in ways that required international co-operation (Giddens 2000: 100). Yet, generally Giddens’s account of the ‘political’ is a strongly consensual, non-adversarial one, whatever his objections to Habermas’s account of deliberative democracy (Giddens 1994a: 115; Mouffe 2005: 59–60). Thus, big business should not be demonised, but encouraged to develop a social conscience (Giddens 2000: 38). His commitment to dialogic democracy and the ‘social investment state’ is aimed to achieve not merely All these reforms, Giddens hoped, would enable government, the economy and civil society to be in ‘balance’ (Giddens 2000: 165). If any of these three aspects became too strong, then either authoritarianism or social disintegration would result. Thus, we can see that Giddens’s new onto-ethical formula for the Left was not intended to scare the capitalist ‘horses’ or encourage any reversal of Thatcher’s ‘passive revolution’. Indeed, it envisaged precisely the opposite, tion to the unemployed and more generally an increasing reliance on the voluntary sector, with few proposals to redistribute income and only a hint at inter-generational wealth redistribution. Giddens’s revision of social democratic

‘doctrine’ entailed a reformulation not merely of the means to achieve traditional leftist values but also of the values themselves by giving them a different content. His ideas involved redescribing the world so that it was no longer problematically capitalist. Appraisal

We can now begin to judge how successful Giddens has been in formulating a new ‘progressive’ ideology to replace ‘old’ social democracy as well as Marxism, to see whether his new onto-ethical nexus for progressive politics works, thereby discarding the Old Left’s critique of capitalism. We should note 166 J. Townshend

that Giddens was not saying that we do not live in a capitalist world, or indeed that it presented no challenges (especially in relation to global competitiveness itics. The evaluative strategy pursued in what follows will be broadly to ask whether we can ignore the capitalist context in seeking to evaluate Giddens’s values is coherent.

Self-realisation

capacity to overcome challenges. Leaving aside the question of whether challenges are self-chosen, this is a particularly narrow conception of self-realisation, whether in the light of classical social democracy or Marxism, both of which stressed the importance of individuals having free time in order to realise their purposes and potentials. There is little in Giddens’s writings about the alienating nature of work under capitalism and the need either to reduce working hours or make jobs more interesting. Although Giddens explicitly stated that workers should not be expected to undertake boring, dead-end jobs, he said little about

‘structural’ solutions to this problem. He pointed to the possibility of retraining,6

in effect suggesting that somebody else would then occupy such vacated positions (Diamond and Giddens 2005: 111–12).7 In encouraging people to enter the job market and realise their ‘autotelic’ selves, he thought he was helping eradithe standard Marxist (and Smithian) critique of the market that highlights the asymmetries of power between the propertyless worker who has to sell his or her labour power and the capitalist who has far more bargaining assets. In other words, Giddens ignored people’s dependence on the market and therefore their lack of autonomy; a prerequisite for self-realisation. Finally, he did not propose self-actualisation for those in the public sector. Rather he wanted them to compete with each other thereby improving public services and reducing the What of Giddens’s position on the self-realising concerns of the new social movements? His stress on the importance of risk for self-realisation could be seen to be at odds with his commitment to feminist values, which would be far more likely to put the ethic of care at the top of the agenda. True, Giddens might argue that the ‘ontological security’ which could be associated with such an ethic is a prerequisite for risk-taking. However, his ‘rights/responsibilities’

doctrine could easily override the consideration of whether an individual was ready to take risks or challenges, whether those were self-or externally created. Giddens also gestured towards the feminist movement in calling for a better work–life balance, but this was left up to the individual. One is again left wondering how this ties in with his objectives of economic competitiveness and wealth creation, weakened trade unions and the absence of statutory reduction of working hours.

Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ 167

Giddens’s acceptance of the neo-liberal economic settlement also poses problems for his approach to ecological issues. Although he castigated ‘productivism’ as the neurotic compulsion to work, and envisaged a post-scarcity society, he merely appealed to individuals to voluntarily change their life-styles. Such appeals would seem to run counter to his insistence on the need for wealthcreation, economic competitiveness and material incentives, as well as to the market’ policies and labour market ‘reforms’ which would weaken trade union resistance to employers’ pressures to work long hours (Giddens 2002: 21). On Giddens’s reading an individual might decide to become less ‘productivist’, but he underestimated capitalism’s systemic ‘productivism’ with all that this entails produce climate change.

We can also ask more precisely what kind of ‘self’ Giddens wanted to realise. We have already noted the ‘autotelic’ self that many feminists might not feel comfortable with. Yet Giddens seems also to envisage other selves, for example when he referred to the individual as ‘citizen-consumer’, who needed more choice through competition in public services in order, (among other things) to prevent ‘producer capture’ (Giddens 2003: 18–19). Here we have the mix of a private, self-interested self and a more public spirited self that would want selfrealisation for all. More seriously, this market utility-maximising ‘self’ sits uneasily with his ‘ecological’ and anti-productivist self. Thus, Giddens had self-realisation. Not only is his main conception of self-realisation rather narrow, if compared with more traditional views on the Marxist and social democratic Left, but also the ‘self’ to be realised seems to come in all shapes and sizes. Moreover, he had little to say about how capitalism in a systemic sense structures or hinders those choices needed to promote self-realisation.

Social solidarity

Giddens did not put economic equality at the top of the ‘progressive’ political The problem for him then was to include both those at the top and those at the arity. We have already seen that inclusion for the ‘poor’ involved a good deal of

‘rights and responsibilities’ compulsion, which is unlikely to induce a sense of social solidarity. The problem was compounded because at the top end of society rich individuals were offered tax breaks for philanthropic activity, so that in their case social solidarity was to be achieved through voluntary means. In addition, this did little to promote a collective self-identity in that social inequality was in no way affected since substantial transfers of wealth are not contemplated in the short term. For Giddens, when in ecological mode, social solidarity through the

‘effort bargain’ amounted to little more than indicating that human beings qua human beings have a common interest in saving the planet. 168 J. Townshend

It is true that Giddens recognised the need to regulate corporate power in order to create a responsible capitalism. Yet there was no discussion of what might be the limits of co-operation and responsibility of even the best intentioned company (for example a ‘green’ airline company). Giddens accepted that corporate interests and government might diverge, but maintained that corporate power was not always used for sectional gains. This does not take us very far in understanding the nature of politics in liberal-democratic capitalist democracies. The question of who has the largest voice and of the extent to which governments can go against corporate interests has to be considered. Giddens envisaged the need to regulate interest groups and groups of the economically powerful. Nevertheless, his insistence on the necessity of national competitiveness in a globalised world meant that he was more likely to endorse such interests than to challenge those interests (Giddens 2000: 37). Further, Giddens showed little weaken the power of the trade unions. Giddens also hoped to promote social solidarity by increasing ‘third sector’ involvement in the provision of social welfare. Whilst the increase in social solidarity might appear to be obvious for those who were either voluntary providers or recipients of welfare, a reliance on such methods of delivery means that welfare was subject to chance, since a Thus, we are left wondering about the extent to which Giddens was seriously committed to the welfare universalism crucial to a sense of social inclusion and solidarity.

Equality

Giddens also viewed equality as a crucial value in promoting social cohesiveness. We can start by questioning his founding assumption that welfare is a psychic rather than an ‘economic’ concept, thereby enabling him to call for a redistribution of ‘life chances’ or ‘capabilities’, rather than wealth. Although analytically wealth and welfare can be distinguished, in a culture in which selfesteem is often measured by wealth there will be a strong connection between the two. Giddens’s individualism puts a good deal of emphasis on individual choice and thus makes his argument too easy, because while in theory any individual might choose to give away all their possessions, and live a frugal life, yet within the context of a society that strongly inculcates a status system based upon material achievement, the chance of such a choice is likely to be rare. Turning more directly to his version of equality, as Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ or

‘neo-progressive’ project unfolded, the issue assumed increasing importance, not merely because he wanted everyone to have equal ‘life chances’ associated with the idea of equality of opportunity, but also because any social democratic sense of social solidarity involves some notion of fairness strongly associated with substantive equality or equality of outcome. Not surprisingly he favoured slimming down the board-room ‘fat cats’ (Giddens 2007: 117–19). Nevertheless, his emphasis is on the procedural, understandably so given his emphasis on the Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ 169

importance of incentives. Thus for him greater substantive equality seemed only to be relevant if it contributed to greater procedural equality. Hence overcoming inter-generational inequalities of wealth was merely a means to the goal of procedural equality, rather than to achieve a degree of social solidarity (Giddens 2007: 104). Similarly, his desire to overcome child poverty and inequalities in education stemmed from a ‘procedural’ motivation (Giddens 2007: 104). Thus we can say that he had given up on the traditional social democratic assumption that greater wealth and income equality was a vital ingredient of social solidarity. His focus was on opportunity for the aspirational individual. We should note his potentially contradictory meanings of equality of opportunity, or ‘equality of life-chances’. One was market productivity driven, the other inspired by a developmental ethic – the realisation of psychological, moral, aesthetic and rational potentials. Giddens held that equality of opportunity was necessary from the viewpoint of economic incentives, or as promoting ‘high levels of social and cultural diversity’ giving individual and groups the ‘chance there is no necessary correlation between these two versions of equality of opportunity. Thus, whatever the rewards, jobs may not be self-realising, or the outside their work. Even if the job is one conducive to self-realisation, there viduals. The solidarity issue also arises because ‘losers’, unable to get their desired job, could feel resentful. While Giddens admitted that those left behind offered no proposals to remedy this problem.

‘clever’ individual might come to the Rawlsian conclusion that unequal outcomes are ‘morally arbitrary’ rather than deserved (Rawls 1973: 100–4). Moreover, despite Giddens’s stress on the need for incentives, if there were to be high death-duties the rich could also be resentful if after having worked hard all their lives, their accumulated wealth went back to the state. We should also note that relation to defend high income taxes in the name of social solidarity. Although this may of course have an effect on the motivation of the talented, this is an empirical question, and one cannot assume that a higher level of income tax would necessarily demotivate people as Giddens seemed to assume (White 2007: formulation of substantive and procedural equality. Although Giddens might argue that his interpretation was valid for pragmatic reasons, either electorally or foster remains unclear. Moreover, although Giddens linked employment (and of course upward social and economic mobility) with self-esteem (Giddens 2007: 123), he did not take seriously the idea that unequal socio-economic outcomes could have the opposite effect.

170 J. Townshend

Democracy

Finally, a few brief comments can be made about ‘dialogic democracy’, which was also part of Giddens’s strategy for social solidarity. Few on the Old Left would object to Giddens’s proposals and his democratic sentiments, but would most likely say that he does not go far enough in clearly establishing the condecision-making. While Giddens was fully aware that the extension of democracy required ‘economic equalisation’, presumably in a substantive sense, there was little analysis of the socio-economic background of ‘active’ citizens, despite than the poor (Giddens 1998: 82). Whilst the promotion of grass-roots democracy could be seen as desirable, Giddens had little to say about the owners of the media having a much larger voice in political deliberation than less well-off members of society, or how the needs of capital accumulation impact upon the political agenda (perhaps not surprising given his insistence upon economic global competitiveness). Moreover, even his book Beyond Left and Right had little to say about the Marxist (and often feminist) critique of the separation of public and private spheres within liberal-democracy, especially in relation to the family and private property. Although some democratisation within the family ing of workplace democratisation. Moreover, the trade unions were given little space in his proposals for the ‘democratization of democracy’. Indeed, as already noted, he had no wish to see the end of Thatcherite trade-union legislation designed to reduce drastically trade union power. Thus, in a key area of human relations, that of the workplace where power is at its most asymmetric, Giddens had little to say. Hence we can see that he ignored the need for ‘economic equalisation’ in many of its forms. his explicit attempt to develop principles and policies that would reconcile autonomy and interdependence in the social and economic spheres, and bring the state, the economy and civil society into some form of balance. The state was to do far less than the social democratic state in protecting the individual from market forces. Such protection by the state is a prerequisite for autonomy. The kind of solidaristic interdependence that Giddens envisages masks the extent to which it is built on asymmetric power relations and sharp divisions of wealth and income.

Conclusion

What has been shown is that Giddens did not stray far from the coordinates of the Thatcher ‘passive revolution’ that changed the ‘superstructural’ relation between the state and its citizens and took accumulative priorities (‘wealthcreation’) as paramount. We have also seen how Giddens attempted to write a new onto-ethical ‘story’ for the Left that avoided the radical anti-capitalism of Giddens’s ‘Third Way’ 171

Marxists or the pragmatic anti-capitalism of ‘old’ social democracy. We have also shown that ‘being on the Left’, even for Giddens, was not just a question of values, since it involved an analysis of how the social, political and economic world actually works. For some, as Giddens suggested, anti-capitalism might be about the politics of redemption, yet for others it could be more about the survival of the human race, or how in systemic terms the existing order obstructs the realisation of ‘progressive’ values such as self-realisation, solidarity, equality and democracy. We can of course suspect that Giddens may have known all this did not challenge the accumulative imperative of capitalist society. His Third Way discourse enabled him to avoid addressing many of these problems that in some of his early political work he regarded as endemic in capitalism and liberal-democracy.

involved in a hegemonic project of a ‘passive’ revolutionary kind that kept classes, if not individuals, in their place. His ‘progressive’ ethico-political position in effect promoted social solidarity and (patchily) self-realisation from the top down, rather than from the bottom up. He had little desire to foster workingclass self-activity in the workplace, or to use state power to distribute income and the use of productive assets in favour of working-class people, by such lating working hours so that male and female workers would have opportunities to participate more fully in democratic deliberation. Such demands of course might still involve class compromise, but they presume that a class struggle actually exists. Although the question of what a counter-hegemonic strategy would look like has not been addressed in this chapter (see Leggett, this volume, for an alternative account of the possibilities of a Third Way analysis in this regard), any ‘war of position’ from the bottom up would have to challenge Giddens’s suggestion that the Left in the epoch of ‘high modernity’ need no longer be anticapitalist. Notes

1 Even in his essay ‘Gramsci and Us’ Hall did not explicitly use the term ‘passive revolution’, although he saw Thatcherism as a form of ‘regressive modernisation’ (Hall 1987: 17–19).

2 In relatively underdeveloped countries such as Italy this emancipation also involved the liberation of the southern peasantry.

3 The application of other meanings of Gramsci’s concept could of course be applied to

‘Labourism’ in general, especially trasformismo, the incorporation, and indeed ‘decapishould, however, be more aware than Gramsci was of the effects of the electoral system in liberal-democracies in diluting election manifestos to increase electoral appeal. 4 Giddens was strongly critical of the Old Left, whether Marxist or social democratic. However, his book Beyond Left and Right still contained a commitment to its standard presumption that there was something deeply problematic about capitalism and liberaldemocracy. So he was able to write that ‘Unchecked capitalistic markets still have 172 J. Townshend

many of the damaging consequences to which Marx pointed, including the dominance of these tendencies surely remains as important as it ever was’ (Giddens 1994a: 11–12). Nevertheless, in this work and in subsequent, more policy-focused ones he sought to provide an onto-ethical framework for the Left that did not require these standard criticisms of liberal capitalist democracy. nition in relation to the Marxist and social-democratic Left, because there are differences of position. Marxists and left-wing social democrats wanted to replace capitalism altogether, whilst right-wing social democrats believed that capitalism had to be reformed. Nevertheless, all agreed that capitalism created many, if not necessarily all, of the social and economic (and perhaps political) problems they wanted to resolve. 6 And what of the morale of someone expected to retrain as they got older, say in being up-to-date in the information revolution? In any case, does everyone like continuous reinvention?

7 Tellingly, in a discussion with Will Hutton, Giddens did not respond to his point about

‘old’ capitalist power relations remaining the same despite changes in the nature of work (Hutton and Giddens 2001: 30).

12 Feelbad Britain

A Gramscian view1

Pat Devine and David Purdy

From 1992 to 2007, Britain enjoyed sustained economic growth, falling unem Happiness: Lessons of a new science

Avner Offer (2006) details the range of social and personal disorders – family Gramsci distinguished three forms of social consciousness – corporate, class and hegemonic – concerned respectively with narrow sectional interests, economic class interests and with the presentation of a particular class interest as the interhegemony, in which different classes seek to present their interest as the interest characteristic of advanced capitalist economies, with their developed civil societaking in ideological, cultural, moral, legal and political, as well as economic, 174 P. Devine and D. Purdy

social forces gathered around the dominant class and held together in a form of common sense of the age, constantly and creatively adapting to changing signori

history, through repeated renegotiation of our own particular historic comproAs early as 1919, in the pages of Ordine Nuovo, he adopted the slogan for most likely outcome of any organic crisis was what he called a ‘passive revoluwould have the effect of containing the new social forces and pressures that had was the continued domination of capital and the continuous reproduction of the Feelbad Britain 175

2 to interpret the

to the organic crisis of the 1970s when the post-war political settlement imploded ony and developing a political project aimed at creating a greener, fairer, can such a project make headway?

Symptoms and causes of Britain’s social malaise

2005) together with data on the prevalence of

per cent suffering from major depression and 9 per cent from a less serious children and young people aged 5–16 have a clinically diagnosed mental disorder 176 P. Devine and D. Purdy

one country with another, average happiness, along with the suicide rate, are unemployment rate, the quality of government and the prevalence of religious health and longevity, educational attainment and work satisfaction – reveals a and privately sponsored specialist schools, all in the name of ‘educational stand4

-

Feelbad Britain 177

for long working hours, economic insecurity and general powerlessness in con et al. ment was more informal than the institutionalised forms of corporatism practised passim

and preserve political consensus for some twenty years after 1945 – a classic decisions that govern their lives, they are unlikely to think of themselves as tion of mass unemployment to maintain discipline at work and keep wages in P. Devine and D. Purdy

social tension, while the unions largely failed to transcend a narrowly sectional were often improvised and her electoral success owed more to the split in the the self-regulating market, together with the capacity to translate this vision into Feelbad Britain 179

council houses and the privatisation of state enterprises to the construction of a market forces into areas of social life from which, with good reason, they had result is a stressed, dysfunctional society whose way of life and mode of work What is to be done?

As we have argued, the organic crisis of the 1970s in Britain was resolved ment were forced onto the defensive, vainly seeking to preserve institutions and P. Devine and D. Purdy

nomic growth outweighed the costs incurred in toil and suffering, periodic spread of market forces to social activities in which their role was previously ments are needed?

judged, they are instruments for altering the political landscape, recasting social lems facing society in the present, and propose a strategy for tackling them in

Convergent global development

-

Feelbad Britain

avert environmental disaster must include steps to reduce and, in the long run, Critical thresholds for atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases have climate change, raise living standards in poor countries, and improve the quality

Citizen’s income

-

P. Devine and D. Purdy

cracy, unpaid work in the household and voluntary sectors of the economy all aspects of social reproduction, involving all relevant stakeholders and provid Social ownership

facilities, from housing through energy and transport to support for local small Feelbad Britain

energy supplies to housing and commerce is already on the political agenda and cries out for municipal involvement carrying through democratically agreed ate governance to include a wider set of stakeholders than merely shareholders The problem of agency

has dwindled as the mainstream parties, jostling for position in the crowded competition and seeks opportunities to challenge conventional wisdom, change

-

P. Devine and D. Purdy

5

and reordering priorities, nurturing new constellations of interests and carving capitalist consumerism does not deliver the satisfactions it promises, together with secular and religious networks which seek to counter consumerism and improve sectional approach and to converge in a common struggle aimed at replacing, in many women (and some men) juggle with the competing demands of career and

-

Feelbad Britain

agement of the economy into a common frame, pitting the claims of common cit6

of Great Britain and most similar parties in the developed capitalist countries, and social justice, and containing many socialists, nevertheless in practice seeks to manage capitalism rather than replace it, having little grasp of what the politics of programme that articulates their concerns and aspirations within a progressive organically rooted in the different social forces constituting the alliance, in their need to transcend sectional interests and develop a strategic hegemonic project and 7

procedures and resolutely non-sectarian in its dealings with other organisations, P. Devine and D. Purdy

Notes

et al.

The Guardian

-

13 Conclusion

The enduring attraction of Gramscian

analysis

Mark McNally

assessing what relevance Gramsci’s political analysis has in a world transformed from his own historical context of the post-First World War period, and indeed, as that of testing the validity of Gramsci’s analysis by actually applying his ideas adequately what ‘was living and what was dead’ in his work – to pick up once From their various theoretical and empirical perspectives, each of the chapters has analysed and deployed Gramscian categories in this context, and consequently we are now in a much stronger position to make some general assessments about the continuing relevance of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and his revolutionary questions in retrospect: what have these essays disclosed about the limitations and strengths of applying Gramsci to contemporary politics? What do they tell us about the problems of applying his concepts to a world that has changed radically from the 1930s and 1970s, with the emergence of a new global economic order reinforced by the dominance of neo-liberal ideological themes? And above all, what have the essays revealed about the continuing capacity of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony – and its associated concepts – to illuminate and offer guidance and hope to the forces of radical change in the contemporary world? It is principally Acknowledging the limitations

Opening his seminal study of Gramsci in 1981 Joseph Femia acknowledged that there was ‘remarkably little agreement about what Gramsci really said’, and lamented the fact that the tentative and provisional character of his writings (especially the Prison Notebooks) made them particularly amenable to ‘a wide variety of interpretations’ and therefore fair game for ‘a battle of citations’

188 M. McNally

remains elusive, and the current volume highlights once more the lack of agreeter and utility of Gramsci’s concepts of course makes the task of applying his ideas to the contemporary world all the more problematic, and it is worth highlighting how the current volume once again bears testimony to some of the key Foremost among these is of course the problem of negotiating Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks

secondary literature (see, for example, Anderson 1976/7; Buci-Glucksmann relationship in modern Western societies between the state as an agent of coerdescription of hegemony in the Prison Notebooks as ‘una combinazione della forza e del consenso che si equilibrano’1

solely with the struggle for ideological ascendancy in civil society as Gramsci distinguishes between the ‘ “direct domination” or command exercised through the State and “juridical include an essential economic and class base – ‘il contenuto dell’egemonia politica del nuovo gruppo sociale che ha fondato il nuovo tipo di Stato deve essere prevalentemente di ordine economico’

it more closely with Gramsci’s holistic concepts of ‘integral state’ and ‘historical Prison Notebooks to denote a new kind of relationship or alliance between social forces in which ‘a fundamental social group’ abandons its ‘economiccorporate’ phase (sectarianism), eschews reliance solely on domination ( domina- zione) and sets out to establish ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ ( direzione) over the various subaltern forces – creating a new power ‘equilibrium’ – by engaging in an ideological and ‘educational’ struggle to gain their consent for its All of the above appear in the current volume to some extent, and the interters by Ludwig and Dikici-Bilgin are very much within the second tradition of hegemony, as they highlight how Gramsci’s concept can be deployed to illumiand struggles to establish a new relationship between state and civil society that will protect the former by reinforcing identities and groups that serve to maintain Conclusion 189

follow the latter in identifying hegemony much more closely with the notion of hegemony that focuses on a form of supremacy that has as its principal raison d’être the institution of a particular mode of economic production and distribuhegemony that retains a central focus on the state and which he feels has been of a new radical alliance in contemporary Britain will require above all a willingness by each of the political forces involved to abandon ‘economic-corporate’

these contributions to the volume, therefore, we can see that the divergences and alive, and thus continue to present a problem for the application of Gramsci’s cialists of Gramscian ideas to the international the fray in this volume by accusing them now of misunderstanding the ‘realist’

served these theorists as a useful ally to mount a challenge to the ‘realist’ tradiepistemology to Gramsci and followed suit will no doubt be strongly contested, since – as Worth points out in this volume – some of these theorists have been equally arraigned for a tendency to assume all too easily a priori economic and class structures that are fundamental or primary, and therefore by no means ameWhile Femia opens up a new interpretive can of worms for neo-Gramscians, those who claim that Gramsci is essentially a theorist of the nation-state rather defending nonetheless a reading of Gramsci’s inter nation alism that preserves his was principally concerned with the nation-state and national culture rather than 190 M. McNally

development of this concept represented an enrichment of his internationalism Indeed, this problem of interpretation is exacerbated by the issue of the historical gap between our world and that of Gramsci – or for that matter, the world again the essays in this volume have acknowledged and endeavoured to surmount this problem of demonstrating how Gramsci’s ideas remain relevant, despite the fact that they were originally conceived to engage critically with a political environment and mobilise social forces in an environment that is argucontributors acknowledge that the new wave of economic ‘globalisation’ and the predominance of a ‘neo-liberal’ ideology in our world are developments that Gramsci could barely have imagined, let alone have taken into account in on the key problems of ascertaining to what extent the political world has in fact changed since the 1930s and the 1970s, or indeed, to what extent there is still much that our world shares with Gramsci’s of an historical or a more Those essays in the volume informed by a more sociological approach to the to the radically different character of capitalist production in the contemporary especially incongruous with the kind of hierarchical and relatively stable mass production of a Fordist nature that Gramsci assumed to be increasingly hegem1970s is emblematic of the wider character of late modernity for many contributors who highlight the pluralised and fragmentary nature of society in our Gramsci’s ideas are suitable for the analysis of such a complex and dynamic social order, given his concern with relatively homogenous proletarian and ology of globalisation – argues that Gramsci in fact lived through a period of rapid social transformation and it is precisely because he adapted his thinking to meet the necessities of social and economic change that we can learn much however, is that the scale of recent change requires us to move beyond Grams- Conclusion 191

There are, nonetheless, some contributors to the volume who – while recognising the evident gap between Gramsci’s world and ours – remain convinced socially detrimental for radical politics to overlook as it struggles to cope with ence opens the way of course for maintaining that at least some of Gramsci’s in its critical engagement with Western capitalism and its refusal to present some of its key attributes – including its ideological preference for individualism – as somehow neutral and natural developments in late modernity, as he individualism – which Leggett argues the Left will now have to learn to live with and tame since these are constitutive elements of late modernity – with a kind of rampant neo-liberal capitalism that has ‘feelbad’ and even pathological ism may have changed its spots, but it is still essentially as exploitative and socially destructive as it was in Gramsci’s day, which is why his analysis of is a lot more sceptical about the extent of contemporary ‘globalisation’ –

particularly its political and cultural dimensions – that represents for some the theoretical work that supports the view that forms of nationalism and national identity are continuing to thrive in the conditions of late modernity and should to learn from Gramsci’s inter nation alism and especially his concept of ‘the national-popular’ which represented an attempt by Gramsci to emphasise the need to win each national battle for the state as a vital preliminary stage to this volume who assume a degree of continuity between Gramsci’s world and ours, recognise that adapting his political thought to this new world order is clearly not without its tensions, and all seem particularly determined to avoid the kind of ahistorical applications of Gramsci’s ideas that writers such as M. McNally

Gramsci and negotiating the gap between his world and ours is the vexed question discussion of this issue, Gramsci at different stages of his political and intellectual of deciding which of these accounts of agency one should regard as the authentic Gramsci is compounded by the fact that some or all may well have outlived their work, but also to a determination to confront Gramsci’s account of agency with Schwarzmantel, for example, focusing on Gramsci’s early and late tendencies to identify the forces of revolutionary change with the proletarian masses in the educative battle to win the consent of subaltern political forces, is sceptical about perspective, the transformation of capitalism from a Fordist to a post-Fordist order has effectively dissolved the mass proletariat which Gramsci believed –

particularly in his early writings – would form the kernel of the new proletarian and moral leadership’ is also problematic for this contributor, who views party politics in contemporary conditions as focused almost exclusively on immediate and short-term electoral victories, rather than on Gramsci’s ambitious project of creating a new culture or Weltanschauung as a crucial staging-post in transformGramsci has something to offer on thinking about agency today, is in his stimulating observations about the need for democratic institutional structures –

whether at the level of the party or the state – which this contributor sees as complementary to current discussions on the deepening of democracy and thereOther contributors to the volume continue to regard the key agents of hegemand civil society associations – as retaining their relevance in contemporary coning to meet new challenges in ways which Gramsci could not possibly have whose agency is by no means consistent throughout Gramsci’s work and especially in the Prison Notebooks of hegemony from Gramsci’s writings and addressing the tensions that inevita- Conclusion 193

as within a Gramscian framework that asserts the continuing relevance of the key issues for Leggett and Townshend is the extent to which the British Labour to regard the political party and state as central agents of hegemony, they noneBritish politics much greater attention will have to be dedicated to creating and sustaining multiple relations between a whole range of groups and associations in British civil society that will effectively act as satellite agents of its hegemlinked to political parties and the central state is taken up too by Dikici-Bilgin in the tensions that emerge when the agents of hegemony are conceived broadly as civil society in Turkey nonetheless supports her argument that a Gramscian approach to the relations between the agents in both these spheres in fact appears much more realistic when it comes to the dynamic and dialectical nature of conGramsci’s conception(s) of agency in order to take account of perceived changes in the contemporary political world, while credibly claiming to be within a global hegemony and global resistance that were only on the whole enterprise of applying Gramsci’s categories to the internahegemony (or counter-hegemony) that can be equated with those Gramsci idena somewhat different perspective – all maintain the validity of treating organisatinue to be confronted not only with the task of producing coherent and persuasive political analysis, but also with the need to counter suggestions that they are agents of hegemony – both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic – is by no means should therefore be acknowledged as a further limitation in any effort to apply M. McNally

Developing Gramscian insights in dialogue with our own time One reaction to these limitations is of course to recognise them as manifestations of the fragmentary – if insightful – quality of Gramsci’s later thought or the somewhat outdated character of his social analysis, and accordingly to look to other more comprehensive and contemporaneous theoretical approaches with represented in the volume too, and it is especially evident in the contributions of arguments about orthodoxy and interpretation, and more willing to marry ambitiously Gramscian analysis with the ideas of contemporary thinkers – even if this neo Worth and Femia in this volume), and therefore are to some extent immune from Gramsci’s key concepts – trasformismo – and privileges its mode of ideational as opposed to leadership decapitation of oppositional movements, which allows him to Cox’s novel concept of the nebuleuse; ‘a transnational and international network of state elites, corporate representatives and intellectuals’ responsible for carrying out this ideational work that builds ‘a policy consensus for global capitalism’ (Cox and trasformismo

to meet the needs of contemporary conditions through his critical analysis of the current neo-liberal nebuleuse as it seeks to neutralise the progressive ideas of the In a similar fashion, Gundula Ludwig draws on Gramsci’s extended and integral conception of the state to meet a perceived weakness in the current literature on feminist state theory which has tended to focus on what she describes as point, Gramsci’s penetrating analysis of how the modern state not only dominates but also inculcates a new culture and way of life – that has inscribed within afraid to confront Gramscian analysis with what she regards as its limitations, and she therefore critically engages with the Gramscian notion of ideological state power, demonstrating its tendency to reduce power to the internalisation of build on Gramsci’s notion of the ‘integral state’ by enriching it with poststrucpower as an ongoing and pervasive process in modern societies (Foucault 1980; Conclusion

Judith Butler’s concept of ‘reiteration’, used here to transform what she regards as Gramsci’s unsatisfactory notion that ideas become internalised in consciousButler in viewing norms (of sexual inequality) as inscribed in everyday practices which are of course then amenable to subversive activity at various levels and ideas, Ludwig thus also criticises and develops them in a dialogue with conFilc too, leaning on a similar tradition in contemporary political theory, situates his analysis of the Israeli political party Likud within the Gramscian tradition of hegemony and counter-hegemony, and then develops and enriches these the essentialist core in Gramsci’s theory of hegemony which both these theorists regard as out of place in the contemporary political arena where power cannot be is less inclined to see the Gramscian conception of power as reductionist, pointto argue that Gramsci was a lot less incompatible with the poststructuralist tradition of conceiving power as a process in which subjects are produced by discurdeparture from Gramsci, however, consists in his adoption of Laclau and as an expansive inclusionary counter-hegemonic project that sets out to unite a uses this Laclaudian conception of populism to shed new light on Likud’s short neo-Gramscian or what might even be described – as Filc does – a postEnduring attractions But regardless of whether one considers the essays in this volume as authentically Gramscian, neo-Gramscian or post-Gramscian, they all bear testimony to the continuing attraction of Gramsci’s political thought – notwithstanding its limitations and the fact that it was originally conceived in reaction to the political problems of a world that seems in many respects radically at odds with our seasoned, and a new generation of, political theorists to turn to his work in their efforts to understand and normatively engage with modern politics? On the evidence of this volume, there appear to be two dimensions of Gramsci’s political 196 M. McNally

thought that prove particularly alluring, and indeed which compensate for the First, there are his penetrating observations on the nature of power in the modern state and his ability to develop political concepts to successfully and critipolitical history of his own period, thus lending them a more concrete and illuoperation and effects of modern power in his Prison Notebooks beyond its relaand the control of the coercive and juridical apparatus of the central state has ceracknowledged, nonetheless, that the questions that led Gramsci on this path – the problem of the failure of the working classes to rise successfully against capitalism in the West in the aftermath of the First World War and the subsequent invesTake, for example, that most distinctive characteristic of Gramsci’s theory of hegemony involving the reconceptualisation of ‘civil society’ as a new terrain of power and struggle, and the argument that the social forces that dominate the through building associative relations with so-called ‘private’ groups and organici’s historical context are clearly visible in this pursuit and illumination of the society in this manner has far from outlived its usefulness, and it is for this reason that it has continued to attract political theorists such as Worth and Dikici-Bilgin Gramsci’s concept of civil society, and he argues that if we are to get a more complete understanding of the kind of neo-liberal hegemony that characterises the current international order this dimension of its dynamic construction of consenstate in Turkey have taken a somewhat unsophisticated perspective on its historical development, associating it too readily with coercion alone without examining how it sought to expand and reinforce its power in civil society by engaging Conclusion 197

It is moreover this illuminating account of new forms of power that also marks Gramsci’s related concepts of ‘passive revolution’ and trasformismo, and it is no surprise that they too have continued to inspire contemporary theorists 3 but there is no doubt that they were

deal with the tendency of socialist movements to become manipulated, co-opted and neutralised by the ingenious powers of the modern capitalist state in his own option into a neo-liberal and fundamentally capitalist agenda under the ideorevolution which had characterised British politics from the early 1980s, with the supposed forces of change failing to challenge the privileges of the minority on behalf of the majority and therefore leaving intact the fundamental relations son uses Gramsci’s related concept of trasformismo to demonstrate how the forces of radical change at the international level – the alter-globalisation movement – are falling victim to comparable forms of power as their radical ideology is skilfully co-opted, tempered and rendered ineffective by powerful neo-liberal Just as this volume illustrates how Gramsci’s insights into the workings of the modern state and its novel power apparatus continue to provoke and inform the critical analysis of contemporary politics, so too does it reveal the continuing appeal of the truly transformative

to point out that Gramsci was not simply in the business of criticising conhim was the need to elaborate political concepts that would inspire and guide the thought, where the critical is mixed with an innovative will to create a new and more equitable world, remains one of its most alluring qualities; not least in a contemporary context in which radical political theory has become overly engrossed with an all-out criticism, jointly informed by Foucault’s invocation of tainly have agreed with Foucault’s famous declarations on the pervasive nature of power which cannot be escaped even in the act of resistance (Foucault 1990: course suggested that new relations of consensual power could be constructed which enjoyed greater democratic legitimacy and guaranteed more extensive 198 M. McNally

cerned himself so thoroughly with the organisation of power in the capitalist state – economic, political and cultural – and became convinced that the only no denying the undeveloped and sometimes contradictory nature of Gramsci’s thought in this area, neither should we neglect the enduring attraction of this transformative dimension of Gramsci’s concepts to which this volume is once Gramsci’s thought in their critical observations on the Alternative Globalisation guard against ideological manipulation by powerful forces in the neo-liberal nation alism and ‘the

in national arenas as a prelude – indeed precondition – to mounting a serious drawing on Gramsci’s fascinating suggestions on the need for new forms of institutionalised democracy is on a similar terrain of developing this creative and context of British politics, there can be little doubt that it was primarily the work erism was the constructive and innovative character of its hegemonic strategy, transform the face of British politics and create a new culture of neo-liberal the obvious disparity between the approaches of Leggett on the one hand, and its cue from Third Way analysis which he skilfully distinguishes from Blairism by identifying the former with Gramsci’s notion of organic struggle and the conjunctural

forces on British life behind it by rediscovering some of the essential elements Conclusion 199

insistence on the need to establish autonomy from capitalism as a principal condition for embarking on a truly hegemonic project and this is what he argues to neo-liberal capitalism as the Conservatives – and in the building of a coalition of progressive forces across British politics which they argue could eventually merge into a new party if they could be persuaded to genuinely embrace the logic of Gramsci’s hegemony and its eschewal of ‘economic-corporate’ and essays on British politics draw on the transformative and creative dimension of Gramsci’s concepts to criticise, analyse and direct the possible forces of radical On the evidence of this volume then, it seems that despite the considerable demonstrates that Gramsci’s work is now informing radical thinking in ways that his multiple illnesses, largely induced and exacerbated by his incarceration at the ering that set out to test the relevance of his ideas 70 years after his death, and to book does – that his writings continue to illuminate, provoke and inspire politNotes 3 Both concepts were already employed in Italian political and intellectual circles before Gramsci adopted and reconstructed them for his critical purposes (Bellamy and Bibliography

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Comparative

Politics

Ethnocracy: Land and identity politics in Israel/Palestine America Will Not Wait for the Won’t Do Countries Index

agency and agents 3, 5–6, 9–13, 27, 29, 34,

151, 198; media and 138; Thatcherism

75n7, 79–92, 106n3, 121, 138, 148, 151,

and 156

155, 183–6, 192–3, 197; contemporary

Bobbio, Norberto 109–10, 160

capitalism and 85–6; factory councils

Bolshevik revolution (1917) 1–3, 80

and 81–7; global 8–9, 88–9, 193;

Bordiga, Amadeo 61, 64, 74

liberal-democratic institutions and

bourgeoisie 4, 36–7, 63, 83, 120, 157–8;

89–92, 192; Marxism and 79; religion

bourgeois hegemony 12, 110, 133n1

and 29–30; party and 80–1, 84–5, 87–8,

Britain 2, 4–5, 7, 11, 13–16, 20, 22, 25, 28,

185–6, 192–3; postmodernity and 81,

31n4, 137–40, 146, 153, 156, 158–9,

175; state and 23, 146, 158, 188, 192–3;

164, 171n3, 173–86, 189, 193, 197–9;

working class and 80–1

elections in 139, 171n3, 175, 177, 185,

AKP (Justice and Development Party in

193; see also capitalism; inequality;

Turkey) 107, 116–17

organic crisis; trade unions

alliance 12, 14, 62–3, 126, 133, 185–6,

Brown, Gordon 15, 144, 154–5, 179

189; class 61, 12, 157, 174; collective

Bukharin, Nikolai 196

identity 69, 73; hegemony and 27, 62,

bureaucracy 42, 86, 90, 93, 116–17, 194;

185, 188; social movements and 67

leadership and 62, 68

Alternative (alter-) Globalisation

Bush, George (junior) 30, 49

Movement 7, 9, 43, 46, 48, 52, 58, 65,

Butler, Judith 13, 93–4, 99–101, 103–6

89, 193, 197–8; democratic organisation

of 48–9, 53, 67–9, 73; ‘globalism’ of 59,

capitalism 3, 8, 21–4, 26, 30, 43–4, 51,

69–72; national-popular and 9, 67, 72,

60–1, 63–5, 105, 115, 119, 120, 124,

191; as postmodern Prince 9, 46, 88–9;

132, 142, 146–7, 153, 156, 160, 162,

WTO and 48–9, 194; see also

172n5, 179–84, 190–1, 198–9; British

environmentalism: leadership (political)

156, 174–8; capitalist mode of

amicus briefs 43, 48, 55–6; see also WTO

production 22, 27, 45, 79, 83, 101, 145,

Anderson, Perry 4, 108, 157, 188

147; contemporary culture of 85–8, 91,

anti-capitalism 160–1, 170–2, 191; see

161, 184, 190, 192, 197; Fordist 85, 97,

also capitalism

190, 192; global 45–6, 51, 55, 59–60,

articulation 5, 26, 28–30, 60, 62, 72–3,

64, 73, 92, 189, 194; New Labour and

115, 126–7, 132, 148, 185–6, 198;

159, 185, 197; Third Way and 160–2,

individualism and 150–3, 155; Laclau

165–8, 170–1, 172n4, 172n7, 197;

and Mouffe on 27–8, 109, 120

Western capitalism 8, 67, 95, 110, 117,

‘autotelic’ self 162, 164, 166–7

173, 191, 196

Catholic Church 30, 62, 84

Bauman, Zygmunt 86, 152, 154, 190

centralism, democratic 68, 73

Bellamy, Richard 19, 26, 43, 58–9, 191,

citizenship 15–16, 62, 70–1, 75n3, 83,

199n3

87–8, 90–2, 101, 114, 151, 162, 164,

Blair, Tony 13, 15, 49, 146, 149, 152,

170, 175, 185; citizen-consumer (Third

154–5, 179, 198; Blairism 138, 146–9,

Way) 143–4, 147, 161, 167; citizen’s

Index 219

income 177, 181–2, 184; citizen-soldier

185; see also Partito Communista

(Israel) 126, 129

d’Italia (PCd’I)

civil society 2–4, 11–13, 15–16, 24, 27,

Compass (New Labour think tank) 154, 173

29, 65, 74, 102, 108–11, 164–5, 170,

competition and competitiveness 45, 152,

179; British 185–6, 193; consent and

159, 162–8, 170, 178–9, 181, 183

101, 110–13, 188; democratisation and

compromise 96, 109, 116, 165, 171, 174;

107, 110–11, 115, 118; global 7–8, 10,

see also consent and consensus

20, 25–7, 31, 52–3, 57, 59, 69, 71–4,

conjunctural (contrasted to the ‘organic’)

196; hegemonic struggle and 107,

13, 137–40, 147–9, 152–3, 198

109–10, 116–18, 188, 193, 196;

consciousness 32–4, 83–5; false 123;

ideology and 5, 16, 66, 97, 110, 114,

popular 11, 13, 87, 89 reductionism and

118, 118n5, 188–9, 196; ‘private’

194–5; reform of 85, 91, 173, 189;

organisations and 110, 112–13, 115,

socialist 80, 85

118, 192–3, 196; state (political society)

consent and consensus (contrasted to

and 11, 66–7, 94–5, 98–9, 107–9, 111–coercion) 5, 8–9, 13, 21, 26–7, 43, 68, 18, 118n3, 154, 174, 185, 188, 193, 196;

73, 96–9, 101, 109–16, 119, 145, 157,

in Tsarist Russia 3, 95, 157; in Turkey

177, 188, 199n1; ‘active’ 109, 157;

107–18, 193, 196; in theUnited States

compromise and 96, 116; democracy

23, 30; in Western liberal democracies

and 90, 173, 197; education and 98, 188;

3, 10–11, 95, 110, 112, 139, 157, 173,

gender and 101, 105; global 24, 27, 45,

188; see also dialectics

51, 55–6, 194, 196; ideology and 47,

class 14, 21, 26–30, 39, 44, 46–7, 62, 81,

112, 188; neo-liberal 7, 14, 25, 27, 55,

86, 100, 104, 108, 111–12, 114, 124,

194, 196; subaltern groups/classes and

128, 142, 147, 149, 162, 164, 171,

20, 25, 100, 104, 106, 192; see also civil

173–4, 176–7, 188; alliance 61, 157,

society; hegemony; integral state

conservatism 20, 25, 34, 107, 117, 147

171, 173, 179; parties and 80, 84, 88;

Conservative Party (UK) 5, 25, 139, 149,

reductionism (essentialism) 94, 120–1,

154–5, 173, 178, 186, 198–9

132, 189, 195; ruling (dominant) 6–7,

consumerism 12, 67, 86–8, 144, 161, 165,

15, 20, 27, 44, 47, 95–6, 109, 116, 121,

167, 175–7, 179, 184

124, 143–6, 157–8, 174; subaltern/

co-optation 48, 72

subordinate classes 2, 20, 27, 29, 31, 61,

cosmopolitanism 9, 62, 68–71, 73, 164–5,

124, 130–1, 145, 157; transnational

189; see also internationalism

capitalist class 19, 22, 24–6, 28, 30; see

(Gramsci’s)

also bourgeoisie; working class;

counter-hegemony see hegemony

hegemony

Cox, Robert 6–7, 19–23, 26, 28, 30–1,

coalition 9, 47, 67–8, 72–3, 116, 126, 198;

31n1, 33–6, 43–8, 52, 56, 188–9, 194

of British Left 186, 199; of developing

crisis see organic crisis

countries 50, 53

Croce, Benedetto 6, 84, 13

coercion (contrasted to consent) 13, 24, 29,

54, 95, 98–101, 109–14, 116, 118–19,

della Porta, Donatella 58, 65–72, 75n1

144, 188, 196, 199n1; see also consent

democracy and democratic institutions 14,

and consensus

34, 45, 72, 74, 83, 90–2, 111, 117,

Cold War 2, 6, 11, 20–4

122–3, 160, 162, 165, 171, 173, 175,

collective man ( l’uomo collettivo) 12, 66,

177, 180, 186, 192, 198–9; deepening of

86, 122, 130, 138–9, 142–4

15, 91–2, 180, 186; ‘dialogic’

collective will 63, 81, 84, 109–12

democracy (Giddens) 164, 170; income

Comintern see International, Third

and 182, 185; international organisations

‘common sense’ 5, 23, 27–9, 42–3, 45,

and 46, 49, 52, 55–7, 68; leaders and led

47–8, 51, 57, 96–8, 101, 104, 121,

60, 62, 73, 89–90; market and 153–4,

138–40, 151–2, 156, 174, 180, 185,

177; production and 83–5, 160, 170–1,

186n7, 198

177–8, 182; representative democracy

communist party 46, 48, 60, 62, 85, 87, 89,

89–92; see also liberal democracy;

185–6; Soviet Union 4; Great Britain

populism; social democracy

220 Index

Derrida, Jacques 32, 197

168–9; gender and 51; procedural

determinism, economic 3, 96, 138, 146–7,

equality 169; social solidarity and

150, 155

158–9, 163; substantive economic

dialectics 23, 25, 39, 46, 157, 161; civil

equality 163, 167–9; see also inequality

society and political society 108–9,

equilibrium and balance 40–1, 59, 65, 73,

116–17, 193; intellectuals and masses

75n6, 80, 97, 109, 103, 132, 146, 150,

110; mind and objective reality 41

165, 170, 180, 183, 188, 199n1

discourse 69, 128, 143, 146, 148, 152, 155,

essentialism see reductionism

171, 189; discursive practices 195;

ethics and the ethical 15, 158; Giddens and

inclusionary and exclusionary 127–9;

162, 165–71, 172n4; production and 83,

meaning and 36, 127; objective reality

86; socialism and 141, 160–2; see also

and 32–3, 36; gendered subjectivity and

state

99, 101, 104; populism and 123, 130

Eurocommunism 4

domination see coercion; intellectual and

European Union 23–5, 42, 49–50, 54, 56,

moral leadership

57n1, 71–2, 74, 75n3, 73n5, 102, 115

ecological movements see

factory council movement 60, 81–7, 91

environmentalism

Fascism 1, 5, 30, 61, 63, 84, 87, 149, 153,

economic-corporate (sectarianism and

157, 158, 175, 199

caste rule) 55, 62–4, 67, 70, 87, 157,

Femia, Joseph 8–9, 19, 41n1, 59, 61, 65,

173, 178, 185, 188–9, 199

96, 98, 187, 188–9, 193–4

economic development 180, 183–4; Britain

feminism 2, 13, 93–5, 99–103, 106n6, 160,

and 173; Gramsci and 143, 149;

162, 166–7, 170, 178; feminist state

happiness and 180; unsustainability of

theory 93–5, 104–6, 194; see also

180–1; WTO and developing countries

gender

50

First World War 1, 61, 157, 182, 187, 196

education 15–16, 29, 45, 51, 101, 114,

force see coercion

126, 131, 147, 158, 161, 164, 169, 176,

Fordism 4, 23, 72, 85, 97, 101–3, 106n7,

180, 186n4; citizenship and 90–2;

132, 143–4, 150, 152, 158, 190, 192

factory councils and 85; political party

Foucault, Michel 32, 106n6, 106n9, 194, 197

and 87–9, 192; see also hegemony; state

free trade 7, 176; WTO and global free

electoral politics 72, 83, 87–8, 171n3, 177,

trade 23, 49–51, 55

180, 183, 185, 192; see also Britain:

French Revolution (1789) 7, 108

Israel: Turkey

elites and elitism 11, 67, 96, 110, 157, 174,

G8 (and G7) 24, 42, 58, 68, 70–1, 74, 75n2

177; cosmopolitanism and 62, 67, 70–1;

GATT (General Agreement on Trade and

passive revolution and 47; populism and

Tariffs) 23, 45–6

122–3, 126–30, 133n2; transnational

gender 13, 51, 54, 69, 93–106, 106n7, 121,

24–5, 29, 42–3, 45–52, 55, 57, 194;

126, 184, 186n5, 194; gender

socialism and 79–80; in Turkey 111,

performance 99–100; nature and 93,

116–17

98–101; subjectivity and 93–4, 99–105;

environmentalism 51, 88, 101, 160–2,

see also inequality

164–5, 167, 178, 180–2, 184; AGM and

Germain, Randall 8, 19, 21, 26, 43, 59,

9, 45–6, 49, 52, 54, 57, 57,n1, 58, 67,

189, 191

69, 72; European Union and 42; WTO

Giddens, Anthony 14, 138, 141–4, 148–9,

and 49, 52–4, 57

151–4, 156–72, 190, 197, 199

epistemology: Gramsci’s Machiavellian

Gill, Stephen 9, 19–20, 22–4, 26, 28, 30–1,

‘realism’ 39–41, 189; idealist

34–6, 45–6, 88

epistemology of IR neo-Gramscians

globalisation 6–7, 9, 26, 28, 115, 161,

36–7, 189; neo-Gramscian critique of

190–1; cultural 20, 29–30, 70, 151;

positivism 34–6; positivist 3, 33–4

economic 23–4, 27, 57–8, 69–71, 141,

equality 34, 46, 55, 57, 152, 155, 160,

143, 152, 190; political (governance) 19,

168–9, 171; AGM and 10; autonomy

69; see also Alternative (alter-)

and 154; equality of opportunity 163,

Globalisation Movement

Index 221

Hall, Stuart 5, 26–31, 31n4, 94, 106,

individualism 12, 23, 81, 86, 148, 168,

137–40, 144–7, 149, 151–3, 156, 171,

183; contemporary individualisation of

171n1, 189, 198

society 14, 138, 140–1, 148, 151–5,

happiness 162–3, 173, 175–6, 181

191; neo-liberal 153, 155, 159, 191

hegemony 3, 5–6, 8, 11, 19–20, 23, 25, 27,

inequality 56, 153, 159, 163, 166–7, 173;

60, 62, 64, 80, 93–100, 102–4, 106n9,

gender 93, 194; Israeli Palestinians and

109–12, 119–22, 132, 157, 173–4,

125; income distribution in Israel 131;

178–9, 186n7, 187, 195–6, 199; agents

Britain 176–7

of 9, 29, 79–92, 121, 192–3; as coercion

insecurity 44, 48, 173, 177, 179

and consent 100–1, 109–10, 119, 188,

integral state 93–4, 96–7, 99, 101–3, 105,

199n1; consent and 20, 25, 27, 96–8,

106n10, 188, 194

103, 109–10, 112, 116; counterintellectual and moral leadership hegemony 7, 9–12, 29–30, 42, 46, 82,

(contrasted to domination) 95, 109, 120,

107, 110, 116–17, 119, 122–4, 126–32,

188; see also hegemony

140, 147, 150, 185, 193; Coxian

intellectual and moral reform 65, 81, 83,

92, 144

new ‘common sense’ 5, 27, 29, 97, 101,

intellectuals 2, 45, 62–3, 82, 84, 89, 108,

121, 137–9, 174, 198; democracy and

113–14, 117, 194, 196; agents of

90–2; dialectical character of 29, 31,

hegemony 192–3; ‘nationalisation’ of

122; economic and class centre of 27,

62; organic intellectuals 12, 110, 117,

94–5, 97, 102, 105, 120, 132, 173–4,

125–6, 185, 186n7

189, 195, 199n2; as educational

International, Second (Socialist

relationship 8, 96, 98, 101, 188, 193;

International) 83

expansion of modern state and 95, 105;

International, Third (Comintern) 4, 60–1,

global hegemony 6–10, 19, 21, 23–4,

64–5, 74

27–30, 46, 59, 64, 81, 193; hegemonic

International Monetary Fund (IMF) 7, 42,

state 7, 20–2, 31n1, 45; as intellectual

45, 51, 58, 68–9, 71–2, 74, 193

and moral leadership 96, 120, 173;

international political economy (IPE) 6,

19, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32–7, 39–41, 43, 193

59, 109, 157, 188–90; Laclau and

international relations (IR) 6–10, 19–21,

Mouffe and 27, 94, 119–20, 195;

25–37, 39–41, 43, 58–9, 64, 188–9,

orthodox IR and 20–1, 26; nation-state

193–4, 196

concept 8; ‘national-popular’ character

internationalism (Gramsci’s) 58–65, 67–8,

of 64, 67; neo-liberal hegemony 14, 23,

70, 72–4, 189–91, 198

28, 49–50, 55, 57, 82, 89, 175, 196; US

Islamism and Islamists (Turkey) 107, 112,

hegemony 22–3, 29, 31n1, 69; see also

115–18

alliance; bourgeoisie; civil society;

Israel 12, 119, 124–33; elections in 127–9,

integral state; intellectuals

131–2; Mizrahim 125–31; Palestinians

historic(al) bloc 7–8, 12–13, 21–2, 44–5,

125–7, 129; see also inequality; trade

67, 119–24, 128–9, 132, 174, 177, 179,

unions

183–5, 186n7, 188–9

Italy 1, 4, 6–8, 12, 14, 25, 40, 58, 60–3, 74,

historicism 21–3, 40, 197

83, 85, 90–2, 149, 157, 171n2, 197, 199,

Hutton, Will 141, 172n7, 176

199n3

idealism 32, 35–6, 40–1, 41n2, 68, 74, 189

Jacobinism 7, 63–4, 68

identity 11–12, 27–8, 31n4, 36, 63, 68–9,

justice, global 30, 48–9, 58–9, 71, 73–4

75n1, 81, 99–100, 111–15, 120, 123,

131, 140, 142, 152, 191

Kemalism 115–16

ideology 5–7, 9, 13–14, 21–3, 27, 39, 43,

Kenny, Michael 8, 19, 21, 26, 43, 59, 189,

45, 47–8, 53, 55, 60, 62, 65–6, 68, 69,

191

70–1, 73, 82, 84, 96–8, 110–14, 118,

Keynesianism 44, 141–2, 158, 177–8

118n5, 120–2, 124–7, 131, 138, 140–2,

145, 149–50, 152, 157, 159–60, 162,

Laclau, Ernesto 27, 67, 94, 119–24, 128,

165, 173–4, 186, 186n7, 187–92, 194–8

132, 194–5

222 Index

law 16, 23, 93, 98–9, 106n6, 114, 121,

neo-Gramscians 6, 8, 19, 21, 28, 30, 32,

194; environmental 52–3, 57n1; Islamist

34–6, 38, 40, 144, 151, 189, 194–6

(Turkey) 112

neo-liberalism 6–9, 14–15, 22–5, 27–30,

Layard, Richard 173, 175–6

42, 45, 48, 52, 57–8, 69–72, 82, 89,

leadership (political) 1, 10, 12, 14, 24, 42,

102–3, 132, 138, 140, 142–8, 151–5,

79, 87, 89, 91, 96, 109, 157–8, 173, 178,

159–60, 175, 178–9, 183–7, 190–1, 194,

194; AGM and 47–8, 60, 62, 67–9, 73;

196–9; see also class; consent and

communist party and 60–3, 84; New

consensus (contrasted to coercion);

Labour and 146, 148; populism and

hegemony; individualism

122–4, 126–8, 130–1; see also

New Labour 13–14, 137–56, 159, 175–6,

bureaucracy; democracy; Jacobinism;

179, 182, 197, 199

transformism ( transformismo)

new multilateralism 43, 46, 48, 52–3, 57

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich 3, 9–10, 37, 60–1,

New Right 13, 140, 179

80, 84, 185, 196

non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

liberal democracy 3–4, 10–11, 15–16, 68,

42–3, 45–6, 52–4, 58, 74; alter-NGOs

81, 83–5, 88–91, 149, 157, 168, 171,

43, 52–7, 193–4; market-oriented NGOs

171n3, 171n4; Marxist critique of 160–1;

(ma-NGOs) 43, 52–3, 57

media and 13; political parties and 87–8;

see also democracy; civil society

objectivity 36, 38–9

liberalism 2, 20, 22, 34, 42, 48, 90, 94–5,

ontology 21, 26, 28, 30–1, 34, 147, 150,

107–8, 116–17, 123, 131, 141, 163, 172,

160–2, 166–7

176, 186; see also liberal democracy;

Ordine Nuovo 174

neo-liberalism

organic crisis 156, 174–5; in Britain 178–9

Likud Party 119, 124–33, 133n6

parliament and parliamentarianism 79, 83,

Machiavelli, Niccolò 10, 39–40, 64, 80,

87, 90–1

84, 88, 145, 189

Partito Communista d’Italia (PCd’I) 60–3

market 5, 7, 12, 22, 25, 43, 45–6, 51–2, 55,

passive revolution 6, 14, 19, 103, 132,

58, 75, 88, 124–5, 131, 140–1, 143, 145,

156–8, 174, 177, 179, 197; New Labour

148, 151, 154–5, 159–61, 163–4, 167,

project and 14, 138, 144–7, 156, 159,

169, 170, 171n4, 175, 178–80, 182,

165, 170–1, 197; organic crisis and

198

174–5; populism and 132; transformism

Marx, Karl 3, 98, 106n4, 109, 152, 172n4

and 46–7, 197

Marxism 6, 13, 27, 32, 36, 40, 41n2, 62,

peasantry 12, 61, 171n2

70, 80–2, 84, 138, 157, 161, 165–6;

‘philosophy of praxis’ 2, 11–12, 44, 80,

agency and 79–80; classical 79;

82, 84, 88, 106, 132

orthodox 39, 157; Soviet 3; structural

pluralism and plurality 4, 11–12, 42, 48

21; Western 1; see also ‘philosophy of

political party 9–10, 75n7, 81, 83–4, 87–9,

praxis’

141, 153, 185, 192–3; in Turkey 112–13

‘Modern Prince’: Gramsci’s concept of

political society 63, 95, 99, 108–10; in

9–10, 46, 81–2, 85, 87–9, 183, 185–6,

Turkey 111–18; see also civil society

186, 192

populism 12, 74, 119, 122–4, 127, 129,

modernity: high 161–2, 171; late 65, 137,

131–2, 133n2, 195; authoritarian 5, 140;

140–2, 148–51, 155, 190–1; liquid 86

as counter-hegemony 122–4, 129;

Morton, Adam David 26, 29, 30, 43–4,

exclusionary 122–3; inclusive 122, 127,

47–8, 57, 59, 73, 197

131–2

Mouffe, Chantal 67, 94, 109, 119–22, 124,

positivism see epistemology

128, 132, 165, 194–5

post-materialism 66, 182

Mussolini, Benito 63

postmodernism 9, 13, 32, 36, 81

post-structural(ism) 93, 104–5, 106n6,

national-popular 9–10, 12, 28, 58–64,

194–5

67–74, 124, 126, 189, 191, 198

Prison Notebooks 2, 5, 8, 29, 41n2, 61,

nationalism 28, 111, 127, 191

63–4, 70, 80–1, 84, 90–1, 94–6, 99, 104,

nebuleuse 43, 45–6, 48, 51, 55–7, 194

106n4, 108–9, 157, 187–8, 192, 196

Index 223

proletariat see working class

Tarrow, Sidney 58, 66–7, 69–71, 75n3,

public space and public sphere 13, 15, 116,

75n4

154

Thatcher and Thatcherism 4–5, 7, 13–14,

29, 137–40, 144, 147, 151–2, 156,

realism see epistemology

158–9, 165, 171n1, 178–9, 182, 198

reiteration 99–100, 104–5, 195

Third Way 13–15, 138, 140–2, 147–51,

relativism 32, 37–8, 40

155–6, 164, 168, 171, 179, 190–1,

religion 27, 29–31, 121, 140, 146; in

197–9

Turkey 111–15; see also Catholic

trade unions 25, 58, 66–7, 83, 114, 141,

Church

146, 166–7, 170, 178, 178, 193; in

representative democracy see democracy

Britain 158–9, 168, 184; in Israel 125;

and democratic institutions

in Turkey 110, 113–14, 116–17

Risorgimento 7, 14, 63, 157

transformism ( trasformismo) 12, 14, 42–4,

ruling class see class

72, 83, 126, 138, 144–5, 146–8, 157,

Rupert, Mark 8, 22–3, 27, 29–30, 34, 36

174, 194, 197; passive revolution and

Russia and the Soviet Union 1, 3–4, 23,

46–7; WTO and 42–3, 48–57

60–1, 95, 124, 157–8, 196

transnational capitalist class see class

Trotsky, Leon 61, 63, 196

Sassoon, Anne Showstack 59, 67, 108–10,

Turkey 107–18, 193, 196; elections in 107,

117, 157–8

117; historical formation of state and

Seattle, ‘battle of’ 42, 46, 48–50, 58, 88–9

civil society 111–14; see also civil

Second World War 5–7, 22, 177

society; elites and elitism; political

secularism (Turkey) 111–12, 114–18

parties; trade unions

self-realisation 160, 162–3, 166–7, 169,

171

unemployment 159, 164, 173, 176–8

Sennett, Richard 86–8, 152–3, 190

United Front strategy 61

social democracy 14, 79, 83, 87, 154, 185;

United Nations 42, 44–5, 51–2, 72, 74

anti-capitalism and 160, 171, 172n5;

Giddens and 162–3, 165, 167–70;

Van der Pijl, Kees 19–20, 22, 24, 30, 44

Keynesian 142, 177–8; New Labour and

voluntarism 138, 146–7, 150, 155

142, 145–7, 159–60; in post-War Britain

158; see also democracy and democratic

war of movement 132, 157, 174, 178–9

institutions

war of position 4, 11–12, 57, 63, 132, 157,

social forums 30, 58, 66, 68, 71; European

171, 173–4, 195–6

Social Forum 69; World Social Forum

welfare state 72, 141, 159, 161, 164, 175,

69, 72, 89

177–9

social movements 10, 12, 42, 46, 48,

Weltanschauung (world view) 11, 82, 192

58–60, 65–8; new social movements 2,

Williams, Raymond 26–9, 31n4, 183, 189

9, 11, 66, 88, 160, 162, 166; women’s

working class 2, 4, 14, 60, 64, 79, 80,

movement 103

82–3, 85–6, 88, 110, 132, 143, 158, 171,

solidarity 42, 65, 86–7, 152, 158–64,

176; decline of 9–12, 81–2; Italian

167–71

working class 12, 61, 85, 88; post-First

‘Southern Question’ 8, 12, 61, 157

World War defeat of 1–2, 61, 196

Stalin, Joseph 2, 61, 64, 74

World Bank (WB) 7, 23, 30, 42, 45, 51,

state (concept of) 3–5, 7–8, 11, 15–16,

58, 68–9, 71–2, 74, 193

19–22, 26, 28–9, 31, 40, 44–5, 66–7, 93,

world order 6–7, 9–10, 14, 19, 21–30, 33,

95, 100, 105, 108–14, 139–40, 142–3,

42, 44, 190–1

146, 157–9, 170, 174, 185, 188–9,

World Trade Organisation (WTO) 7,

191–3; ethical and educational role of

42–57, 58, 68–9, 71–2, 74, 75n2, 193–4,

15–16, 95–7, 98, 102, 143, 158; see also

197; amicus briefs and 55–6;

agency and agents; civil society;

constitution of 45–6; developing

feminism; hegemony; integral state

countries and 54–5; ideational

structure and superstructure 3, 96–7, 108,

trasformismo and 48–53

110, 157

Document Outline

- Book Cover

- Title

- Copyright

- Contents

- Contributors

- Acknowledgements

- Abbreviations

- 1 Introduction: Gramsci in his time and in ours

- Part I Gramsci and the new world order

- 2 Beyond world order and transnational classes: The (re)application of Gramsci in global politics

- 3 Gramsci, epistemology and International Relations theory

- 4 Trasformismo at the World Trade Organization

- 5 Gramsci�s internationalism, the national-popular and the Alternative Globalisation Movement

- Part II Theorising the political

- 6 Gramsci and the problem of political agency

- 7 Governing gender: The integral state and gendered subjection

- 8 Civil society and state in Turkey: A Gramscian perspective

- 9 Populism as counter-hegemony: The Israeli case

- Part III Gramsci and contemporary British politics

- 10 Prince of modernisers: Gramsci, New Labour and the meaning of modernity

- 11 Giddens�s �Third Way� and Gramsci�s �passive revolution�

- 12 Feelbad Britain: A Gramscian view

- 13 Conclusion: The enduring attraction of Gramscian analysis

- Bibliography

- Index